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ABSTRACT

Akrami, Rahimullah. M.A. Department of Political Science, Wright State University,
2019.
Revisiting Afghanistan’s Modern Political History: The Role of Ethnic Inclusion on
Regime Stability

This study examines the role of ethnic inclusion as a factor of regime stability in
Afghanistan through an historical case analysis from 1880 until 2009. By utilizing case
study research methods, the goal of the study is to examine all the past regimes in order
to show whether there is a relationship between the dependent variable regime stability
and the independent variable ethnic inclusion. The study assumes the hypothesis that an
ethnically inclusive regime will be stable while an ethnically exclusive regime will be
unstable. Five indicators are used to measure each variable respectively. Each indicator is
assigned a score of 1 or 0, with a total possible score of 0 or 5. The differences of the
combined scores on each variable are utilized to test the hypotheses, where a lower
denominator indicates robustness and a higher denominator indicates weakness.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In the last few decades, Afghanistan has experienced a plethora of social,
economic and political crises. The current Afghan government has struggled to provide
security and bring stability to the country. A SIGAR (Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2017) finding shows the Afghan government in Kabul only
had about 60% of the country’s total territory under its control in 2017, while 11% was
under the direct rule of the insurgent groups such as the Taliban and ISIS, and 29% was
contested among them (Clark, 2017). Moreover, the Asia Foundation’s annual survey on
observing the national and personal security of Afghan citizens, found that overall, 69%
of Afghans felt their personal safety was at risk, while over 19% of all Afghan families
had been victims of the violence and insecurity (Burbridge et. al., 2016, p. 7).
However, President Ashraf Ghani current government’s failure to bring stability
is only a reflection of Afghanistan’s frequent regime instability in the recent history. A
brief historical review of each regime in the past 120 years shows that there have been
numerous regime collapses and failures. From the founding of Afghanistan as state by
Abdur Rahman Khan in 1880 until the country’s first full democratic government in
2002, virtually all regimes have been unstable at some level. For example, although
Abdur Rahman established a strong monarchic reign during his 21-year rule in 1880, his
regime faced over 40 different rebellions from opposition groups (Wahab &
Youngerman, 2010).
Abdur Rahman’s son and heir to the throne, Habibullah Khan similarly faced
tensions from organized uprising during his 19-year reign. Habibullah Khan’s son and
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successor, Amanullah Khan’s monarchy was overthrown in an uprising by a Tajik rebel
Habibullah Kalakani in 1929 after ten years in power (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010).
However, Kalakani’s own time on the throne lasted only nine months before Nadir Shah
overthrew him as an “illegitimate ruler” and was himself appointed king for five years.
After Nadir Shah’s assassination on November 8, 1933, his 19-year old son
Muhammad Zahir was crowned king (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). The newly
appointed King Zahir Shah ruled for forty years from 1933 to 1973, establishing a
dominant Pashtun monarchy for decades. However, his cousin Daud Khan overthrew
Zahir’s monarchy in a nonviolent coup in 1973 and established the country’s first
Presidential Republic under the Democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. During his
five-year tenure, Daud Khan saw rising ethnic violence and tensions as more political
parties were created along ethnic lines (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). But his republic
was short-lived. On April 27, 1978, the communist People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA), with support from the Soviet Union, staged a military coup,
overthrowing Daud’s regime (Runion, 2007).
PDPA soon split into two rival factions along ethnic lines over struggles for
power and had four different heads of state from 1978 until 1992. The Soviets gradually
lost faith in PDPA leaders and invaded Afghanistan in February 1979, marking the
beginning of a ten-year occupation until their withdrawal in February 1989 (Runion,
2007). When PDPA’s last ruler Najib’s government collapsed in 1992, the country
plunged into complete chaos and lawlessness as the Mujahedeen factions, which were
organized along ethnic lines, began internecine fighting to take control of the country in
their respective regions (Runion, 2007).
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The Mujahedeen parties eventually came to a stalemate that gave rise to a group
calling itself the Taliban (Seekers of Knowledge), a predominantly Pashtun ethnic group,
that saw an opportunity to fill the vacuum of power left by the internecine rivalries
among Mujahedeen factions (Runion, 2007). The Taliban quickly rose to power amid a
civil war, making sweeping victories leading to the capture of the capital Kabul in 1996,
and subsequently over 90 percent of the country a year later (Runion, 2007). Although
initially it was well received by Afghans, people came to resent the regime’s brutal
practices and radical Sharia religious laws (Runion, 2007).
After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched a military invasion
toppling the Taliban regime. Soon a UN mandated international conference in Bonn,
Germany was convened to create a new transitional, democratic Afghan government. On
June 22, 2002, a Loya Jirga (“Grand Assembly”) was convened, consisting of
representatives from all ethnic groups. The assembly elected Hamid Karzai as an interim
president for 2 years. Karzai then went on to win his first five-year presidential term in
2004, and a second full term in 2009 (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010).
This brief history review shows that for more than a century most political
regimes in Afghanistan have been unstable. This regime instability raises an important
question: what are the underlying roots of ‘political stability’ and how does ethnic
inclusion impact regime stability in Afghanistan? One of the fundamental ways to find
the answers, lessons and implications is to conduct an historical analysis of past regimes.
This study examines the role of ethnic inclusion as a factor of regime stability in
Afghanistan. Through an historical analysis of past regimes from 1880 until 2009, this
study informs the debate on whether there is a relationship between ethnic inclusion and
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regime stability. By examining each regime separately, using a criterion I have
developed, the study will examine the independent variable degrees of ethnic inclusion to
determine its impact on the dependent variable regime stability.
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CHAPTER TWO: TRENDS IN LITERATURE
The Origins and Application of Ethnicity in Afghanistan
Since its founding, Afghanistan has been known to be a multiethnic and diverse
nation-state (Rubin, 1995; Barfield, 2010, Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, Dupree, 2002;
Maley, 1997; Mustafa & Khan, 2015). Dupree (2002) argues Afghanistan’s ethnic
diversity is a product of its location at the crossroads of ancient trade routes and invasion
paths extending from Central Asia to South and Southwest Asia “…where four great
civilizations meet” (p. 976). Moreover, Dupree (2002) writes, “conquering armies, men
of intellect, missionaries, pilgrims, traders, artisans, nomads and political exiles…[have]
all contributed to Afghanistan’s heritage over the millennia” (p. 977). And, “It is in this
reciprocal interaction of diverse influences that the medley of Afghan culture
germinated” (Dupree, 2002, p. 997).
Contrary to this view, other scholars note that Afghans are a collection of
“…disparate groups [which] have been brought together by historical accident and not by
any shared historical experience or urge to live together” (Mustafa & Khan, 2015, p. 31).
In either case, present day Afghanistan is a reflection of its past, and has been home to
various tribes, clans, sub-clans and ethnic groups. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group at
40% of population, followed by Tajiks at 33%, Uzbeks at 9%, Hazaras at 8%, Aimaq 4%,
Turkmen at 3%, Balochi at 2% and others at 5% of the total population (Burbridge et. al.,
2016).
Pashtuns, who predominantly live in the South and South East, have dominated
state politics since the creation of the Pashtun Durrani Empire in the seventeenth century
(Mazhar et al., 2012). The Tajiks, who have recently gained more political power in the
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post-Taliban regime in 2000s, are the second biggest group (Mazhar et al., 2012).
Hazaras, who are descendants and “part of the invading hordes of Genghis Khan in the
13th century”, have settled in the central part of the country and have been historically
marginalized (Mazhar et al., 2012). Uzbeks, mostly concentrated in the northern
territories, are “refugees and fighters escaping the Russian armies and subsequently the
Soviet forces in Central Asia” (Mazhar et al., 2012).
However, like the historical roots of these groups, there is also considerable
disagreement on the historical origins of the concept and application of ethnicity in
Afghanistan. The arguments in the literature to this extent are twofold: one, the concept
of ‘ethnicity’ is categorically complex, intertwined and ambiguous in the context of
Afghanistan’s ethnic relations; and two, it is difficult to accurately pinpoint the concept’s
origins. Simonsen (2004) notes the “essentialist concept of ethnicity [in Afghanistan] can
easily be challenged… [Because] language, religion and descent have all [been] used to
define ethnic groups” (p. 708).
Furthermore, other sources of identity, such as “tribe, region, and sub-groups
within ‘ethnic groups’… and rural-urban (and indeed literate (educated) –illiterate)” are
also interchangeably used to define one’s ethnic identity (Simonsen, 2004, p. 708).
However, the basic term qawm, defined as a ‘solidarity group,’ has been traditionally
applied to define ethnic affiliations in Afghanistan. The denomination of qawm is an allencompassing term which can be “situational and relative, and may thus (alternatively)
describe tribe, region, ethnic group or profession” (Simonsen, 2004, p. 708).
Mazhar et al. (2012) also agree that Afghanistan does not have a single ‘uniform’
ethnic identity nor it is a ‘self-contained ethnic unit’ and its ethnic make-up consists of
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‘multilayered identities’ (p. 97). However, “There had been no term of ‘Ethnic Groups’
till 19th century and more realistically, the ‘Foreign academicians and governments began
to divide Afghan society systematically into ethnic categories by the difference in
language, sect, culture etc.’” (Mazhar et al., 2004, p. 98).
Moreover, they note the term ‘ethnic groups’ is a foreign invented concept, which
was “first used by the French researcher and anthropologist, named Dollot (1939:47),
who “categorized Afghan people in several ethnic units” (Mazhar et al., 2004, p. 98).
Regardless of the debate on the origins of ethnicity, Mazhar et al. argue that ethnic
diversity is a major force in Afghanistan that drives “religious, ideological, economic and
geographic and linguistic” differences among the ethnic groups but these groups “…apart
from the Muslim faith, [have] little in common” (Mazhar et al., 2012, p. 99).
Arif Sahar (2014) argues ethnicity is socially constructed and is often politicized
by Afghan elites for political agendas. Sahar explains, “ethnies” provide the basis for the
primordial identities for ethnic groups, which give them a “…sense of belonging to a
homeland (watan), ‘country’ (mamlakat), ‘peoples’ (qawm, tayfa), and religion
(mazhab)…” (2014, p. 294) In the case of Afghanistan, the ethnicization of ethnic groups
was “…strongly entrenched in the societal fabric and is fully institutionalized” as a
consequence of civil wars and violent conflicts, especially after the 1978 PDPA coup
(Sahar, 2014, p. 296). This opened up the “ethno-regional networks, which skillfully
manipulated availability of malleable ethnic identities that were constituently created and
negotiated in the face of other groups’ loss of power” (Sahar, 2014, p. 297).
Giustozzi (2006) agrees with the politicization narrative and presents the 2004
presidential elections as a real life example, where candidates appealed to their own
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ethnic core groups for votes. The voters reciprocated the candidates’ pleas by voting
along ethnic lines: 95 percent of Pashtuns voting for Hamid Karzai; 90 percent of Uzbeks
voting for Dostum; and 80 percent of Hazaras voting for their candidate, Mohaqiq
(Centliveres-Demont, 2015, p. 211). Although the Tajik vote was nonpartisan to a larger
degree, still over 60 percent voted for Qanuni. The parliamentary elections a year later
followed a similar voting trend to the presidential elections.
Rubin (1995) has noted that ethnicity is not only limited to the domination of one
large ethnic group such as the Pashtuns, but all the ethnic groups in Afghanistan utilize
the principle of qawm or ethnic relations. The difference is that among some groups, such
as the urbanized Tajiks, qawm is seen more on a regional level, while among Pashtuns, it
is tribal. According to Rubin, ethnic political alliances in Afghanistan have often shifted
from one to the other purely based on self-interest and political gains.
For instance, the Persian speaking Hazara leader Abdul Ali Mazari formed an
unlikely alliance with the Pashtun Taliban to get on the winning side during the 1994
civil war. However, when the Taliban lost the battle for capturing Kabul, they turned on
Mazari, imprisoning him on charges of treason and being loyal to the anti-Taliban Persian
speaking alliances. Similarly Hekmatyar, who was ethnically Pashtun, fought against the
predominantly Pashtun Taliban militias, while simultaneously attacking the Tajik Ahmad
Shah Massoud’s government during the 1990’s civil war.

The Impact of Ethnic Politics on the Afghanistan as a Nation-State
The role, implications, and consequences of ethnicity date back to when
Afghanistan was founded as a tribal nation in 1774 during the Pashtun Durrani Empire
(Mishali-Ram, 2008). Although the Durrani king Ahmad Shah was able to force the
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Afghan tribes into a loose ethnic federation and hence establish a strong Pashtun
hegemony over the other tribes, his kingdom often faced ethnic revolts and power
struggles by non-Pashtun groups (Mishali-Ram, 2008, p. 480). Tensions over the Pashtun
hegemony of the political system has since then led to ‘power struggles’, ‘internal
revolts,’ and fighting “within the Durrani ruling class and…by non-Pashtun
groups…[who began] challenging Pashtun hegemony” (p. 480).
Nazif Shahrani (2002) similarly argues modern Afghanistan was founded on
“...an utterly inappropriate model of a… ‘modern’ nation-state government structure with
discriminatory policies…” (Shahrani, 2002, p. 717) According to this view, Afghan
rulers have tended to manipulate and exacerbate the role of ethnicity, kinship and
religious ideologies to benefit their private agendas (Shahrani, 2002). Such policies have
had a massive impact on the Afghan society and politics because ethnicity, kinship and
ideology are the “most fundamental bases for individuals and collective identities and
loyalties…” (Shahrani, 2002, p. 717)
Hyman (2002), on the other hand, argues Afghanistan’s ethnic problems are a
result of a false sense of nationalism created by the Pashtun hegemony over the other
groups in the ‘form of internal colonialism’. According to Hyman, since the creation of
the modern state in Afghanistan in the beginning of 19th century, the Pashtun elites have
established dominance over the politics. Because of this dominance, “Afghan nationalism
developed in tandem with state power and state control over peoples living in the
kingdom” (Hyman, 2002, p. 306). Under Amir Abdur Rahman’s reign, “State power
grew by a form of internal colonialism, with military pressure and coercion used against
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unruly, often independent Pashtun tribes and against non-Pashtun minority peoples
gradually brought under firmer control by the center” (Hyman, 2002, p. 307).
Rubin (1989), however, argues the opposite of the internal colonization thesis,
namely that the historical roots of the ethnic fragmentation in Afghanistan lie in
Afghanistan’s imperialist past when the country was a ‘buffer state’ between Czarist
Russia and the British Empire in late 18th century. According to Rubin, “The state that
developed within the boundaries drawn by these imperial powers never developed the
capacity to extract sufficient resources from its own territory and population, but instead
depended on the financial and military resources it obtained from foreign governments”
(Rubin, 1989, p. 151).
Saikal (1998) joins Rubin in this view arguing that outside interventions have
often “polarized the Afghans along ethnic lines…” in order to create an “ethnic clientele”
state (p. 114). According to Saikal (1998), ethnicizing Afghan politics began with the
Soviet Union who created an “ideological polarization” by installing a Marxist-Leninist
regime in a traditionally Islamic country, which gave rise to guerrilla resistance factions
generally referred to as Mujahedeen (p. 114).
Maley (1997) notes Afghanistan has not had a “full legitimate national
government” in most of its recent history, and has failed to create a unified national elite
(Maley, 1997, p. 168). According to Maley, in the past hundred years, only King Zahir
Shah, who ruled from 1933 to 1973, enjoyed “a certain degree of traditional
legitimacy…” and even he was “careful not to put it to the test through challenges to the
core interests of Afghanistan’s micro-societies” (Maley, 1997, p. 168). But all the other
regimes were dependent “…on non-legitimate forms of domination” (168). Maley adds,
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Afghanistan’s failure to create a national legitimate government is result of a lack of a
‘unified national elite,’ which “consist of competitors for control of the central
government, and should be distinguished from local elites which have no aspiration to
exercise nationwide power” (p. 169).
However, although ethnicity has often been a source of conflict and violence, and
despite being an extremely ethnically diverse state, Afghanistan has not experienced
ethnic secessionist movements (Adeney, 2008, p. 539). Adeney contributes this lack of
secessionist movements to the existence of a strong ‘national Afghan identity,’ noting
that an “Afghan national identity exists, irrespective of the complex of diversity in the
country” (p. 539). Moreover, this “nascent sense” of the Afghan identity that emerged
with Pashtuns was not only crucial to the nationhood, but “it also provided the Pashtuns
with a lasting dominance over other ethnic minorities” (Jawad, 1992, p. 14).
The denomination of qawm, an all-encompassing but relative term, is the
overarching ethnic label that describes a tribe, region, ethnic group or profession in
Afghanistan (Simonsen, 2004). Ethnicity as a social construct is often politicized by
Afghan elites for political agendas because it provides the basis for the primordial
identities for ethnic groups, such as a ‘homeland’ (watan), ‘country’ (mamlakat),
‘peoples’ (qawm, tayfa), and ‘religion’ (mazhab) (Sahar, 2014).
However, ethnicity is not only limited to one large ethnic group such as the
Pashtuns or other smaller groups, but all the ethnic groups in Afghanistan utilize the
principle of qawm or ethnic relations. The difference is that among some groups, such as
the urbanized Tajiks, qawm is seen more on a regional level, while among Pashtuns, it is
tribal.
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In order to better understand Afghanistan’s unique ethnic history, ethnic nuances
and ethnic conflict, it is essential to comparatively explore some common trends in the
larger ethnic literature. The next few sections explore trends and the best systems in the
literature on how to accommodate ethnically diverse societies and how to fairly represent
ethnic minorities.

Managing Ethnic Minorities through a Democratic Framework
Scholars have debated which approach is best suited to manage ethnically-diverse
societies (Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Rustow, 1970; Lipset, 1959;
Diamond & Linz, 1989; Skocpool & Goodwin, 1994). Ethnic conflicts can have many
causes, but most often, lacking systems that accommodate all minorities equally leads to
conflict of interests and hence violence (Reilly, 2001). Because ethnic groups are usually
set along deep ethnic cleavages rooted in long historical divisions and differences,
designing a system that represents all ethnic groups equitably is difficult (Reilly, 2001).
Although scholars agree that any meaningful solution to accommodating ethnic
minorities must come from a democratic arrangement, there is little consensus on which
framework is the most effective (Anderson, 2013; Lijphart, 1969, 1991; Hartzell &
Hoddie, 2003; Roeder & Rothchild, 2005; Sen 1999; Rustow, 1970; Dahl, Shapiro, &
Cheibub, 2003). Technically many systems could provide accommodation to minorities,
but every approach has consequences.
Anderson (2013) best captures the essence of the issue at stake when discussing
how to manage ethnic societies, noting, “The problem then is not just about resolving
ethnic conflict– this can be achieved through a variety of coercive techniques, from the
forcible suppression of ethnicity to the elimination of entire ethnic groups… [but] the
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problem is how to do this within a peaceful democratic framework” (p. 2). Anderson
adds, “…While democratic solutions to ethnic conflicts are undoubtedly difficult to
engineer, the undemocratic alternatives (forced assimilation, or genocide, for example)
are almost always far worse” (p. 3). Hence, along these assumptions, the present study
argues that democracy by default, both in theory and practice, is the most desirable
system to manage minorities.

Engineering a Democratic Approach to Accommodate Ethnic Societies
While democracy is the best system to accommodate ethnic societies, there is
little agreement among scholars on which approach is the best for that task. Since
ethnically divided societies are usually more prone to violence due to a lack of an
equitable system that can accommodate all groups in a society, building the best system
to equally accommodate ethnic societies is debated (Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell,
2007; Rustow, 1970; Lipset, 1959; Diamond & Linz, 1989; Skocpool & Goodwin, 1994).
The argument revolves around two competing perspectives— the consociational
arrangement advocated by Lijphart and the centripetalist approach developed of
Horowitz.
In the consociational system, Lijphart (1969) proposes a power-sharing
mechanism among the elites based on political compromise such as coalition building. A
successful consociational democracy requires four conditions in order to survive: (1) the
elites’ ability to represent everyone’s interests; (2) the ability to overcome conflicts of
interests by joining rival groups; (3) the commitment to maintaining the system; and (4)
the elites’ understanding of ‘political fragmentation’ (p. 216).
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According to Lijphart (1969), competition in fragmented societies can drive the
government to political instability because the stakes are extremely high. The elites
would therefore voluntarily avoid political competition in order to “prevent passions
aroused by elections from upsetting the carefully constructed, and possible fragile system
of cooperation” (Lijphart, 1969, p.143). Lijphart (1969) notes that the consociation
practice must be extended to the electoral system in order to function and bring political
stability. The elites of a state must be willing to come to a compromise and build grand
coalitions in order to form a government (Lijphart, 1969, p.145). Although Lijphart
(1969) concedes that consociational arrangement of government does not always work
since the experience failed in Cyprus, Nigeria and Uruguay due to various factors, he
stresses that when all the conditions are met, it is a suitable option for any diverse society
(Lijphart, 1969).
Horowitz (2002) agrees that forming coalitions in ethnic societies is essential, but
criticizes consociationalism on the grounds that the leaders, who hold the majority (i.e. 60
percent votes), are not likely to enter into a coalition with others because it would not be
desirable to give up power, and therefore, they will likely “retain control for
themselves…” (p. 148) Second, “the assumption that elites in divided societies are likely
to be more tolerant of other ethnic groups or less inclined to pursue advantage for their
own group is extremely dubious” (Horowitz, 2002, p.148). Third, even if the elites agree
to “compromise across ethnic lines in the face of severe divisions, there is usually a high
price to pay” (Horowitz, 2002, p. 148).
Instead, Horowitz (2002) argues that the incentive-based electoral systems are the
best way to accommodate ethnic societies because it rewards them for working together.
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According to the author, “If political leaders are likely to be more willing to compromise
under some electoral systems than under others, it follows that the electoral system is the
central feature of the incentives approach to accommodation” (Horowitz, 2002, p. 150).
In summary, instituting a system that equally accommodates ethnic groups
reduces the likelihood of ethnic conflict. And because sustaining some system is better
than no system at all or an authoritarian system, many scholars suggest that a democratic
arrangement is the correct framework to represent ethnic minorities.
The two main approaches for engineering the best democratic arrangement are the
power-sharing approach in the consociational arrangement developed by Lijphart and the
incentive-based system of the centrepetalism developed by Horowitz. Both have merits
and downfalls and their success and failure depends on further factors such as where and
how they are applied and implemented. For the purposes of this study, a general
introductory discussion on these relevant literature theories of these designs for the
context of study should suffice.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLE
MEASUREMENT
Research Design
This study is designed as a qualitative case study framework in order to examine
the role of ethnic inclusion on regime stability. Through an in-depth analysis, the goal is
to determine whether there is a relationship between the dependent variable regime
stability and the independent variable ethnic inclusion. By applying the case study
methodology, the study consists of two variables, each of which is measured by five
indicators, where each indicator is assigned an individual score. Additionally, the
process-tracing method, a qualitative analysis tool, is used within the case analysis to
examine the relationship between the variables and test the hypothesis.

Operationalization of Variables
Two sets of five indicators are assigned to measure the dependent variable regime
stability and independent variable ethnic inclusion respectively. If the indicator meets the
criteria, it is assigned a positive score of 1, for a total of 5 possible scores. However, if an
indicator does not meet the defined criteria, it receives a score of 0. For example, if a
regime is legitimate, then it will score 1 on the indicator legitimacy of the dependent
variable regime stability. On the contrary, if a regime does not meet the criteria, it would
score 0. This process of scoring consequently applies to all the indicators for both
dependent and independent variables for all the cases under examination.
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Dependent Variable Measurement
The criteria developed to measure the dependent variable regime stability include
five indicators that are defined as follows:

Regime Legitimacy: whether a Loya Jirga approved a regime in power.
Loya Jirga, a traditional grand assembly of ethnic representatives, has historically
been held to approve regimes by consensus before they assume power. Regimes
that were ratified through this process score 1, and those that weren’t score 0.
Regime Transition: whether transition of power was nonviolent.
Regimes that transitioned to power through peaceful means, that is, without a war
or violence, score 1 each. Those that took power through coercion or aggression,
score 0. Hereditary transitions of power, where a ruler inherits the throne through
dynastic linage, are considered too.
Uprising Frequency: whether a regime faced uprisings while in power.
This criterion does not assume the intensity of uprisings, but assigns scores on the
basis of whether regimes have faced any uprisings or not. To maintain
consistency, uprisings, rebellions, resistance movements, and revolutions are all
used synonymously.
Power Consolidation: whether a regime used authoritarian means to consolidate
power. A distinction should be noted that this variable is not measuring a regime’s
legal sovereign power to govern a state, but it is examining the concentration of
power by regime through means of authoritarianism.
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Regime Failure: whether a regime collapsed while in power.
Examines regimes that were violently brought down by a rebellion, military coup,
invasions, and civil war or combination of these factors.

Independent Variable Measurement
The criteria for the independent variable ethnic inclusion include the following
five indicators:
Regime Leader: how the head of the regime was appointed.
Examines who the ruler of each regime was, and whether the position was open to
eligible candidates from across any ethnic groups to contest and hold.
Army Head: how the head of the army was appointed.
Examines who held the position of head of the national army, and if it was open
to eligible candidates from across any ethnic groups.
Government Positions: how key ministerial positions were filled.
Examines how key ministers were appointed and whether the positions were open
to eligible candidates from across any ethnic group.
Political Representation: how seats in the parliament were allocated.
Examines who held parliamentary seats in each regime, and whether ethnic
groups were equally represented.
Political Opposition: how the government allowed political dissent.
Examines whether certain ethnic groups were banned from dissenting against the
government based on their ethnic identity.
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Hypothesis
The working hypothesis for this study assumes that the more ethnically inclusive
a regime is, the more likely it is to be stable. The relationship between the dependent and
independent variables is determined by the difference of their scores. For instance, when
a case scores low on one variable, it should similarly score low on the other, and viceversa.
Moreover, the lower or higher difference in the scores between the variables will
show whether a hypothesis is robust or weak. In other words, a hypothesis would hold
true in cases with the lowest difference in scores, while it would be false in cases with the
highest difference in scores. Cases that fall under a difference of 1 are considered robust
while cases that fall above 1 are considered weak.
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Case Selection
The cases under examination in this study include all the political regimes from 1880
until 2009. This time frame covers fourteen different regimes as identified below in the
table.
Table 1. 1: Selected Case
No.

Case

Regime Type

1

Monarchy

2

Abdur Rahman
Khan
Habibullah Khan

Date in
Power
1880-1901

Monarchy

1901-1919

3

Amanullah Khan

Constitutional Monarchy

1919-1929

4

Kingdom

1929-

5

Habibullah
Kalakani
M. Nadir Shah

Monarchy

1929-1933

6

M. Zahir Shah

Constitutional Monarchy

1933-1973

7

M. Daud Khan

Single-party/Presidential Republic

1973-1978

8

Nur M. Tarakai

1978-1979

9

Hafizullah Amin

10

Babrak Karmal

11

M. Najibullah
Ahmadzai
The Mujahedeen
& B. Rabbani
The Taliban &
M. M. Omar
Hamid Karzai

Communist/People’s Democratic
Republic Party
Communist/People’s Democratic
Republic Party
Communist/People’s Democratic
Republic Party
Communist/People’s Democratic
Republic Party
Theocracy/Islamic Republic
Theocracy/Islamic Emirate

1996-2001

Democracy/Presidential Republic

2002-2009

12
13
14
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19791979-1986
1986-1992
1992-1996

CHAPTER FOUR: CASE REVIEW & ANALYSIS
Abdur Rahman, (ruled) 1880–1901
Abdur Rahman became amir (“ruler”) of Afghanistan at the end of the Second AngloAfghan war in May 1880 after signing a truce treaty with the British (Barfield, 2010).
Rahman’s next goal was to consolidate power and pacify the country. He easily defeated
his Pashtun rivals Ayub Khan in 1881 and Muhammad Ishaq in 1888 respectively,
thereby ending the debate over succession to the throne (Kakar, 1979, p. xxi-xxii).
Uprisings, however, continuously sprang during the amir’s reign. By 1887, Rahman’s
army had put down a serious rebellion from the Pashtun Ghilzai tribe while the Hazara
rebellion had been crushed by 1893 (p. xxiii). Abdur Rahman’s last major military
campaign ended with the surrender of the Kafiristan region residents, who were later
coerced into mass conversion to Islam (p. xxiv).
After the Ghilzais were defeated, the amir rewarded the Muhammadzai clan of the
Pashtun Durrani tribe by appointing them to high bureaucratic posts, giving their families
stipends and allowing their exiles to return (Kakar, 1979, p. 9). The amir also made
Muhammadzais sharik-i-dawlat (“partners of the state”), hence guaranteeing them
official political status and economic benefits (p. 9). The amir’s relations with the second
major Pashtun ethnic group Ghilzais were stable until they rebelled against his regime in
1886. After the Ghilzais were defeated and were no longer a considered a threat to the
throne, the amir made efforts to reconcile with them (p. 9). However, the Ghilzais did not
receive any special status or rewards apart from lenient treatment of their tribal leaders.
The Tajiks in Kohistan had rebelled only a year after Abdur Rahman had become
amir in 1881 (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). Rahman was further annoyed with the Tajiks when
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they refused to help him put down the Ghilzai rebellions. The amir was also suspicious of
the Persian Qazilbash ethnic group and the Hazaras who had shown a pro-British attitude
(Kakar, 1979, p. 10). Even though the Hazaras had earlier helped the amir in the fight
against Ishaq Khan in the succession wars, he was skeptical of the non-Pashtuns as a
whole when they “showed inclination toward Russia…” (Kakar, 1979, p. 10)
Rahman was once quoted, saying, “It was a wrong policy that up until now the
chiefs of tribes other than Afghans (i.e. Pashtuns) were vested with power” (Kakar, 1979,
p. 10). A strong supporter of the Sunnis, which most Pashtun groups fall into, the amir
did not look favorably upon the Shia speaking tribes. The amir later held the view that
“no reliance can be placed on any other tribe than on the Afghans [i.e. Pashtuns]” (Kakar,
1979, p. 10).
Although Rahman initially pursued a policy of tribal unification after his
succession to the throne, he reversed this policy later. In the beginning, he reconciled the
Hazaras with the major Pashtun ethnic group Ghilzais, which saved the ethnic minority
Hazaras from being massacred in tribal wars (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). However, the amir
later abandoned this policy when ethnic rebellions became more frequent and saw that
dividing the tribes was the only way to reduce their power and ability to organize
rebellions (p. 10). Another major shift in tribal policy began in the 1890s. After the amir
had crushed most domestic rebellions and had established a strong central government
capable of pacifying the tribes, he now feared a foreign threat. Thus the amir began a new
campaign of national unity among the tribes by utilizing their sense of nationalism and
urging them to help him protect Islam from infidels (p. 10). The amir even created the
jashn-i-mutafiqqiya-i-milli (“the national festival of unanimity”) and ordered its annual
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observance “throughout the country in hopes that it might ‘beget a feeling of unity among
Afghans’” (Kakar, 1979, p. 11).
In general, Rahman utilized all the means to ensure his absolute status as the ruler
including using his personal relationships (Kakar, 1979, p. 16). He had multiple wives
most of whom were married for political reasons. The amir had a policy to “unite the
tribes with the State through marriages” and his own political marriages were mostly
symbolic (Kakar, 1979, p. 16). Moreover, his two sons, Habibullah and Nasrullah, were
subject to a formal relationship with the amir, addressing him as amir (p. 16). Rahman
never appointed any of his sons to positions such as governors, fearing that they would
revolt against him (p. 16). But as long as his sons didn’t have any political ambitions on
their father’s throne, they were treated second only to the amir, by being appointed to
positions in the royal court as well receiving hefty stipends (p. 17).
Rahman had assumed the amir al-muminin (“commander of the faithful”) title
thereby giving him full legal and religious authority (Kakar, 1979, p. 21). Other titles
such as zia al millat-i-wa aldin (“the light of the nation and religion”) as well as the more
prestigious shahansha-i-adil (“the just emperor”) gave amir the absolute authority over
all matters and judicial decisions (p. 21). The extent of his reach over the legal system
can be seen in the amir’s autobiography, where he claims that all laws are “subject to my
approval” (Rahman, 1900, p. 66). The amir similarly never liked to delegate authority
and directly oversaw administrative tasks of the government. He did not have a deputy to
act on his behalf, except his son Habibullah Khan, who sometimes acted as amir (Kakar,
1979, p. 22).
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Rahman also established an executive council called darbari aam (“public court”)
that resembled a kind of parliament, consisting of darbar-i-shahi (“royal court”),
khwannin-i-mulki (“khans with feudal privileges”); the two chambers that acted as upper
and lower houses respectively (Kakar, 1979, p. 23). The council was made up of
khwanin-i-mulki, the ulema (“religious clerics”) and the court members. However, like
the high court, the amir did not give the council any official authority and used it a
channel to ‘rubber stamp’ his decisions (Kakar, 1979, p. 23). Only those who were
chosen to serve on the council had proven their loyalty, did not have political ambition
and “neither [had] the capacity nor the courage to detect anything wrong in the law or the
policy of the sovereign” (Kakar, 1979, p. 23). The few khan-i-ulum (“chief justices”),
qazis (“judges”), muftis (“advisers”) and mullahs (“religious clerics”) simply held
symbolic seats “in the council for reasons of seniority and service” (Kakar, 1979, p. 24).
The amir’s policy for key ministries and governmental departments was also to
avoid concentration of power in the hands of those who were appointed to these posts.
Although high-level officials maintained titles like sadr-i-azam (“prime minister”), wazir
(“minister”), mustaufi (“attorney general”), “they were not used officially or were used
only a short while” (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). Abdur Rahman’s “relationship with his
ministers was not like that of a king with ministers, but like that of a master with his
servants” (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). Because there were no official laws or policies that
defined or gave these officials their responsibilities during the amir’s reign, ministers
mostly “relied on his good will” (Kakar, 1979, p. 27).
Even though the bureaucracy greatly expanded during Rahman’s reign, the amir
did not have a formal cabinet nor made any efforts to form one like his predecessor Sher
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Ali Khan (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). The amir imprisoned his finance minister shortly after his
brief tenure for holding ‘sympathies’ for one of the amir’s rivals (p. 27). He also jailed
his general attorney on corruption charges but in “reality [it was] because of the amir’s
opposition of authority in one hand” (Kakar, 1979, p. 28). The amir had banned all senior
officials from “getting together, forming friendships among themselves and talking about
state affairs” (Kakar, 1979, p. 28). However, publicly the amir maintained a positive
image of the high governmental officials by giving them civilian and military titles and
high salaries. The highest military officials included the amir’s son Habibullah Khan as
the brigadier and Diwan Naranjan as a colonel. Other high-level officials included a sipah
salar (“superintendent”) of Kabul and the head of the auditing office (p. 28).
Although the amir appointed officials based on prestige, status and loyalty to the
amir, he openly recruited people to high official bureaucratic positions from various
ethnic groups including minority tribes like the Qizilbash, the Tajiks, and the Hindus
(Kakar, 1979, p. 28). In fact, “it was the amir’s policy to give high positions in the
administration to members of the smaller ethnic groups or those with no basis of power”
(Kakar, 1979, p. 28). Moreover, “members of the larger ethnic groups were not barred
from the bureaucracy if it could be proved that they were loyal to the amir” (Kakar, 1979,
p. 28). However, “no matter what their origin, most senior officials were dismissed, often
disgracefully, before they became important” (Kakar, 1979, p. 28).
Lower level positions as sarishtadar (“head of the financial departments”),
safdaftari (“head of main bureau”), and munshi (“secretaries”) were predominately run
by ghulam pachas (“page boys”) and mirzas (“junior secretaries”) (Kakar, 1979, p. 29).
In his biography, the amir writes that he recruited from all the ethnic groups and that
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some of his most trusted and loyal members of the government were slaves. Although the
Qizilbash dominated most of the administrative positions, they were not enough to fill the
expanding bureaucracy. Therefore, the amir recruited mirzas from other ethnic groups as
well including the minority Hazaras as well as Uzbeks (Kakar, 1979, p. 29).
During Rahman’s reign, governors were not allowed to “wield both military and
civil powers” as they had traditionally done in the amir’s predecessor’s reign (Kakar,
1979, p. 48). The governors were also limited to a “small number of armed khassadars
(“militia”) in the provinces… [And] In emergencies governors relied upon the army
stations in the provinces” (Kakar, 1979, p. 48). Moreover, the amir only appointed
governors who were “unambitious and insignificant…who had little or no tribal backing”
(Kaka, 1979, p. 48). The governors were at the amir’s mercy and were often humiliated
and disgraced. The more important governors were given titles such as viceroys,
lieutenants but most had the title of hukumran (“chief”), hakim (“administrator”) or wali
(“governor”) respectively (p. 49). Most governors did not have formal authority and
“were warned not to interfere in the affairs of the court or the diwan… Neither were they
permitted to spend government money liberally” (Kakar, 1979, p. 49).
Essentially the local government in Rahman’s reign was “a remote extension of
the central government” (Kakar, 1979, p. 69). Local government offices were inferior to
the central offices and “had to send in reports of their work to Kabul regularly” (Kakar,
1979, p. 69). Policies were channeled down from the center in Kabul and they had little
discretion beyond what the amir had allowed. In fact, “Heads of all provincial and district
offices, including governors and hakims, were appointed, dismissed, promoted, or
demoted by the center” (Kakar, 1979, p. 70). Besides some elders who were technically
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not government officials, “no official was elected” (Kakar, 1979, p. 70). Even
“Governors were merely officials who carried out the instructions they received from the
amir. Once a precedent had been established on a subject governors were not supposed to
ask for further instructions” (Kakar, 1979, p. 70).
The National Army was another important instrument that helped Rahman
become the amir and establish strong authoritarian regime (Kakar, 1979, p. 92). The amir
did not “inherit the army of his predecessors but created a large, disciplined army of his
own, independent of tribal control” (Kakar, 1979, p. 93). He built his own weapon
factories to arm the army with modern weapons. Rahman used the army for two
purposes: to consolidate power and eliminate his opposition and to “shield Afghanistan
against foreign invasion” (Kakar, 1979, p. 96). In his biography, the amir claims that he
was the first king in Afghanistan to have a well-trained and disciplined force and that
“Every person is practically a soldier, and Ghaza (to fight for the truth and faith) is every
citizen’s bounden duty; every true Muslim must fight for his religion” (Rahman, 1900, p.
51).
Conscription was mandatory and recruitment followed a system where, “…the
people themselves send one man out of every eight, and pay all his necessary expenses
during the time he is occupied learning drill and military training” (Rahman, 1900, p. 53).
However, the amir only recruited “men of little significance to military posts” (Kakar,
1979, p. 96). Sons of elders were recruited as officers while the pehskhidmat (“slave
soldiers”) were often promoted to the rank of officers to “meet the demand of a growing
army” (Kakar, 1979, p. 97). The Hazaras and Qizilbash were dismissed from the army
altogether during the Hazara Rebellion temporarily but the Hindus “who had not rebelled
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were also recruited to the army…” (Kakar, 1979, p. 97) The amir also recruited from the
tribal regions of the other side of the Durand Line including Waziris, Afridis, and
Khattaks.
In other words, “…although the army was dominated by the Pashtuns… [it]
included almost all ethnic groups including Uzbeks and Aimaq” (Kakar, 1979, p. 97).
Not all soldiers were treated equal, however, and sometimes the soldiers serving in the
army fought against their own tribes such as the Ghilzai Regiment who fought fellow
tribesmen during the Ghilzai Revolt (Kakar, 1979, p. 113). The second largest ethnic
Pashtun group, Ghilzais, were also treated lower in status compared and considered
unequal to the largest Pashtun ethnic group Durranis soldiers (Kakar, 1979, p. 113).
Overall, Rahman had a mixed record on managing minorities, elevating some
socially and economically while brutally oppressing and often dismissing others (Kakar,
1979; Omrani, 2014; Barfield, 2010). For example, although the amir was a strong
advocate of the Sunni sect of Islam, the minority Shia sects were allowed to practice their
sect openly. Moreover, a small number of other minorities such as Christians, Hindus,
Sikhs, and Jews also practiced their religions openly (Kakar, 1979, p. 148). Hindus were
“given high positions in the bureaucracy” and had a special council that would judge
cases according to Hindu laws (Kakar, 1979, p. 149). Although some Hindus voluntarily
converted to Islam, they were never forced to do so. Jews, who had historically been
settled in various parts of Afghanistan, built synagogues during Rahman’s reign and were
“regulated according to their own customs…” (Kakar, 1979, p. 149) However, other
minorities such as the residents of the Kafiristan region were not as fortunate since their
entire population was forced to convert to Islam after their failed rebellion against the
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amir (Kakar, 1979, p. 151).
Abdur Rahman’s transition (0) to power came by means of means of war, tribal
support, and coming to terms with the British (Barfield, 2010). Rahman ‘raised’ an army,
recruited the Pashtun ethnic group Ghilzais and Tajik ethnic residents of Kohistani tribes
to help him secure the throne while striking a deal with the British to be recognized as the
amir in July 1880 in exchange for protecting their ‘interests’ (Barfield, 2010, p. 143). His
regime’s legitimacy (0) is also debated as Rahman regularly eliminated and killed his
rivals who challenged him for power (Barfield, 2010, p. 143).
Uprisings (0) were common throughout Rahman’s reign and he faced over forty
rebellions from various ethnic tribes that protested his policies (Barfield, 2010, p. 147).
However, Rahman had crushed every ‘autonomous’ group and tribe in Afghanistan to
create a powerful centralized government and kept complete authoritarian control (0) on
the state and country as a whole (Barfield, 2010, p. 149). Although the amir faced many
uprisings and revolts against his regime, his regime did not collapse (1) and remained
intact until his death (Barfield, 2010, p. 151).
Table 1: A. Rahman Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
0
0
0
0
1

Total
0
0
0
0
1
1

Rahman was an absolute head of the regime (0), who maintained total control of
the state in ‘autocratic’ style bureaucracy (Barfield, 2010, p. 152). He “centralized
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Afghanistan and destroyed the power of the regional elites” and Afghanistan became a
‘unitary’ state under rule (Barfield, 2010, p. 160). The amir did not share executive power
with anyone, including his sons, and had the power to appoint or remove all levels of
government officials including clerics, ministers, governors, head of the army and others
at will (Barfield, 2010, p. 160). Rahman had created a state in which no one was allowed
to dissent (0) politically or otherwise and “no internal actors could challenge him or his
government” (Barfield, 2010, p. 160).
Rahman not only lay down the structure for the modern Afghan state, but in his
conquest of maintaining complete authority over the country, he built a strong national
army to pacify the tribes (Kakar, 1979, p. 92). While conscription was mandatory and
every Afghan was essentially a ‘soldier’, conscription within the army (1) were open to
all ethnic groups (Rahman, 1900, p. 51). However, the amir only recruited “men of little
significance to military posts” and often recruited loyal slave soldiers to high-ranking
positions (Kakar, 1979, p. 97). Recruitment in the army was based purely on whoever
pleased the amir the most and was loyal to him while some soldiers were treated better
than others (Kakar, 1979, p. 97).
Table 2: A. Rahman Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total
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Scores
0
1
1
0
0

Total
0
1
1
0
0
2

Moreover, Rahman had created a kind of façade of popular political
representation (0) in his government, which was in fact a complete autocracy (Fletcher,
1965, p. 149). Although he had created a ‘Supreme Council’ and a ‘General Assembly’,
none of the members had real power and were “formed from among the chiefs whom the
Amir preferred to keep in Kabul; but their function was purely advisory, and their advice
was infrequently sought” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 149).
Ironically, however, Rahman recruited people to high level government positions
(1) from minority ethnic groups, with the assumption that minority groups had no power
base and were the least likely to revolt (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). Although he appointed
members in the administration and high posts in the army from Qizilbash, Tajiks, the
Hindus, Hazaras, Uzbeks and others, the majority of his administration was still made up
of Pashtun Sardars (Kakar, 1979, p. 28). He only chose people to government positions
who “showed little ambition” and would routinely shuffle officials if there were the
“slightest suspicion of dissent” (Omrani, 2014, p. 52). In short, Abdur Rahman had ruled
by spreading fear and subjugating the population through coercion and oppression.
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Habibullah Khan, 1901-1919
Abdur Rahman had left such a lasting legacy of fear and subjugation after his
death in 1901 that no one challenged his successor to the throne (Barfield, 2010). Thus,
the transition of power marked the first time in Afghanistan’s history where one ruler
succeeded another without a war of succession (Barfield, 2010). The amir had designated
his eldest son Habibullah Khan to inherit the amirship after his death (Barfield, 2010, p.
175). The British still had control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs after Habibullah’s
succession. Tensions arose in the Anglo-Afghan relations when the British Empire
wanted to renew an old treaty but Habibullah Khan refused to sign it, arguing for
Afghanistan’s independence (Fletcher, 1965, p. 173). After several rounds of negotiations
and threats of war, both sides signed a new treaty on July 21, 1905 that reaffirmed the
British control of the Afghan foreign affairs, while Habibullah had “obtained the renewal
of the annual subsidy, 400,000 pounds for the arrears, and tacit agreement that he was
“Independent King” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 174).
Domestically, Habibullah allowed the return of various political, powerful and
influential families exiled by his father. These included his father’s rivals the Pashtun
Muhammadzai family (i.e. the five Muhasiban brothers), the ethnically Pashtun Mahmud
Tarzi from the Ottoman Syria, the various Sufi movement followers such as the Pashtun
Mujadaddi family among many others (Barfield, 2010, p. 175). Soon the Muhasiban
brothers re-merged as an influential political family during Habibullah’s reign and the
amir personally appointed Nadir Shah, the oldest of the five Muhasiban brother, as his
commander-in-chief of the national army (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 102).
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Tarzi, an intellectual and modernist, who lived in exile through progressive and
nationalist movements in India, Central Asia, Turkey, Syria and Europe, was personally
welcomed by Habibullah Khan. He had worked under prominent reformists such as
Jamal Al-din Al-Afghani for the pan-Islamic cause (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p.
102). Moreover, Tarzi had been influenced by the reformist movements around the world
and began to apply these principles in Afghanistan (p. 103). He founded the Young
Afghan movement, which was inspired from the Young Turk movement that had played a
major role in modernizing Turkey. He also founded the country’s first ever-independent
newspaper Siraj-ul-Akhbar in 1911, with Habibullah’s permission, which played a major
role in promoting pan-Islamism and condemning British imperialism and their indirect
control of Afghanistan (p. 104). Tarzi also personally tutored Habibullah’s two sons
Amanullah and Inyatullah (p. 104).
Habibullah also allowed tribal chiefs to shape state policy (Wahab &
Youngerman, 2010, p. 101). Thus, “the incipient national bureaucracy established by his
father…became open to infiltration by traditional, localized power bases” (Wahab &
Youngerman, 2010, p. 101). The tribal chiefs consisted of local maliks (the village chiefs
elected by locals to represent them in the government), who often took bribes in
exchange for passing laws (p. 101). Moreover, provincial governors or district officials
were now elected from the local khans or landlords, too. The local tribal chiefs now
maintained a large presence in the bureaucracy and thereby “often used state funds and
patronage to reinforce traditional power structures” (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p.
102). Moreover, “Policies laid down by the increasingly Westernized national
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bureaucracy had to penetrate these insulating layers before they could be put in effect”
(Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 102).
Habibullah Khan’s inner political circle included his brother Nasrullah Khan, and
his two sons Inayatullah Khan and Amanullah Khan. Outside his political circle, three
other groups formed an important part of his cabinet including the five brothers of the
Muhasiban family (Fletcher, 1965, p. 176). Of the five brothers, Nadir Khan was
promoted as the amir’s commander-in-chief after beating the eastern Pashtun Mangal
tribe’s revolt in 1913, while Hashim Khan, Shah Wali Khan, Mohammad Aziz and Shah
Mahmud were all given high political positions in the government (p. 177). The Tarzis
was the second most important political family in the amir’s reign. The third important
group outside the amir’s immediate circle was the ethnic Tajik Charkhi family, whose
two sons Ghulam Hyder Charkhi and Ghulam Siddiq Charkhi were both appointed as
generals (p. 177). Although Habibullah maintained influence over these families and
considered them important to his domestic policies of modernization, at the same time, he
was wary of them (p. 177).
Man of the other exiles had also been associated with independence movements in
India and the Ottoman Empire while others were reformist-nationalists, who were
influenced by events such as Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 (Barfield, 2010, p.176).
The exiles were driven by change and brought in new secular and religious ideas into a
society that had been alienated from much of the outside world (p. 176). Moreover, the
returnees “Argued that Muslim societies needed to modernize by adopting or adapting
cultural and economic innovations from the West to compete more effectively with it”
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(Barfield, 2010, p. 176). Soon the various exile parties clashed among themselves as their
beliefs and ideologies came at a crossroad and split into separate factions.
The Western-influenced reformist exiles argued for a push to modernize the
Afghan society while the religious clerics argued for unity of the people based on Islamic
principles and support for a Pan-Islamic movement (p. 176). Although both camps had
differences, they shared a broader goal of rejecting British influence and stirring antiBritish views (p. 176). The religious ulema was worried that British domination of the
Afghan society would undermine the Islamic and social order in the long term, while the
reformist camp—the Young Afghan movement— believed that a continued British
domination was dangerous to Afghan pride and progress (Barfield, 2010, p. 176). The
Young Afghan movement followers believed that the religious leaders were primarily
reactionary and obstructionists and that “structure of religious life and belief needed to be
reformed or displaced before Afghan society could progress” (p. 176).
The Islamic parties countered this argument by claiming that the Afghan society
did not lack such a void and “that if Muslim societies were weak, it was because they had
been oppressed by the Western colonial powers, and needed to display stronger religious
solidarity and stricter applications of the faith in order to become independent again”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 176). Although the religious camp’s position was more popular with
the Afghan population especially their call against the British in India, the nationalists
and modernizers had greater support among the elites and those who supported a change
(p. 176).
While Habibullah still concentrated power and maintained full authority over the
state, he was soon caught between these two influential camps, both of which sought to
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bring large social and political changes by directly impacting state policies (Barfield,
2010, p. 177). The religious camp included members of the ulema, leaders of the Sufi
movement, as well as the amir’s younger brother Nasrullah Khan. The second camp
included members of the nationalist and modernist factions largely influenced by
Muhammad Tarzi (p. 177). Other influential members of this second faction included
students of the progressive Habibia College founded by the amir and his two sons
Enyatullah Khan and Amanullah Khan (p. 177).
Although amir Habibullah was “Initially…content to let both camps flourish
because while he was fairly devout himself…” he eventually withdrew his support and
began to crackdown on both movements when they started to criticize his policies,
especially Afghanistan’s official Policy of Neutrality during World War I (Barfield,
2010, p. 177). The amir quickly lost support of the ulema and the religious factions after
he made a call to Jihad against the British but later reversed his decision (p. 177). The
amir had threatened the British with Jihad after the Anglo-Russian Convention, which
demarcated their territories of influence on Afghan soil without consulting with the
Afghans. However, when the call to Jihad proved immensely popular with the public,
Habibullah feared he would lose control of the war. Moreover, under pressure from the
British, he not only blocked any efforts to the Jihad but also executed some of the
organizers (p. 177).
The crack down on groups demanding Jihad infuriated the amir’s brother
Nasrullah, who had armed and organized some of the groups. Thus, the nationalist camp
also attacked and criticized the amir for allowing the Anglo-Russian Convention without
Afghan’s participation and for accepting limitations on Afghan sovereignty “by giving
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into British demands and not pushing for complete independence” (Barfield, 2010, p.
177). The amir brushed aside the criticisms but was furious when he found out that a
secret party of constitutionalists (mashruta) had been conspiring without the amir’s
knowledge to “abolish the monarchy” (p. 177). This secret group was organized by his
students in his own Habibia College and included high profile members from the
nationalist camp, liberal ulema, and even his two sons according to rumors. Habibullah
moved quickly before the constitutionalists could further plot against his regime and in
1909 the amir arrested and executed many of the members (p. 177). This act created a
public outcry among the population and alienated many of the Young Afghans, who saw
themselves as the vanguard of change.
The amir’s support further waned when he announced the state policy of
neutrality during the First World War (Barfield, 2010, p. 178). The amir was caught up
between the Central powers, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, and the Allied Powers
(p. 1778). Turkey Sultan’s call for a pan-Islamic Jihad had found considerable support in
Afghanistan and reached its peak when a joint Turkish-German delegation arrived in
Kabul in 1915 “seeking permission for Central Power troops to pass through the country
to attack India” (Barfield, 2010, p. 178). In reality, they had “hoped to use Afghanistan as
a base from which to inspire jihadist revolts against the British in the NWFP and perhaps
beyond” (Barfield, 2010, p. 178). Germany had used this Islamic appeal to their full
benefits by allying with Turkey and providing gold and money in order to make more
allies in the Middle East and Asia. The Germans secret service similarly used these
tactics to raise anti-British revolts in India by supporting militant Islam (p. 179).
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Although the British countered these efforts and put high clerics on their payroll
both in Afghanistan and India, it was not enough to sway the growing anti-British
sentiments, including some from the amir's closet members in his court. Both the amir’s
brother Nasrullah Khan and his favorite son Amanullah Khan as well as Mahmud Tarzi
supported the plan to stir up trouble through the border tribes (Fletcher, 1965, p. 180).
Only the amir himself and a few other advisers were against the war hawks and rejected
an all-out attack on India (p. 180). Habibullah, who did not wish for war, knew that the
British were militarily more powerful and also believed that the Allied Powers would
prevail and “show gratitude to Afghanistan for its neutrality” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 181).
Although Habibullah was courteous and welcomed the mission warmly listening
to the arguments of the Central Powers, the mission eventually left without success. In
fact, the amir had found the mission plan of making him the King of India outrageous. In
the end, “…the wisdom of Habibullah’s inaction became evident with the collapse of the
Central Powers…” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183) After the War, Habibullah wrote a letter to
the Viceroy of India explaining the benefits of Afghanistan’s neutrality and not siding
with the Central Powers and asking for a complete sovereignty of Afghanistan in return
(p. 183). However, the amir lacked an understanding like his father Abdur Rahman
“namely that gratitude has small place in the dynamics of power politics” (Fletcher, 1965,
p. 183). The British, who were already facing a new threat of communism “…were in no
mood to listen to Afghan importunities” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183).
The British evaded the question of giving Afghanistan full independence, further
weakening the amir’s resolve. The British did not realize that the amir had been the
victim of various attacks after the collapse of the world order in Europe, Middle East and
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Central Asia and that he was “bearing the brunt of attacks by those unhappy with
outcome” (Barfield, 2010, p. 179). The conservative religious ulema in Afghanistan
blamed the amir for the defeat of the last great Islamic empire, the Ottoman Empire. The
nationalists and other camps blamed Habibullah for failing to regain independence of the
country from the British as a price of the neutrality policy (p. 179). Therefore, the
nationalists-modern faction turned to a new ally, the Soviet Union— “a radical socialist
regime determined to spread its ideology from the ashes of the old czarist empire…”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 179) However, Habibullah’s regime was still strong enough to hold on
to absolute power and because his father Abdur Rahman’s repressive policies had a left a
strong legacy of fear, “…dissatisfaction with the amir never resulted in significant
popular revolts against him” (Barfield, 2010, p. 179).
However, personally the amir’s troubles were doubled by a loss of his favorite
winter capital, Peshawar. In order to escape the harsh winters of Kabul, the amir chose
Jalalabad as his new winter capital and in December 1918 the amir went on a hunting trip
with his brother Nasrullah Khan and his oldest son Inyatullah Khan, leaving Amanullah
Khan “in charge of the treasury and garrison at Kabul” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183). On
February 19, 1919 the amir was found mysteriously dead after he had camped out at a
district in Lagham, just outside of Kabul (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183). Although there were
various theories of his assassination involving the Russians, British and his own cabinet
members as possible suspects, the assassin was never identified.
In mensurating the Habibullah Khan regime, he inherited the throne in 1901 after
facing minimal resistance from his half-brother (Fletcher, 1965, p. 171). However, his
brother failed to garner enough support and therefore his claim to kingship never
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materialized (Dupree, 1973, p. 430). Thus, Habibullah was able to become king without
any opposition and it marked the first time in Afghanistan’s history that power had been
transitioned (1) from one amir to another peacefully (Dupree, 1973, p. 430). Habibullah
had the loyalty of the army but his regime’s legitimacy (1) came from giving positions of
power and subsidies to religious leaders whose political influence had been suppressed by
his father (Dupree, 1973, p. 430).
Table 3: H. Khan Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
1
1
0
0
1

Total
1
1
0
0
1
3

Although Habibullah’s nearly twenty-year reign as king largely remained stable
domestically and he primarily dealt with foreign policy issues, he did face a few revolts
(0), most notable from the Pashtun Mangal tribes in the eastern Khost province (Fletcher,
1965, p. 175). The Mangals, who had protested higher taxes, were promptly defeated and
were granted a truce by the amir (Fletcher, 1965, p. 176). As king, Habibullah intended to
consolidate power (0) and was able to maintain one of the most stable periods in
Afghanistan’s modern history (Fletcher, 1965, p. 184). Although Habibullah was
assassinated while still king, his regime did not collapse (1) while he was in power
(Fletcher, 1965, p. 184).
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Table 4: H. Khan Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total

Scores
0
1
1
1
1

Total
0
Scores
1
1
1
1
4

Although Habibullah remained the absolute head of state (0), he reversed many of
his father’s policies including allowing political exiles to return and giving religious and
tribal leaders power to influence state policy (Dupree, 1973, p. 431). Moreover,
Habibullah was the first king to break tradition and officially appointed Nadir Shah as his
commander in chief for the army (1), instead of taking the position for himself as past
amirs had done (Fletcher, 1965, p. 177). Political representation increased during
Habibullah’s time after he opened up government positions (1) to previously exiled
dissenters including appointing influential political families such as Barakzais, Tarzis
among others to key ministerial (1) positions (Fletcher, 1965, p. 177). Habibullah was
also known for allowing a greater degree of free speech and political dissent (1), although
later he would crackdown on protestors (Fletcher, 1965, p. 177).
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Amanullah Khan, 1919-1929
After Habibullah Khan’s death, his brother Nasrullah Khan declared himself king,
ruling for nine days before he was arrested. Habibullah Khan’s two older sons,
Enayatullah and Hayatullah had sworn allegiance to their uncle Nasruallah, but the third
son, Amanullah Khan, refused to recognize him as king and challenged him for right of
inheritance (Barfield, 2010, p 180). Serving as Regent and Commander-in-Chief of the
army in his father’s reign, Amanullah had garnered the support of the army (Dupree,
1973, p. 441). On his orders, the army captured Nasrullah and brought him in chains to
Kabul along with his supporters, where he was imprisoned in the Arg dungeon.
Amanullah became amir by seizing “…The Arg (a combination of royal residence, fort,
and treasury), the traditional seat of power…” (Dupree, 1973, p. 441) Inyatullah, who
swore allegiance to the new king, was released while Nasrullah was imprisoned (Dupree,
1973, p. 441).
While the new king Amanullah began consolidating power, his first order of
business was to gain complete independence from the British, who still controlled
Afghanistan’s foreign affairs (Barfield, 2010, p. 181). Amanullah declared a Jihad and
appointed Nadir Khan as the minister of war, who scored some victories by overrunning
British posts on the border. However, the Afghan campaign was largely unsuccessful
against the British’s more advanced weaponry and aerial advantage (p. 181). The British,
who felt that the tribal revolts in their backyard could spill over to India and that they
could lose the tide in the Great Game to Russian influence, were also keen on a truce
(Barfield, 2010, p. 181). Hence, by August 1919, both sides had signed the Treaty of
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Rawalpandi, which recognized Afghanistan as a full sovereign state independent in its
foreign affairs (p. 181).
Gaining independence had made Amanullah extremely popular with the people,
especially with the conservative Islamic ulema, who “rewarded him with the title of
Ghazi as a victor of a holy war” (Barfield, 2010, p. 182). The enthusiastic amir embarked
on his next goal of modernizing Afghanistan by releasing a series of social reforms and
state regulations (nizamnamas) to push Afghanistan into the early twentieth century
modernization drive. The most crucial of these was introducing Afghanistan’s first ever
constitution in 1923, which “laid out the structure of the government, and gave the amir
supreme executive and legal authority, but also established the Council of Ministers to
run the government and the State Council to advise it” (Barfiled, 2010, p. 183).
However, after decades of conservative rule under his grandfather’s and his
father’s regimes, the new reforms quickly became controversial and overwhelming for
the traditional Afghan society. These reforms, which sought to bring in generational
change in a short period of time, included “…ambitious administrative, legal and
financial social reforms” (Barfield, 2010, p. 183). The reforms soon drew strong reactions
from the public in three areas including objections to high taxation, mandatory
conscription and laws perceived to be middling in family customs (Barfield, 2010, p.
183).
Amanullah had increased taxes to make up for exhausting the national treasury (p.
183). The increase in tax was not simply an issue of paying more, but the new system had
cut out the traditional middleman in the village and gave government officials
unprecedented power to collect taxes directly. This not only resulted in disgruntled
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villagers but also opened way for more corruption especially since cash was easier to
pocket for collectors (p. 184). Moreover, the central government had failed to
successfully implement the new tax system and effectively collect taxes (p. 184).
The second biggest objection to reforms was the issue of military conscription,
especially in the rural tribal parts of the country. Previously exempt Pashtun tribes such
as Barakzais, Mangals, Zadrans, and Ahmadzais were now required to compulsory draft
in the military. Everyone else “supplied one able-bodied man for every eight eligible ones
(hasht-nafari)” (Barfield, 2010, p. 184). Usually the community would have the
discretion to choose one able-bodied man to serve in the military and would be
responsible to take care of his family in his absence (p. 184). For the tribal leaders this
“power to choose conscripts and negotiate with the state on behalf of the communities
[was]… one of their most important roles” (Barfield, 2010, p. 184).
However, under the new Conscription and Identity Card Act in 1923, conscription
became universal while “the wealthy could buy an exemption” (Barfield, 2010, p. 184).
This was reinforced by introducing Tazkira or the national identity card, which were used
to track conscripts, cutting out the tribal leaders as intermediaries in the drafting process
(p. 184). The new identity cards were also required for filing a court case, registering for
marriage, or doing business. The government “hoped to use its identity card system to
enforce its unpopular new family law by keeping track of what individuals were doing”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 185). Hence, these new state registration and conscription were
“strongly resented as unwarranted state interference in community life” (Barfield, 2010,
p. 185).
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However, the most controversial of all the reforms were the new marriage laws
and the general code of conduct towards women. The amir was “keen to discourage
plural marriages, restrict marriage payments, ban child engagements, and end the custom
of settling blood feuds by an exchange of women” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185). These new
laws were directly in conflict with the longstanding Pashtun code of honor, Pashtunwali,
which emphasized personal autonomy from the state including local community laws that
interfered with family matters. Most Pashtuns “(and other rural Afghans) felt [marriage]
was a private matter or already covered by sharia law principles used by local clergy”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 185).
Moreover, the Afghan government did not have an overarching authority to
implement change in rural parts in order to bring a “Cultural Revolution” and change the
social structure of the society. Although the marriage laws were barely implemented and
affected a small number of people, they were the most inflammatory and rumors spread
quickly that the “state would undermine fundamental social relations sanctioned by Islam
and Pashtunwali…” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185) This was partly due to the spread of false
rumors as the regime had lacked an effective national system to communicate the true
intentions of the reforms to the population directly (Chua, 2013, p. 55).
When false rumors reached rural areas that the government was initiating a ban on
the veiling of women, Pashtuns were horrified (Chua, 2013). Therefore, “In a society
concerned with preserving the appearance of honor and autonomy, men often felt
compelled to act well before such threats became reality” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185). Thus,
“Within three years of coming to power, Amanullah had squarely pushed two of these hot
buttons with his taxation (gold) and social laws (women)” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185).
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Although “…honor itself was judged in the theoretical realm perception could be more
important than reality” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185).
Soon the reforms resulted in angry reactions and a revolt in the eastern Pashtun
Khost province broke out in March 1924 led by Mullah-i-Lang (Dupree, 1973, p. 449).
The Khost revolt, which lasted for 9 months, was guided by “local clergy who saw the
new law codes a threat to their authority and livelihood” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185).
Although the Pashtun Mangal tribes led most of the fighting, the rebellion soon spread to
other Pashtun areas.
To counter the criticisms sprung from the revolt and broaden his political base,
Amanullah ordered to summon another Loya Jirga (“Grand Assembly”) in July 1924 by
inviting a thousand delegates representing the tribes, ulema and landowners (Barfield,
2010, p. 186). The amir had called a similar assembly in 1923 to ‘rubber-stamp’ his new
Constitution and “expected them to renew their support of his laws to counter rebel
criticism” (Barfield, 2010, p. 186). However, the parties in attendance “turned on the
amir and expressed their long-repressed misgivings about his laws” (Barfield, 2010, p.
186). The ulema demanded that the amir allow them to interpret the laws according to the
Sunni Hanifi legal system, “restore the legal distinctions between Muslims and nonMuslims as well as abandon his restrictions on polygamy” (Barfield, 2010, p. 186). The
delegates, however, did support the amir’s laws on raising taxes, expanding conscription
and branded the rebels of the Khost rebellions as traitors (p. 186).
The rebels however were growing in numbers and had made sweeping victories
coming within 8 miles of the capital Kabul, and pillaging and looting any villages in their
way. Although the revolt had begun as a religious response to Amanullah’s
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modernization reforms, it had now included elements of dynastic struggle for the throne
too (Dupree, 1973, p. 449). This shift began when Abdul Karim, the son of the former
amir of Afghanistan Yaqub Khan, offered to lead the rebels against Amanullah Khan and
remove him from the throne while his actual goal was to win the throne for himself
(Dupree, 1973, p. 449). However, when the rebels became reluctant to let Karim assume
leadership, Amanullah used this window of opportunity to shift the tide of war in his
favor (Dupree, 1973, p. 449).
Amanullah spread anti-British propaganda that Abdul Karim was a British plot to
take Afghanistan back. This move allowed Amanullah to rally the Pashtun tribes and
change the course of the war from a revolt against the government to a jihad by the
government against a foreign threat (Barfield, 2020, p. 187). This allowed the amir to
recruit fighters under the call to Jihad and crush the revolt. Abdul Karim fled to India
“but sixty leading rebels were taken to Kabul and publicly executed, though at least one
roundly condemned Amanullah to the crowd as an infidel before he was shot” (Barfield,
2010, p. 187).
The government was “left intact” after the Khost rebellion, mostly because
“historically Afghan rulers were displaced by popular rebellions only in the context of a
foreign invasion–and then only when they spread across regional and ethnic lines”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 187). However, what seemed to have been a short nuance confined
only to the eastern parts of the country, Amanullah’s army suffered “disastrous setbacks”
and the fighting cost him two years income (p. 187). The conflict had also drained the
national treasury and the “necessity” to call on the border Pashtun tribes help to put down
the rebellion showed his government’s weakness to handle a minor conflict. Moreover,
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“it punctured the aura of military invincibility that the Afghan state had nurtured for more
than two generations” (Barfield, 2010, p. 187). However, “this was no longer the case
after the Khost rebellion” (Barfield, 2010, p. 187).
In order to “compensate for the losses, Amanullah had reached out for an alliance
with the conservative clergy, rolling back social reforms but maintaining administrative
ones” (Barfield, 2010, p. 187). Within his administration, the amir’s response to the
revolt was a shake-up in his cabinet (Dupree, 1973, p. 450). He removed Nadir Khan as
the Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief and replaced him with Mohammad Ali
Khan (Dupree, 1973, p. 450). Mahmud Tarzi again returned from Europe and retook his
old position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Tajik Mohammad Ali Khan in
1924 (Dupree, 1973, p. 450). Although Amanullah’s army successfully put down the
revolt, and made wholesale changes in his government, “The end of Mullah-i-Lang revolt
did not end opposition to Amanullah’s modernization schemes” (Dupree, 1973, p. 499).
After the fighting ended, Amanullah went on inspection tours of the eastern
Jalalabad (1925) and the southern Kandahar (1926) provinces to urge his governors to
“maintain better order” (Barfield, 2010, p. 188). He had found new leverage and used it
to reverse most of the concessions he had made years ago in his 1924 Jirga, such as
opening girls’ schools that the ulema had fiercely objected to (p. 188). In this brief period
of peace, the amir felt “confident enough in the stability of the country to take a world
tour in the company of his wife, Queen Soraya” (Barfield, 2010, p. 188). The trip, which
began in November 1927 lasting until June 1928, included visits to countries such as
India, Egypt, Britain, Italy, France, Germany, The Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran. This
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marked the first time ever for a sovereign Afghan leader traveling abroad on an official
visit beyond India or “allowed his wife to play a public role” (Barfield, 2010, p. 188).
While many of the amir’s advisers warned the king that the trip would be costly
and the government would be weak in his absence, others “accused him of endangering
his Islamic faith by visiting wine-drinking infidel lands and allowing the queen to appear
unveiled” (Barfield, 2010, p. 188). The trip was a monumental success for public
relations and remapping diplomatic ties for Afghanistan. The amir received positive press
in Europe and the Middle East. However, the trip’s profound impact was on Amanullah
personally who renewed his old reforms for more radical ones. The amir recalled another
Loya Jirga in 1928 but this time all of the thousand participants were selected from
representatives who largely “approved his new laws with little dissent” (Barfield, 2020,
p. 188).
The new reforms “included plans for economic development, education, the
creation of the National Assembly, and more reforms of the legal system, including
family law and women’s issues” (Barfield, 2010, p. 189). More controversially, the amir
ended women’s seclusion in social settings and ordered the abolishing the customary veil.
These actions alienated the entire clerical establishment including those “who had
supported the amir in the past” (Barfield, 2010, p. 189). But Amanullah was also ready to
confront them directly and reduce their power and influence. After his return from the
tour, the amir had decided to cut all ties with the clergy, refusing to meet even with the
“most prominent representatives, ending their stipend, and forbidding membership in Sufi
orders by government officials” (Barfield, 2010, p. 189).).
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Although the opposition from the religious faction was expected, the amir faced
objections from the modernist camps too. For example, the Minister of Defense Nader
Khan argued that social changes should be made only in selected parts of the country that
can digest them “rather than through the comprehensive packages favored by the amir”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 189). Although the founder of the modernist camp and amir’s Foreign
Affairs Minister and adviser Mahmud Tarzi approved of the radical reforms, he too
argued to implement changes slowly “for the country to absorb” (Barfield, 2010, p. 190).
But Amanullah rejected Nadir and Tarzi’s advice, both of whom eventually left
Afghanistan in mid-1920s and migrated to Europe.
The impact of reforms on the general populous was more influential on a day-today basis rather than theoretical (Barfield, 2010, p. 190). Corruption had risen during
Amanullah’s trip, which had also waned his popularity. The Loya Jirga had merely
‘rubber-stamped’ the amir’s proposal for reforms that had practically doubled taxes on
everything and increased mandatory military service from two years to three years.
Within months of passing the reforms, fresh uprisings had begun but because this time
the amir had upset a large portion of the population, rebellions spread beyond just the
Pashtun tribes as in the Khost Rebellion (p. 190). Another Pashtun tribe, the Shinwaris in
eastern Afghanistan, had joined the rebellion in November 1928 attacking Jalalabad and
burning down the amir’s palace. The unhappy clergy soon gave their blessings to turn the
uprising into a religious struggle and branded the amir an “infidel” (p. 190).
Amanullah decided to use the same strategy used in the 1924 rebellion: promising
to withdraw radical reforms and seeking to win the ulema’s cooperation. However, it was
too late and the rebellion had turned violent as the Tajik Kohistanis in the north of the
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capital Kabul led by the bandit Habibullah Kalakani had also joined the fight (Barfield,
2010, p. 191). Kalakani, who had won the clergy support, soon arrived at the gates of
Kabul. In his final attempt to halt the revolt, the amir offered to suspend all reforms but
even this proposal was rejected. In January of 1929, more government troops started to
defect to the rebels, which was the final straw for the Amanullah to abdicate in favor of
his brother Enayatullah and flee to Kandahar to amass a new army (p. 191).
Within days, Habibullah Kalakani had marched into Kabul claiming victory and
forcing the former king’s brother Enayatullah also to abdicate. Although the Tajik
Kalakani declared himself as the new amir in Kabul, other Pashtun tribes primarily the
Shinwaris proclaimed Ali Ahmad as the new amir (p. 191). Back in Kandahar,
Amanullah had already withdrawn his abdication and began recruiting troops in
Kandahar to take back Kabul from Habibullah Kalakani. The Tajiks did not seek a
Pashtun Muhammadzai royal to the throne but instead named an ethnically Tajik bandit
as amir, which “sent shockwaves through the political establishment… [Because] not
only was he an outsider, he was not even Pashtun” (Barfield, 2010, p. 192).
The deposed king Amanullah was received with little cordiality by the people in
Kandahar. However, the frustration of a Tajik on the throne in Kabul, and the tireless
efforts of Amanullah’s mother to garn support for her son, encouraged him to showcase
the cloak of Prophet Mohammad in an Islamic ritual to win over the population (Fletcher,
1965, p. 219). Eventually, the Pashtun Durrani tribesmen gathered a force of five
thousands tribal fighters, who together with Amanullah’s royal army, marched north to
take back Kabul (p. 219). This attempt had the potential to be successful, as more groups
including the Hazaras and the Pashtun Wardak ethnic group had joined the fight against
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Kalakani. Moreover, Ghulam Nabi Charkhi, Amanullah’s former commander in chief,
had also raised an army in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, ready to attack Kabul (p.
219).
Then, in a surprise move, Amanullah abandoned his march on Kabul and retreated
back to Kandahar. Some argue Amanullah had received rumors of his assassination by
his own supporters, while the other notion was that the powerful Ghilzai tribe, through
whose land Amanullah’s army was passing, were ready to join Kalakani’s forces in the
fight (Fletcher, 1965, p. 219). Regardless of the reason, Amanullah arrived back at the
gates of Kandahar, where his Durrani kinsmen were waiting, thoroughly disgusted with
the king. However, Amanullah did not enter the city and left for Italy along with his
family and the royal treasury (p. 219).
In mensurating Habibullah Khan regime, dynastic tensions quickly arose over
regime transition (0) after Habibullah’s sudden death, because the king had not named a
successor (Barfield, 2010, p. 180). Nasrullah, the former king’s eldest brother, seized the
opportunity and proclaimed himself as the new king (180). His nephews, Habibullah
Khan’s eldest sons, Inayatullah Khan and Hayatullah Khan both swore their allegiance to
his uncle as the new king (p. 180). Habibullah Khan’s third son, Amanullah Khan on the
other hand, rejected his uncle’s claims to kingship, and accused him of being a traitor for
assassinating his father (p. 180).
Amanullah, who had immediately seized the national treasury and had secured the
loyalty of the national army, ordered the arrest of his uncle and his brothers for being
complicit (Barfield, 2010, p. 180). Nasrullah, who had been king for only ten days,
realized he could not attain his position and immediately abdicated in favor of
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Amanullah, but it was too late as Amanullah threw his brothers along with his uncle in
jail. While Inayatullah and Hayatullah were soon released and restored to royal status, his
uncle later died in prison (p. 180).
Table 5: A. Khan Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
1
0
0
0
0

Total
1
0
0
0
0
1

Thus, in accordance with the tradition of royal inheritance, Amanullah claimed
the kingship as the legitimate (1) heir to the throne (Fletcher, 1965, p. 186). Having
gained Afghanistan’s independence, Amanullah had become extremely popular with the
public. The enthusiastic amir soon began pushing his domestic goal of modernizing
Afghanistan by launching various domestic socio-economic, political and religious
reforms (p. 195). The reforms became controversial and were perceived as radical in a
traditionally tribal country and backfired as various Pashtun tribes across eastern
Afghanistan began uprisings (0) in response to them (p. 195). Although Amanullah had
intended to be king for life (0), the uprisings through his rule eventually drove him to
exile and his regime was collapsed (0) by a Tajik rebel on January 14, 1929 (Barfield,
2010, p. 218).
Moreover, Amanullah was the absolute head (0) of the state and maintained the
title of Padsha (king) (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 109). However, the constitution
he had adopted brought new administrative changes to the system ensuring equal political
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representation (1) of all groups (p. 109). It created a cabinet, a partially elected
consultative body, gave women’s equal rights, created an independent judicial system,
and greatly reduced the previous power of tribal chiefs and religious ulema (p. 110).
Table 6: A. Khan Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total

Scores
0
1
1
1
1

Total
0
1
1
1
1
4

Amanullah also allowed government positions (1) to be open to all allowing the
intellectual and his adviser Mahmud Tarzi to form a cabinet of ministers, with a Prime
Minister position (Dupree, 1973, p. 442). Moreover, Amanullah’s regime appointed
Mohammad Nadir Khan as his commander-in-chief of the national army (1), which was
filled on merit (p. 445). In addition, he had appointed an ethnic Tajik Mohammad Wali
Khan as his top diplomatic adviser (p. 445). And lastly, political dissent was allowed to a
greater degree (1) during Amanullah’s regime, from holding various Loya Jirgas to
establishing the first independent newspaper, the Seraj-ul-Akhabr (p. 439).
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Habibullah Kalakani, 1929
Habibullah Kalakani, known as Bacha-i-Saqao (“child of the water carrier,”) after
his father’s occupation, was an ethnically Tajik bandit infamous for his illegal activities
and trouble with the law (Fletcher, 1965, p. 217). He had been sentenced to jail for
attacking an officer in Kabul, where he later escaped to Peshawar and opened a shadow
teahouse for smuggling. Saqao returned to Afghanistan in 1928 and began recruiting a
band of robbers, attacking caravans along the Hindu Kush routes (p. 217). For a brief
period, Saqao enlisted in the army during Amanullah’s public call for tribal aid and free
pardon, and “was given rifles and a general’s admission in the Afghan army” (Fletcher,
1965, p. 217 fletcher).
After seeing the weak and defenseless state of the capital Kabul firsthand, he
abandoned his position and went to Kohistan, where he gathered a band of 300 robbers
and launched a surprise attack on the city. Although this was a relatively small attack,
“the audacity of the move was such that only a swift action by Abdul Aziz, the minister
of war, and a determined stand by the cadets of the military school, kept it from
succeeding” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 217). Saqao, however, was forced to retreat back to
Kohistan after twelve days of fighting in this initial attack. Amanullah’s forces followed
him into the snowy mountainous region of Kohistan, where thousands of Kohistanis
flocked to join their local hero in the fighting (Fletcher, 1965, p. 217). Outnumbered, the
army was forced to surrender, leaving Kabul undefended. On January 14, 1929, Saqao
launched a second attack on Kabul, where Amanullah had barricaded himself in the royal
palace (p. 218). After a few days of fighting, Saqao entered the royal palace on January
27 and captured Arg.
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Declaring himself amir, Saqao began forming a government, which was a difficult
task to do since Amanullah Khan had taken the entire royal treasury with him (Barfield,
2010, p. 218). Hence, Saqao began extracting a large sum from citizens and merchants of
Kabul through the use of threats and torture (p. 218). Aside from facing problems funding
the national treasury, Saqao had to sort out the transfer of authority as the new amir.
Although it is difficult to comprehend how a bandit could control the entire country and
establish a bureaucracy, Afghanistan at the time was virtually an agricultural pastoral
country (Fletcher, 1965, p. 218). Therefore, the local governments at the provincial level
were least impacted by a change in central government in Kabul and “…simply
continued to carry out instructions from Kabul, without regard to who issued them”
(Fletcher, 1965, p. 218).
Moreover, “Some of Amanullah’s aids, especially those in what remained of the
Afghan army, agreed to serve Saqao in return for lavish financial rewards and the
promise of future favors. But the civil government was so depleted that only two of the
Saqao’s cabinet were able to read; the bandit Amir himself was totally illiterate”
(Fletcher, 1965, p. 218). Saqao also began raising an army of ten thousand men in Kabul,
mostly recruited from his hometown Kohistan by paying them “with money extorted
from Kabul merchants and equipped with the stores in the government arsenal” (Fletcher,
1965, p. 219). He was quick to eliminate all other Pashtun royal rivals to the throne by
executing Amanullah Khan’s half-brothers Hayatullah Khan, Abdul Majid Khan as well
as Amanullah’s cousin Ali Ahmed Jan, who was captured when organizing a resistance
movement in Kandahar (p. 219).
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Moreover, “The authority of the bandit amir was mostly an illusion” (Fletcher,
1965, p. 219). His becoming amir was only possible “…because the region was so
decentralized, and the cities were so few and scattered, that an individual even with the
Saqao’s drive and courage was able to seize control of Kabul and Kandahar, and by the
use of extorted funds recruited an army of assorted malefactors eager for loot and
excitement” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 219). But in reality, “There was little to enable Saqao to
consolidate his rule. He had no standing whatsoever among the Pushtoon tribes, which up
to this time had taken no part in the fighting but waited aloof for the inevitable agents of
the Saqao’s downfall to do their work” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 220)
Saqao’s regime was mostly reactionary, as he immediately eliminated all of
Amanullah Khan’s reforms. Although Saqao was a skilled fighter, he proved to be a
“poor ruler leaving Kabul in chaos during his nine month reign” (Barfield, 2010, p. 192).
The Tajik born amir was successful staying in power briefly because of his monopoly on
dividing “the Pashtun tribes for a surprisingly long time, keeping them at odds with one
another by appealing to their local mullahs (who approved of his reactionary policies) as
well as playing on a traditional animosities between Ghilzais and Durranis” (Barfield,
2010, p. 192). In Afghanistan’s history, the emperors and kings had come from the
Pashtun Durrani Empire “for so long that even the most powerful regional and tribal
leaders could not conceive of it being otherwise” (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Although
many had resented Amanullah’s progressive policies, recognizing a Tajik amir from the
bottom of the Afghan ethnic groups was such a ‘radical break’ from the past regimes that
the sight of unveiled women walking in public in Kabul was less controversial by
comparison (p. 193).
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In fact, Saqao was able to become amir easily because the rebels around the
country were mostly concerned with toppling Amanullah at any cost and had not
“agreed” on who should become the new ruler (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Considering an
amir from any other group than a Pashtun ethnicity had never been an issue in Afghan
politics. Thus a Tajik amir’s presence in Kabul briefly altered the ethnic dynamic of the
Afghan political culture. In the past, “regional faction leaders invariably aligned
themselves with some member of the royal line who used their support to establish his
own authority” (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). For example, Dost Muhammad’s son Akbar was
able to assume leadership of the resistance against the British in the Anglo-Afghan wars
and helped his father to the amirship. Abdur Rahman Khan had similarly been recognized
by both the British government and the Afghan resistance movements allowing him to
become amir. Although Amanullah Khan had many tribal critics, none of them saw
themselves as rulers, and he too was able to become amir (p. 193).
Saqao’s support, however, primarily came from his own Tajik clan, the
Kohistanis, who were alienated by Amanullah. The Pashtun tribes, including the Pashtun
Shinwaris, rejected a Tajik ruler and threw their support behind Ali Ahmad as the new
amir. Ali Ahmad had been the same “general that Amanullah Khan had sent to suppress
the Shinwari’s when they had rebelled against Amanullah’s reforms. Ali Ahmad, who
came from the Pashtun Qandahari Loinab sardars, was a member of the old elite and
therefore an outsider himself (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Soon Ali Ahmad and the
Shinwari's launched an attack on Saqao’s forces to remove him from the throne in Kabul
but this attack failed, and hence Ali Ahmad had squandered his chance of becoming amir
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(p. 193). Ali Ahmad escaped to Qandahar but was captured and returned to Saqao who
brutally executed him by blowing him out of a cannon (p. 193).
After this failed attempt to oust Saqao and the collapse of Ali Ahmad’s army, the
eastern Pashtun tribes began reconsidering their opposition to Amanullah Khan (Barfield,
2010, p. 193). Amanullah Khan too was ready to drop all previous reforms and negotiate
a new deal with the tribal and religious leaders (p. 193). Many of the eastern Pashtun
tribes, who feared that Saqao could consolidate and strengthen his hold on power in the
long term, joined with their ‘brothers’ in the south to expand their support base and
remove Saqao. In other words, “They pledged to restore to the throne the very amir that
they had only a few months earlier declared an infidel and driven from office” (Barfield,
2010, p. 194). Afghan politics are known for side switching, hence both parties ignored
their past rivalries so they could collectively face a common enemy.
Back in Qandahar, Amanullah had been rallying the influential Pashtun Durrani
group to win back his throne. Amanullah had been running a shadow political campaign
against Saqao by appealing to the Pashtun chauvinism “insisting that such a proud people
could never accept a Tajik bandit as their amir” (Barfield, 2010, p. 194). Moreover, the
former amir also spread rumors that the British had installed Saqao as their agent but “as
much as the British disliked Amanullah, the uprising against him was of his own making
and none of their doing” (Barfield, 2010, p. 194). However, they also did not support him
in taking back power either. Declaring a ‘policy of neutrality’ the British neither
acknowledged Saqao’s regime nor allowed Amanullah Khan access to ship weapons held
in India (p. 194).
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Despite this setback, Amanullah’s position improved when his former minister of
defense Nadir Khan and his brothers returned from France in February of 1929. Nadir,
who had “strong ties with the tribes,” soon took the lead in organizing the tribes to
overthrow Saqao (Barfield, 2010, p. 194). Although some were worried that Nadir Khan
intended to make himself as the new amir, he did not give this impression and played his
hand subtly by positioning “himself as an enemy of [Saqao] allied with Amanullah
without ever making it clear whether or not he supported Amanullah’s restoration”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 194). However, in May of 1929, Amanullah’s effort to restore himself
as the amir failed after his army was attacked on their march from Qandahar to Kabul by
the Pashtun Ghilzai’s near Ghazni province (p. 194). Meanwhile Saqao had made an
alliance with the Pashtun Mujadaddi family, a rival of Amanullah Khan, and began
attacking their traditional enemy the Pashtun Durrani rivals (p. 194).
The leader of the Mujadaddi family, Omar Fazl had gained the support of the
Pashtun Ghilzai’s under the notion that Nadir Khan, who was closely communicating
with Fazl, would become amir. Hence, “Faced with continued attacks by both Saqao’s
troops and the Ghilzai’s, and having received word that Herat had fallen to Saqao’s
forces too, Amanullah soon took Nadir’s advice that he should leave Afghanistan for
exile in Europe” (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). Nadir Khan now became the sole leader of the
fighting and a Pashtun champion to remove a Tajik ruler (p. 195). In order to legitimize
his position as amir further, Nadir Khan called for a Loya Jirga of tribal elders to
challenge his Tajik counterpart to be legitimate ruler of the country, a “contest the Tajik
would surely lose” (Barfield, 2010, p. 195)
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Although Nadir along with his brothers attacked Kabul four times in the summer
of 1929, they failed to remove Saqao. Moreover, the Pashtun tribes had become
fragmented either because of the absence of Amanullah Khan or perhaps because of it
(Barfield, 2010, p. 195). On the other hand, Nadir was running out of money to support
the army’s campaigns and in the absence of an amir, the tribes were enjoying the power
vacuum left by a central government (p. 195). Finally, the tide turned in favor of Nadir
when his brother Shah Wali Khan amassed a “tribal lashkar of twelve thousand Wazir
[i.e. Pashtun] tribesmen from the British side of the frontier…who took Kabul on October
13 [1929]” (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). The Waziri fighters, “In the absence of pay…looted
the city before returning home” (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). And as was expected at the end
of the conflict, Saqao “was hanged, along with around a dozen of his followers”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 195).
Saqao’s defeat raised the question of who should become Afghanistan’s next
amir. Nadir Khan withheld from automatically claiming the throne and recommended
that a Loya Jirga pick the new amir (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). According to his brother,
Nadir Khan’s “position was that once the evil had ended, Afghans should choose their
monarch in the time-honored way,” and “he disclaimed any interest in the job himself”
(Barfield, 2010, 195). However, the Jirga “rejected Amanullah’s restoration and
enthusiastically chose Nadir to replace him–a decision particularly welcomed by the
armed tribesmen still on the streets of Kabul who refused to leave until he took the
kingship” (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). And the new amir accepted the position saying, “Since
the people so designate me so, I accept. I will not be the king but the servant of the tribes
and the country” (Barfield, 2010, p. 195).
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In mensurating Bacha Saqao’s regime, he came to power in one of the most
violent transition (0) of powers in Afghanistan’s history by overthrowing Amanullah
Khan’s regime in a bloody civil war (Dupree, 1973, p. 452). The bandit, who wanted to
take the throne, had recruited fighters in his homeland Kohistan and had launched various
attacks on Kabul during the final few months of Amanullah’s regime (Dupree, 1973, p.
452). Saqao was also able to draw support around the country from the conservative
religious ulema to fight against Amanullah, who had angered the clergy with his
controversial social reforms (Dupree, 1973, p. 454).
After assuming the throne in Kabul, Saqao soon assumed the titles of Ghazi
(“holy warrior”) as well Khadim-i-din-i-rasululah (“Servant of the Prophet’s Religious”)
(Dupree, 1973, p. 458). Saqqao’s regime lacked legitimacy (0) because he was a selfdeclared amir who had taken power by overthrowing the sitting king and killing all his
challengers (Barfield, 2010, p. 191).
Table 7: H. Kalakani Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
0
0
0
0
0

Total
0
0
0
0
0
0

Moreover, the throne was up for debate as the Pashtun Shinwaris, who had also been
fighting against Amanullah, had proclaimed Ali Ahmad as their amir (Barfield, 2010, p.
191). Saqao was ‘only’ able to become amir because those who were fighting to against
Amanullah’s regime had not decided on who should replace him as the new king
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(Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Ali Ahmad’s claim to the throne however ended when he was
captured by Saqao’s men and “executed by being blown out of a cannon” (Barfield, 2010,
p. 193).
Although Saqao’s rule was short, he continuously faced uprisings (0) against his
regime. The Pashtuns, who had become united against a Tajik ruler, branded the banditamir as an agent of the British and vowed to overthrow him (Barfield, 2010, p. 195).
Saqao had intended to rule Afghanistan as the new amir (0) but his regime’s only lasted 9
months before Nadir Khan and his brothers overthrow it (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). His
downfall (0), however, was inevitable because all odds were against him as a Tajik ruler.
Before Saqao, there had never been a Tajik ruler as all kings had come from the Pashtun
tribes (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). When Nadir Khan gathered a Loya Jirga of prominent
Pashtun tribal leaders after taking the lead role in fighting against the Tajik ruler, the
Jirga quickly branded Saqao a “tyrant”, thereby delegitimizing him as a ruler (Barfield,
2010, p. 195).
Table 8: H. Kalakani Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total

Scores
0
0
0
0
0

Total
0
0
0
0
0
0

Saqao was an absolute head of the state (0) whose regime’s was dominated (0) by only
his ‘friends’ and ‘relatives’ (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 113). His colleagues
considered the capital Kabul as an “enemy” city where they killed off those loyal to
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Amanullah Khan and extorted money from residents to fund the government (p. 113).
Saqao’s regime was mostly ‘reactionary,’ canceling all of Amanullah Khan’s reforms
gave the clergy power back (p. 113). He did not have an organized army (0) but irregular
forces who were primarily recruited from his hometown Kohistan (Rasanayagam, 2003,
p. 22).
Political representation (0) was not something Saqao was concerned with since
most of his administration was made of former bandits who ruled Kabul in chaos during
his nine months in power (Barfield, 2010, p. 192). Moreover, he had divided the Pashtun
tribes by playing on their animosities and keeping them at odds with each other (Barfield,
2010, p. 192). Saqao similarly did not allow any opposition (0) to his rule and would
either buy ‘influence’ or simply eliminate anyone that opposed him, including all his
rivals such Ali Ahmad and Amanullah Khan’s two eldest brothers (Barfield, 2010, p.
192).
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Nadir Khan, 1929-1933
Nadir Khan’s appointment as king was the beginning of a dynastic change that
brought the Muhasiban family to power. Nadir Khan soon assumed the title of shah
(“king”) as a symbolic move to distant himself from Amanullah Khan (Barfield, 2010, p.
195). Although Nadir Shah was elected by a Loya Jirga representing the people,
Amanullah’s followers claimed that Nadir had no right to be the legitimate king and that
the Loya Jirga was too small to elect the new amir (p. 197). However, the succession
debate ended when the British recognized Nadir’s regime in November 1929 and
provided him with money to “stabilize his government” while the new king reiterated his
support for all the existing treaties between the two nations (Barfield, 2010, p. 197).
However, Amanullah’s followers were not ready to quit the fight for the amirship
and in 1930, the Pashtun Shinwaris and the Tajik Kohistanis led separate revolts against
the new king in the eastern tribal belt and northern regions. Nadir was quick to react and
called on his border Pashtun tribes to help put down the revolt and “executed and
imprisoned” many Amanullah supporters (Barfield, 2010, p. 197). By September 1931,
Nadir had successfully put down any revolts or uprising against his regime and had called
another larger Loya Jirga consisting of 510 members, “who approved an official
declaration of deposition (khal) that formally abrogated the rights of Amanullah and his
heirs on the grounds that he had violated sharia law” (Barfield, 2010, p. 197). Although a
last major revolt led by Saqao’s uncle in the Kohistan region broke out in July 1931, it
was easily put down with the help of the tribes (p. 228).
The new king Nadir Shah was a cautious ruler who put the country’s progress and
stability as his top policies (Fletcher, 1965, p. 222). Nadir sought a middle ground policy
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when dealing with sensitive religious laws and traditions. For instance, although he
ordered that the purdah (“seclusion of women”) to be reinstated, he simultaneously
reopened girls’ schools that Saqao had closed (p. 226). Moreover, in order to satisfy the
religious zealots, he restored big government pensions to various influential mullahs
including Mohammad Siddiq, the Hazrat of Shor-Bazaar, who had played a major role in
bringing down Amanullah Khan’s regime earlier (p. 227). Nadir Shah began his rule in
close consultation with his four brothers, and while there were differences among the
royals when arriving at government decisions, they usually presented a united front
publically (Fletcher, 1965, p. 228).
Nadir continued forming a permanent government by announcing a new
constitution on October 31, 1931 largely based on Amanullah Khan’s 1923 constitution
framework (Fletcher, 1965, p. 228). According to the new constitution, the throne
became hereditary in Nadir Shah’s family and a new cabinet, senate and house were
established (p. 228). The cabinet, which consisted of eighteen departments, included the
position of prime minister, presidents for the house and senate, the directors of mines and
agriculture, ministers of war, state, foreign affairs, interior, justice, education, health,
finance, commerce and post (p. 228). The constitution however gave the king the power
of the “head of the executive, legislative and judicial departments, made him commander
in chief of the armed forces, and proclaimed the inviolability of his person” (Fletcher,
1965, p. 229).
In fact, “The major contradiction in the 1931 Constitution was that, although the
government was declared to be responsible to the Parliament, members of the Parliament
had to swear loyalty to the government” (Dupree, 1973, p. 463). Moreover, Nadir had the

66

power to declare war, appoint the prime minister, approve all officials and make
emergency laws. The constitution, based on various sources such as Turkish, Iranian and
French constitutions, was a ‘hodgepodge’ of contradictions (Dupree, 1973, p. 464). It
tried to combine western thoughts with local Afghan traditions and customs along with
Sharia Law (p. 464). Although the constitution did prescribe authority to the institutions
it created, in reality, real power stayed with the royal family. The government was never
fully able to implement its constitutional duties and even though Nadir’s reign is often
described as a constitutional monarchy, it was merely an oligarchy (p. 464).
In short, the 1931 Constitution had “…created a façade of parliamentary
government while leaving control in the hands of the royal family, kept the judiciary
primarily under the religious leaders, created a semi-socialist economic framework with
the principle of free enterprise accepted and guaranteed theoretical individual equality”
(Dupree, 1973, p. 471). These powers effectively crippled the legislature body and
therefore the government was merely an oligarchy where power was concentrated with
the elite Pashtun Mohammadzai family (Fetcher, 1965, p. 229). Local governments also
did not change during Nadir’s reign. The country was divided into five major provinces
(Wilayats) and four smaller provinces (Hakumat-i-Ala). Governors or Walis (also referred
to as Hakumat Naibs) were head of the provincial governments appointed by the central
government (p. 229). However, power was shared between police chiefs and civilian
heads of the government and in some parts such as the southern and eastern provinces,
police only had basic authority.
Although Nadir implemented various economic development plans to modernize
Afghanistan, many Afghans still resented him. The king launched various plans to
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modernize the largely pastoral and agricultural Afghan economy by building the first
National Bank and introducing a new currency (Fletcher, 1965, p. 230). Moreover,
Nadir’s most significant act was establishing proper transportation and communication
channels by building highways and connecting large provinces (p. 230). Even though
these were monumental steps towards progress, Nadir’s reign remained unpopular with
Afghans, many of whom believed that Nadir and his family’s claim to the throne were
not valid. Moreover, Nadir was less popular with the younger generation who had
preferred the progressive Amanullah Khan (Fletcher, 1965, p. 230). And although Nadir
was publicly accused of being a British agent, he was in fact an ‘Anglophobe,’ a member
of the “war party” that launched the third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919 and became the
hero of that war (p. 232).
Tribal turbulences also increased during Nadir’s reign from 1930 to 1933 as the
border Pashtun Mohmand and Afridi tribes began launching more raids in the eastern
parts of the country. In 1931, a tribe was able to capture a city in Peshawar on the border
briefly before the Indian Army was able to oust them. While the tensions between the
British and the border tribes increased, tribal leaders pleaded to Nadir to intervene but
they were uncharacteristically advised to “make their peace with the British” (Fletcher,
1965, p. 232). This was a major break away from previous Afghan amirs who would
negotiate with the British on behalf of all the Pashtun border tribes. While many Afghans
saw this as more evidence that Nadir was a British client, the king was simply being
careful of provoking the British who he feared could arrange to overthrow his monarchy
(p. 232). Nevertheless, Nadir’s neglect of the eastern tribes had caused great resentment
among Afghans.
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The resentment took physical form when in June 1933 Mohammed Aziz Khan,
the oldest of the Pashtun Mohammadzai brothers serving as the Afghan ambassador in
the Afghan embassy in Berlin, Germany was shot dead by a graduate Afghan student.
The student assassin, Kemal Syed, who had come to Germany for advanced studies,
“gave his reason [as] the betrayal of the eastern [i.e. Pashtun] tribes by the
Mohammedzais” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 233). Not long after, another similar incident
occurred when a student entered the British Embassy in Kabul to assassinate the British
ambassador but was stopped after killing two high level clerks. The increase in these
incidents was a sign of public frustration and resentment towards the government.
Eventually on November 8, 1933 another student by the name of Mohammad Khaliq
approached king Nadir himself during a royal soccer game celebration in the palace, and
shot him dead (p. 233).
All three student assassins were coincidently from the same German-staffed Nijat
College, which led to rumors that the murders were plotted at the school; however, in
reality assassinating the king was more likely motivated by a personal grievance
(Fletcher, 1965, p. 233). Just prior to his assassination, Nadir had accused General
Ghulam Nabi Charkhi of being complicit in aiding a brief revolt by the Pashtun Dari
Khel Ghilzai tribes. Ghulam Nabi, who was the son of Ghulam Hyder Charkhi Abdur
Rahman’s commander in chief and an Amanullah Khan supporter, had rejected the
accusations and verbally abused the king in his palace. Nadir, who also had a short
temper, had ordered the execution of Ghulam Nabi on the spot (p. 234). The student
assassin Mohammad Khaliq, who had shot down Nadir was the adopted son of Ghulam
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Nabi, and was therefore, likely motivated by revenge for the killing of his adoptive father
(p. 234).
Despite the resentment, Nadir’s reign was relatively stable because the main goal
of the Pashtun Muhasiban family was domestic stability for the country (Barfield, 2010,
p. 198). A highly powerful family, the Muhasiban would rule Afghanistan for the next 50
years with Nadir’s son Zahir Shah succeeding him immediately after his death (p. 198).
Unlike Amanullah Khan’s attempts, the Muhasiban’s long-term vision was to introduce
social change and modernize gradually, implementing it in Kabul first and then
expanding it to the rural areas. The Muhasiban however were not able to create a strong,
centralized government like the Iron Amir and realized that the greatest threat to their
rule was a perceived alliance between the “disaffected rural population and the
conservative Islamic establishment, but over time its own policies made these groups
ever more marginal and less politically significant” (Barfield, 2010, p. 198).
Essentially, the Muhasiban family’s journey to becoming a powerful royal family
began with Nadir and his four brothers, who had accompanied him on his return from
France and were detrimental in appointing him as king. Nadir had repaid by appointing
all of them to high and powerful government posts, naming “Hashim Khan as premier,
Shah Wali Khan as the minister of war and commander-in-chief, and Shah Mahmud as
the minister of interior” (Barfield, 2010, p. 199). Although Nadir’s son Zahir Shah
became king at 19 after his father’s death, real power rested with his uncle Hashim Khan
from 1933 until 1946 (p. 199).
In mensurating Nadir Shah’s regime, his accession to power and his subsequent
transition (0) were violent and bloody. Nadir had raised an army of tribal fighters along
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with his brothers and fought for several months before they recaptured Kabul from Bacha
Saqao on October 10, 1929 (Dupree, 1973, p. 459). After successfully overthrowing
Bacha Saqao and recapturing Kabul, Nadir initially refused to proclaim himself as the
new king but later accepted on the insistence of the tribal army and the jirga (Dupree,
1973, p. 459). Nadir’s ascendance to the throne, however, had infuriated Amanullah
Khan’s supporters, who hoped to put the deposed king back on the throne (Dupree, 1973,
p. 460). However, the dispute over the right to kingship ended when Nadir called a Loya
Jirga that legitimized him (1) as the new king in September 1930 (Dupree, 1973, p. 460).
In his five-year reign as king, Nadir faced a few major uprisings (0) early on from
the Pashtun tribes such as Shinwaris, Ghilzais and the Tajiks in the Kohistan region
(Dupree, 1973, p. 460). The Shinwaris revolt began with the quest to restore Amanullah
Khan to the throne and protest tax increases, but Nadir cleverly bought off their khans
ending their revolts (Dupree, 1973, p. 460). The fight against the Tajiks in Kohistan was
brutal however, and Nadir had to call on his ally border Pashtun tribes once again to help
put down that revolt (p. 460).
Table 9: N. Khan Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
1
0
0
0
1

Total
1
0
0
0
1
2

Nadir Shah made an early example by brutally putting down the Tajik Kohistani
revolt and killing the leader, and from then on, did not face any other revolt until his
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death in 1933 (p. 460). Nadir and his brothers had intended to stay in power for years to
come (0) as they began pacifying Afghanistan and subjugating the tribes (p. 461).
Although a student assassinated king Nadir on November 8, 1933 in a public ceremony,
his regime, however, did not collapse (1) and his son immediately inherited kingship (p.
475).
Moreover, Nadir was the absolute head of state (0) who made sure executive
power stayed within the royal family by appointing his brothers to key government
positions (0) in his cabinet (Barfield, 2010, p. 199). Hashim Khan was appointed as the
Prime Minister, Shah Mahmud as Minister of Interior, and Shah Wali Khan as the
Commander-in-Chief (1) of the army (Barfield, 2010, p. 199). However, popular political
representation (1) increased under Nadir’s reign after allowing the adoption of a new
constitution (Dupree, 1973, p. 463).
Table 10: N. Khan Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion
Indicators
Regime
Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total

Scores
0
1
0
1
0

Total
0
1
0
1
0
2

The same Loya Jirga that had proclaimed him king, adopted a new Constitution in
1931, which created a bicameral Parliament, albeit with the king’s approval, and a 105body National Council to advise the king (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 115).
However, there was no indication in the constitution that would prevent the royal family
from “ruling at its own discretion” (Wahab & Youngerman, p. 115). The members to the
new Parliament were partly elected and partially appointed by the king (p. 115).
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Although in theory the government was responsible to the Parliament, in reality
the latter simply ‘rubber-stamped’ the king’s decisions and its members had to swear
loyalty to the king (Dupree, 1973, p. 463). Moreover, Nadir Shah had also greatly
restricted liberal free speech and political dissent (0), which resulted in “thousands of
Afghan intellectuals were imprisoned or killed” (Runion, 2007, p. 93). Despite the 1931
constitution giving various institutions and government administrations authority in
Nadir’s regime, real power stayed with the king and his royal family, who had essentially
created an ‘oligarchy’ (Dupree, 1973, p. 464).
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Zahir Shah, 1933—1973
After Nadir Shah’s death, the three remaining Muhasiban brothers shared power
among each other. Mohammad Hashim Khan, who had the highest authority, became the
Prime Minister from 1933 until 1946 (Fletcher, 1965, p. 234). Shah Wali Khan, who was
known as the Fateh-i-Kabul (“Conqueror of Kabul”) after capturing the capital from
Bacha Saqao, accepted a much lesser role as the ambassador to England and France from
1930 until 1947 (Dupree, 1973, p. 447). Contrary to previous dynastic regime changes,
none of Nadir’s three brothers made a ‘personal bid’ for the throne and instead promptly
proclaimed the designated heir Nadir Shah’s 19-year old son Zahir Shah as the new king
(Fletcher, 1965, p. 234). This internal unity among the Pashtun Muhasiban family, who
were considered an outsider clan when Nadir Shah became king, was fundamental in
helping maintain the royal throne in the family as well as ensuring a peaceful transition of
power in the country (p. 234).
The new king Zahir Shah had been groomed for kingship from an early age. After
graduating from the military school in Kabul, he was appointed as the minister of war and
education at the age of 18 (Fletcher, 1965, p. 235). However, because of his inexperience
in politics and young age, he remained only in the background for twenty-two years
while his uncle Hashim Khan run the government until 1946 (p. 235). During his tenure
Hashim was largely able to maintain the internal stability Nadir Shah had brought to
Afghanistan, but his regime was tested with a few major revolts (p. 235). However, most
political challenges during this time were related to foreign policy.
Internally, the Afghan government’s most persistent problem during Hashim’s
tenure was putting down a border Pashtun Afridi tribe’s rebellion against the British
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(Fletcher, 1965, p. 238). The Afghan government had been caught in the middle of the
Pashtun border tribes Madda Khel and Tori Khel deadly fight against the British, but it
eventually ended in a truce (p. 238). In 1939, other fresh fighting began when a Syrian
relative of former Queen Soriya called Shami Pir (“Syrian saint”) vowed to restore exking Amanullah Khan back to the throne (p. 239). However, the British soon convinced
him to abandon his conquest in exchange for twenty thousand pounds. Some argue that
Shami Pir was a British plot to put pressure on the Afghan government as a response to
German presence in Afghanistan, but there is no evidence to support this theory (p. 239).
Eventually Hashim, who had steered Afghanistan into stability for 13 years,
stepped down as prime minister in 1946 due to poor health, with the youngest Muhasiban
brother, Shah Mahmud, replacing him (Fletcher, 1965, p. 242). Shah Mahmud, who
quickly gained popularity for being a progressive and liberal-minded Prime Minister,
opened up the political system and brought democratic changes. However, Zahir, who
was now 32 and had been mostly a ceremonial king until now, began taking an active
role in the Afghan politics.
His first official state policy was to release many political prisoners including
members of the Ghulam Charkhi family as well as the students imprisoned for the attacks
on the British embassy in 1933 (Fletcher, 1965, p. 244). Other significant changes during
Shah Mahmud’s tenure as Prime Minister was allowing relatively free elections and the
creation of a new democratic Parliament 1949 (Dupree, 1973, p. 495). This liberal
experiment grew rapidly and the new Parliament began holding the government
accountable by regularly calling ministers to the chamber for questioning. The “Duties
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and Rights of Ministers” clause gave the cabinet ministers unlimited power while
relieving the king of any ministerial duties (p. 495).
Soon the new liberal parliament passed laws to allow freedom of the press, which
led to the creation of several newspapers. The three major ones, Watan (“Homeland”),
Angar (“Burning Embers”), and Nida-ye-Khalq (“Voice of the People”) were all opposed
to the monarchy and began criticizing its policies openly (Dupree, 1973, p. 495). The
public soon caught up and letters to the editors began pouring while “religious leaders
and their supporters received the brunt of the attacks in the free press” (p. 495). The
editors consistently called on the government to hold ‘genuinely free elections’ and that
the “government should be responsible to Parliament” (p. 495). Moreover, a new
National Democratic Party was founded whose members were also staunchly against
Zahir’s monarchy. The government responded quickly to these developments by arresting
protesters and banning the three newspapers that published from 1951 until 1952 (p.
495).
However, the monarchy could not totally cease the rise of the new democratic
movement. The new Parliament had inspired a group of 30 students in Kabul University
to form a student union that continued the criticism against the government (Dupree,
1973, p. 296). While they were ignored initially, the group grew in size and influence
quickly, and fearing that it would hurt the status quo, the government formed a progovernment political party in response. But this failed and even government employees,
who were encouraged to join the party, showed little to no interest (p. 496). The
government crackdown on liberal groups also forced another prominent ‘political
brotherhood’ the Wikh-i-Zulmaiyan (“Awakened Youth”) movement. But opposition and
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attacks in the press continued against the government and “More and more pieces pointed
to religious fanaticism as the major institution holding back Afghan progress” (Dupree,
1973, p. 496).
Eventually the government grew desperate and ordered the army to dissolve the
student union, forcing its members to escape to Pakistan (Dupree, 1973, p. 497).
Moreover, it began cracking down on all “liberal” movements by closing down all nongovernment newspapers and arresting over twenty-five political liberal leaders including
the leaders of the Wikh-i-Zulmaiyan political organization. While jails began filling with
liberal dissidents, only those who agreed to stop taking part in anti-government
movements were later released. In short, the experiment in the so-called ‘liberal
parliament’, which had begun in 1949, had failed by 1952 (Dupree, 1973, p. 497)
In September 1953, there was another internal change of leadership in the
Muhasiban family. A radio announcement declared that Prime Minister Shah Mahmud,
who had held the position for ten years, had resigned due to health reasons and Daud
Khan had replaced him as the new Prime Minister (Fletcher, 1965, p. 259). Shah
Mahmud, who was the last of the Muhasiban brothers, had restored the long-term
stability in his time as prime minister. Although Shah Mahmud was liberal and in favor
of progress, he had been cautious and pursued thinly veiled conservative policies. And
even though Shah Mahmud’s tenure had been one of stability and peace, economic
progress was slow and people had become increasingly frustrated with the government
(p. 259).
When Daud Khan took over his new position, he had the support of the foreign
minister, his brother Mohammad Naim as well as his cousin and the king, Zahir Shah.
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Although the transition of power had been peaceful, the shift in leadership went from
Mahmud Shah’s semi liberal policies to Daud’s aggressively progressive ones (Fletcher,
1965, p. 259). Shah Mahmud’s supporters were not convinced of his health as the reason
for his resignation since he had been in good health at the time of his stepping down (p.
259). And even though the concerned supporters were few in numbers, they resented the
new administraton and a quiet revolution had begun to take place (p. 260).
Daud however was fully committed to his new position. He had been successful
as the acting defense minister in helping put down the 1949 Pashtun Safi tribe revolt
(Dupree, 1973, p. 260). Having the support of the king and his brother, this new royal trio
now controlled Afghan political affairs. For much of the 1950s, Daud was at the helm of
Afghan political scene. He had become extremely popular with people, especially the
progressive elites. However, Zahir was becoming wary of his cousin’s popularity and
consolidation of power. Moreover, Zahir had been intending to take a serious role in
running the country with the resignation of Shah Mahmud in 1953 (p. 277).
Although Daud was appointed as prime minister, most Afghans knew that the
government “was in reality an oligarchy with power at the hands of the royal family” (p.
278). Hence, it lacked a broad power base and many Afghans continued to resent it and
its Western mentality. Daud was suddenly coerced into resigning as prime minister in
March 1963 (p. 278). Daud had accomplished a great deal in a short period of time, from
giving women freedoms to bringing stability and progress. However, the conservative
clergy fiercely disliked him for his policies and for being a member of the royal family.
His personal goal for an independent Pushtonistan had ended with the break-off of
diplomatic relations with Pakistan, one that almost brought both countries to the brink of
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war. In his farewell speech, he lobbied for a more open and democratic government
suggesting the “separation of its executive, legislative and judicial power” (Fletcher,
1965, p. 279).
Zahir welcomed these suggestions and appointed a committee to prepare a new
constitution. Daud Khan’s resignation had brought enthusiasm for more openness and a
new constitutional period. Zahir had seen peoples’ drive for full democracy and was
determined to begin implementing a transition to a full constitutional monarchy by
separating the executive branch of government from the royal family (Dupree, 1973, p.
561). The newly appointed Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Yusuf was given full
authority to appoint a new interim cabinet. No one with royal background was eligible to
be elected in the Cabinet of Ministers while only four of the total twelve members were
appointed from the Pashtun Durrani tribe. Moreover, for the first in decades, two nonPashtun members were also elected to high-level government positions (p. 561).
However, these changes in the government fell short of a complete regime change as
Zahir still maintained the power to confirm the new cabinet.
Nonetheless, Prime Minister Dr. Yusuf delivered his first speech emphasizing on
more constitutional reforms “and a more representative government” (Dupree, 1973, p.
562). The atmosphere around the country was positive and people expected many
changes overnight but the centuries of stagnation in the country soon led to frustrations
(p. 563). Realizing this discontent, the new government soon put together a committee to
draft a new liberal constitution by February 1964. A 29-member advisory committee
comprising of all major ethnic groups, liberals and conservative clerics as well as royal
family members reviewed the draft constitution before it went to a vote for adoption in a
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Loya Jirga (p. 566). The government, however, still maintained tight control over the
process as well as all the media that reported on the proceedings of the new constitution.
Because only around 25 percent Afghans were literate at the time, radio broadcasts were
“more important than newspapers and magazine in reaching the masses” (Dupree, 1973,
p. 567).
Zahir convened a Loya Jirga consisting of 452 members that would ratify the new
Constitution, which included members of the National Assembly, the Senate, the Cabinet,
the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Committee, and members selected from all
provinces to participate. However, the government did maintain strong influence over
elections in the provincial elections and conveniently screened out any ‘anti-government’
candidates (Dupree, 1973, p. 568). Essentially only 176 of the total 452 members of the
Loya Jirga were elected in free elections while the remaining came from the above
governmental bodies (p. 569). The Jirga began its session and opened the debate on the
128-articles of the new constitution. The Jirga hall was full of all the ethnicities that had
come from all corners of Afghanistan including Pashtuns, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks,
Baluch, and Nuristanis among others (p. 569). After 11 days of intense arguing and
deliberations, the Jirga eventually passed the new Constitution on September 19, 1964 (p.
574).
The new constitution declared Afghanistan as an independent, unitary
constitutional monarchy with Islam as the official state religion. Although it gave nonMuslim minorities the right to practice their religion, it attached within the law clause
that drew criticism from the Hindus of Afghanistan. The constitution did however put
secular law before Hanafi Sharia law to the discontentment of many mullahs. Moreover,

80

criticism centered around the article that banned anyone from competing for the royal
throne which stated that kingship would remain in the house of Mohammad Nadir Khan,
Zahir’s father, and in the event of the king’s death, the throne would be passed on to his
son, and so on (Dupree, 1973, p. 575). The constitution did mention that the Royal
Family couldn’t form political parties, or hold the positions of Prime Minister, Member
of Parliament or Justices to the Supreme Court (576). However, the article giving the
king the right to dissolve Parliament whenever he wished also raised debates in the Jirga
(p. 578). Regardless, Zahir finally adopted it on October 1, 1964 to a cheering Loya Jirga
crowd (p. 586).
The first general elections in the ‘New Democracy’ were held after the adoption
of the new constitution for the bicameral Parliament consisting of a 216-elected Wolesi
Jirga (Lower house) and an 84-member semi-elected and semi-appointed Mesharano
Jirga (Upper House) (Dupree, 1973, p. 587). The king appointed 28 members to the
Mesharano Jirga, while the rest were elected in provincial elections per 28 provinces (p.
587). The first elections were heavily influenced by the government, which still
controlled the media and run a heavily pro-government campaign through state press (p.
588). The concept of free elections, however, was new to Afghans especially in the rural
parts of the country (Dupree, 1973, p. 589).
The Parliament soon became a place of disagreements and the Wolesi Jirga split
into various groups, each driven by a certain ideology including the conservative
religious leaders, a laissez-faire economy group, a group favoring the King’s progressive
policies, a small group of liberals, and a far left Marxist group led by Babrak Karmal
(Dupree, 1973, p. 591). Intense tension broke out during the confidence vote ceremony of
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the Prime-Minister designate Dr. Mohammad Yusuf when Kabul University students
who had been attending the session in the spectators’ gallery began shouting antigovernment slogans (p. 591). Babrak Karmal, who had invited the students to disrupt the
confidence-vote hearing, invited more students to the next session a few days later when
the Wolesi Jirga was approving Dr. Yusuf’s cabinet. This time, the students chanted
phrases like ‘gaining freedom’, ‘exercising our constitutional right’ and “…sat in the
deputies’ seats and refused to leave until “the dishonest rascal have been driven from
government” (p. 592). The Parliament session was forced into adjournment.
For the next session on October 25, 1965, the Wolesi Jirga exercised its behindclosed-doors meeting clause but students poured in again with demonstrations beginning
early in the morning and lasting until the evening that day. In a sudden change of events,
Afghan troops opened fire on the slogan-yelling students killing three and wounding
others (Dupree, 1973, p. 592). This drew nationwide criticism against Zahir’s
government who promptly replaced Dr. Yusuf with Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal as
the new Prime Minister (p. 595). Schools in Kabul had been closed due to the protests but
reopened a month later and Mainwandwal went to personally offer sympathies and hear
students’ demands. Student protests against the government continued in spring 1965,
however.
The regime responded by promulgating freedom press laws in July 1965, which
immediately led to the creation of various private journals including the highly influential
Khalq (The Masses or The people). The Khalq journal, run by its liberal publisher Nur
Muhammad Tarakai, published only six issues before it was shut down by the
government in May 1966. But it had made its mark on the people by claiming “it was the
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democratic voice of the people” (Dupree, 1973, p. 601). Moreover, it declared that its
“policy would be to alleviate ‘the boundless agonies of the oppressed peoples of
Afghanistan’” (Dupree, 1973, p. 608). Khalq quickly gained large audience both among
the intelligent circles as well as the people.
The private journal, influenced by the Marxist ideology politically, had argued to
put all power in the hands of the people and economically “favored the public over the
private sector, and demanded land reform to release the Afghan peasant from ‘the feudal
system, which dominates Afghan society’” (Dupree, 1973, p. 608). The Khalq was soon
accused of being anti-monarchy, anti-Islam and anti-constitution, but the editors denied
all these allegations (p. 608). Regardless, it was shut down by the attorney’s office citing
its inflammatory rhetoric against the government. The shutting down of other major
newspaper and journals followed and by 1968, the government had effectively banned or
closed down all major print press such as Afghan Mellat, Masawat (“Equality”), Parcham
(“The Flag”) and Shula-ye-Jawed (“the Eternal Flame”) (p. 611).
However, from 1965 until 1968, students had held a peaceful day every year in
mourning for those who were killed in the 1965 student protests. In fact the rising student
and workers strikes eventually forced Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal
to resign in November 1967. A new Prime Minister Nur Ahmad Etemadi was sworn in by
the Parliament on June 11, 1968 (Dupree, 1973, p. 649). Parliament, however, had
become merely a ‘rubber-stamping’ service organ for the government. Intensely divided,
it failed to pass meaningful legislation and was often dysfunctional (p. 651).
Young, liberal and leftist candidates had predominantly contested the general
elections in the New Democracy period in 1965. However, even more minorities groups
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such as the Uzbeks, Tajik and Turkmens contested the 1969 elections (Dupree, 1973, p.
652). The newly elected assembly’s first meeting was in January 1970 where they
approved the new cabinet of the Prime Minister. Zahir, against some discontentment,
reappointed Ahmad Etemadi as the prime minister and because he held a large influence
and ‘political astuteness’ in the Parliament still, the lawmakers eventually swore-in
Etemadi in an overwhelming vote of confidence (186-to-16) (p. 654).
The monarchy progressively became unstable during the late 1960s and in early
1970s during the ‘New Democracy’ period. Frequent changes and resignations in the
prime minister posts, a divided parliament, a weaker monarchy, and continuous
demonstrations by students demanding more freedoms had all resulted in slow progress
towards a full democratic experience. In the span of less than a decade of the new
democratic constitutional monarchy, there had been four changes in the prime minister
position (Dupree, 1973, p. 662). Eventually, Prime Minister Etamadi’s government had
failed and he was forced to resign over differences with the Parliament on May 16, 1971
(p. 664). A few weeks later Zahir nominated Dr. Abdul Zahir as the fifth Prime Minister
in the past ten years. However, a sixth change prime minister followed quickly when the
king accepted Zahir’s resignation and appointed Mohammad Moosa Shafiq as the new
Prime Minister on December 12, 1972 (p. 666).
In mensurating the Zahir Shah regime, after the death of the first Muhasiban King
Nadir Shah, the remaining brothers quickly united and reasserted their control on the
monarchy. Although Nadir had been king only for five years, the Muhasibans had set a
strong precedent by maintaining internal stability. The legitimacy (1) of the monarchy,
therefore, was never in question as the Muhasiban family “reasserted their control,
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perhaps stronger than before” (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 117). Hundreds were
arrested on the conspiracy charges for the death of the deceased king and 18 were
executed (p. 117). Although the Muhasibans faced some resistance initially from the
Charkhi family, the transition of power (1) was stable and Afghanistan remained peaceful
for a decade after Nadir Shah’s death in 1933 (p. 117).
In King Zahir Shah’ forty-year long rule, the Muhasibans only faced a single lowresistance rebellion early on in 1939 in the eastern Khost region led by Pir Shami (the
“Syrian Siant”) (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 117). The saint, a far relative of former
Queen Soriya, had vowed to restore the deposed king Amanullah Khan back on the
throne, but it promptly failed when it did not gain enough followers and the British
convinced their leader to return to Syria in exchange for a large sum of money (p. 117).
Otherwise, the monarchy remained without any major uprisings (1) throughout the four
decades of Zahir Shah’s rule (p. 118).
Table 11: Z. Shah Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
1
1
1
0
0

Total
1
Scores
1
1
0
0
3

The Muhasibans had effectively controlled the state by “organizing the state’s
relatively small bureaucracy and military as ‘servants of the palace,’ patrimonial
institutions with little political influence and no autonomy” (Barfield, 2010, p. 210).
Hence, they had intended to stay (0) in power for the long term. However, even though
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Zahir Shah along with his uncles ruled for nearly four decades, the monarchy eventually
became weak and its downfall (0) came when Daud Khan carried out a coup against
Zahir on July 1973 (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 133).
Although Zahir established a quasi-liberal parliament during the constitutional
period and held partially free elections, he reigned as the supreme head of state (0)
throughout his rule, having the authority over the state (Dupree, 1973, p. 477). For much
of Zahir’s regime, key government positions (1) were filled by the royal family members
including Zahir’s eldest uncle Mohammad Hashim Khan as the prime minister from 1933
to 1946 and his younger brother Shah Mahmud from 1946 to 1948. However, the king
did appoint non-royal family members to the prime minister position and cabinet in his
last two decades in power (p. 477). Moreover, administrative positions were clearly
established throughout the king’s reign including the Defense Minister (1) who was in
charge of the national army (p. 477).
Political representation (1) increased rapidly during Zahir’s reign, especially
during the last two decades (Dupree, 1973, p. 494). Zahir tried to change the regime to a
constitutional monarchy and tried to establish a liberal Parliament twice during his fortyyear rule. The first Liberal Parliament was established in 1949 when Western-educatedreform-minded Afghans pushed for free elections (p. 494). The new 120-member
Parliament soon allowed freedom of press and held ministers accountable by calling them
in for questioning to the Parliament (p. 495). Moreover, dozens of newspaper
subsequently sprung up and began publishing articles critical of the monarchy. Numerous
political parties, some organized by university students, were established but the
monarchy initially ignored them as having little influence (p. 496).
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Table 12: Z. Shah Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total

Scores
0
1
1
1
0

Total
0
1
1
1
0
3

However, when criticism peaked against the monarchy, the regime struck back by
arresting the leaders of the free movement and shutting down anti-government
newspapers (Dupree, 1973, p. 497). Political opposition (0) and dissent were further
suppressed when Daud Khan became Prime Minister in 1953. Although initially there
was hope that Daud would release political prisoners and bring back the Liberal
Parliament, the opposite turned out to be true. The new Prime Minister “crushed
opposition as it rose, and made no pretense of returning to the days of ‘Liberal
Parliament’” (Dupree, 1973, p. 499).
Daud adopted a more autocratic style rule as Prime Minister by suppressing any
anti-government opposition (p. 500). Daud served as the Prime Minister for nearly ten
years and during this time broadened his political base and consolidated power (pp. 500555). When Zahir feared Daud’s grip on power and the military, he was forced to resign
on March 9, 1963 (p. 555). After forcing out Daud, Zahir Shah had realized the demand
for more freedom and in order to calm the public over the prime minister’s resignation,
the king announced a second experiment in democracy by switching to a full
constitutional monarchy (Dupree, 1973, p. 559).
Afghans rejoiced the ‘New Democracy’ movement and for the first time royal
family members were not allowed to hold executive cabinet positions in the Prime
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Minister’s office. In fact, when the new Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Yusuf, himself
an outsider, announced his cabinet, only four were from the Durrani Pashtun tribe while
two non-Durrani Pashtuns were appointed as well (p. 561). However, even during the
Constitutional Monarchy, the king held absolute power, and the government was not
stable. In fact, from 1965 until 1971, King Zahir Shah had shuffled the government five
times and re-appointed four different Prime Ministers and their respective cabinets (p.
692).
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Daud Khan, 1973-1978
Although Daud Khan’s overthrow of Zahir Shah’s monarchy was nonviolent, his
subsequent rule was dominated by violence amid the rise of various ideological political
movements. These new political movements had emerged as result of the failed
democratic experiment of the 1960’s (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 47). In order to avoid
cracking down on anti-government movements, such political groups began meeting
secretly (p. 47). The leftist-Marxist group, for instance, would regularly meet in private
homes led by a close circle of four Marxist leaders: Babrak Karmal (Pashtun Ghilzai with
Tajik origins), Nur Muhammad Tarakai (Ghilzai Pashtun), Mir Akbar Kheyber (leader of
the Hazara and Tajik members) and Badakhshi (Tajik Panjsheri who recruited Tajiks and
Uzbeks to the cause) (p. 48). It is important to note “how these small groups of left-wing
activists were already dividing along the tribal and ethnic lines of Afghanistan,
eventhough they were a powerless minority on the political scene at the time”
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 48).
By early 1970s, the Marxists and Islamists factions had emerged as the two
leading political forces during Daud’s regime. The Marxist-Communist Afghan faction
was led by Babrak Karmal and Nur Muhammad Tarakai (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 47).
Karmal, who had founded the Student Union in the early 1950s, had been imprisoned for
his part in organizing protests that led to the death of multiple university students in 1954
(p. 47). It was during his time behind bars when he became a committed Marxist and
adopted the name Karmal (‘Comrade of the Worker’s in Pashtu) in order to “dissociate
himself from his elitist bourgeois background” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 47). His
compatriot Nur Muhammad Tarakai had also been politically active during the 1950s as
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the editor of an influential weekly newspaper, where he wrote short Marxist stories
highlighting “the exploitation of the Afghan peasantry by landlords” (Rasanayagam,
2003, p. 47).
This small political group eventually turned into a full-scale political party known
as the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) formed by Karmal and Tarakai
in one of their secret meetings at the former’s house in January 1965 (Rasanayagam,
2003, p. 48). The objective of the party, which emerged in secret documents later in 1966
was, to “…‘resolve the fundamental contradictions of Afghan society’ which could only
be accomplished through socialism, and by the constitution of a ‘national government’”
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 48). However, soon after its founding, the PDPA had split into
two factions in 1967 due to ideological differences between Karmal and Tarakai. Karmal,
who believed in a democratic road to socialism, became the leader of the Parcham
(“Banner”) faction while Tarakai, who tended to be a supporter of a more ‘doctrinaire’
route to socialism, became the leader of the Khalq (“People”) faction (p. 49). The split in
the PDPA was also based on ethnic lines since Karmal had the support of the Tajiks and
Tarakai drew most of his support from the Pashtun populous.
The second main political faction, and the PDPA’s main opposition, in Daud’s
rule was the emergence of the inter-ethnic Islamist camp. This group founded in 1965 as
well, consisted of ustads (professors, teachers) including the Tajik Burhanuddin Rabani
and Pashtun Abdul Rasul Sayyaf of Kabul University’s Theology Department. The
movement had been organized as an Islamic political party under the Jamiat-i-Islami
(“Society of Islam”) led by Gholam Mohmmad Nyazi (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 50).
Highly influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamists argued for a Sharia
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Law based government but had little impact during the ‘New Democracy’ period in early
1960s (p. 52). This new Afghan Jamiat Party “served as a clandestine ideological
umbrella for its student wing, the Organization of Youth Movement, which operated
openly, organizing demonstrations and fighting communists” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p.
53). In fact, “Islamists won the student elections at Kabul University in 1970”
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 53).
Just as there was a split in the communist PDPA party, the Islamists similarly
broke into various factions. Burhanuddin Rabani along with his Tajik compatriot Ahmad
Shah Massud were firm believers of establishing a long-term Islamic state “including the
infiltration of the army and the bureaucracy, as they felt the Afghan people were not
ready to overthrow the establishment” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 53). A more radical
faction led by Pashtun Gulbuddin Hektmatyar preferred ‘direct’ confrontation’ by ‘means
of popular uprisings’ (p. 53). The “Islamists as a whole were not only critical of the royal
establishment, but also despised the tradition-bound ulema and opposed Pashtun
nationalism and the idea of a Pashtunistan. There was also a latent fragmentation along
ethno-linguistic lines in the Jamiat as in the PDPA” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 53).
By the time Daud had overthrown Zahir Shah’s monarchy in July 1973, these
parties were operating in full force (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 60). However, Daud initially
largely ignored both camps, as he was busy forming a new government after the success
of the coup. He changed the state into a Republic and then condemned the monarchy as
‘despotic regime,’ which was “founded on private and class interests’ (p. 61). Daud
declared himself the first president and prime minister of the new republic while also
holding the position of foreign affairs and defense (p. 61). Although Daud created a 50-
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member Central Committee to advise him, its full members were never revealed but it
included the leading Parcham leader Karmal, and other communist leaders such as Dr.
Anita Ratebzad and Noor Mohammad Noor (p. 61).
Daud shared Karmal's view that “the road to socialist revolution lay in the politics
of the ‘united front’: the participation of progressive social forces in a ‘national
democratic phase’” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 61). Hence, Karmal downplayed his own
party’s agenda and believed that Daud’s revolution was already implementing the shared
goals of the PDPA and any independent party action was believed to be
counterproductive. In other words, Karmal “hoped to use the ageing Daud to advance the
cause of his own revolution but without linking Parchamis too close to the regime”
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 61). Although six Marxist-Parchamis were appointed to Daud’s
cabinet, they never revealed their party affiliations and did not take any official position.
Karmal, however, had turned down the Daud’s offer of the deputy prime minister
position.
However, other notable Parchamis had adopted a more aggressive and blunt
approach to infiltrating Daud’s government. Many Parchamis were placed in high-level
ministries as well as lower level bureaucratic position for the purpose of pursuing
Parchami political agenda. Noor Mohammad, for example, headed a ‘military wing’ in
the government in order to stay connected to the progressive-minded army officers.
Moreover, Karmal and PDPA’s long term goal was to “weaken the Khalq faction of the
PDPA, with which he had been engaged in a bitter feud since the 1967 break-up”
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 61). However, Karmal’s political honeymoon with Daud did not
last long when Daud began purging PDPA sympathizers from the regime. After the 1973
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coup, Daud’s regime had rapidly grown into a one-man autocratic rule. Hence, a paranoid
Daud began a witch-hunt to eliminate all his rivals and “sought to manipulate, and when
[he] failed, he struck” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 62).
The PDPA’s response to the government crackdown was to set aside their
differences and rejoin the Pashtun Khalq and the Tajik Parcham factions (Rasanayagam,
2003, p. 65). In July 1977, both factions had merged to form a single party headed by a
30-member central committee (p. 65). However, “It was in reality a tenuous alliance, not
a reunification, so great was the rift in the PDPA as was shown up a year later after it
took power” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 65). Daud’s continued purge of the Parchamis had a
zero-sum effect in that as the Parchami’s presence in the army was reduced, the Khalq’s
presence and influence grew. Hafizullah Amin, one of the leaders of the Khalq faction,
had now replaced Karmal by taking control of the military wing and further infiltrating
the army (p. 65).
Daud had eventually lost a power base by distancing himself from his Soviet ally,
the Parchami faction, and had been “resorting to the age-old practices of nepotism and
buying allies where he could” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 65). Moreover, he was also
moving “towards a one-party dictatorship by banning all political activities and
opposition newspaper and by setting up his National Revolutionary Party”
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 65). PDPA’s infiltration of Daud’s army, however, continued,
and by 1976, Hafizullah Amin had prepared his military wing to a point “where the
Khalqis believed that they could ‘with a certain number of casualties on the part of the
armed forces topple the Daud government and wrest political control’” (Rasanayagam,
2003, p. 66). Moreover, Soviet trained government employees, who fully sympathized
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with the communist agenda, also filled hundreds of technical and professional posts in
Daud’s government.
Daud continued transferring many PDPA officials within the government to the
countryside to keep them off the capital (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). Most Parchamis either
quit their jobs or simply changed their avatar “making themselves indistinguishable from
the officials that they had replaced” (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). Feeling secure after driving
out all the Parchimis, Daud turned to decimating the Islamist camp, forcing many of their
leaders into exile after a plan to overthrow his government was uncovered. Although this
led to “A series of small-scale insurrections by Islamists in 1975, including one by
Ahmad Shah Massud in Panjshir Valley, [they] failed to generate any local support and
were easily crushed” (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). Daud used the uprising as an excuse to
arrest more Islamist leaders (p. 215).
After his coup against Zahir Shah, Daud had demonstrated “how easily a
government might be replaced by a military coup” (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). Thus, both
the Khalqis and the Islamists were continuously attempting to replicate Daud’s successful
coup and “In the absence of a mass political base [of these two] such a strike from within
was seen as a shortcut to power” (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). The Khalqis especially
preferred this route declaring, “Previously the army was considered a tool of the
dictatorship and despotism of the ruling class… [However], this too should be wrested in
order to topple the ruling class” (Barfield, 2010, p. 215).
In the end, Daud had filled his government with people loyal to him while forcing
out both Islamists and Communists from power, but his regime was largely unable to
“implement policies that challenged entrenched local interests” (Barfield, 2010, p. 224).
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For instance, “Provincial officials had a limited agenda: to keep the peace, suppress
banditry, see that conscription went smoothly, and collect what small amounts of taxes
the government still demanded” (Barfield, 2010, p. 224). Daud’s strategy was to abandon
building a rural political base and the “need to maintain political, financial, or ideological
support from the provincial population in order to carry out its policies” (Barfield, 2010,
p. 225). In other words, “National policies and programs were thus largely divorced from
rural areas…” (Barfield, 2010, p. 225)
In mensurating Daud Khan’s regime, he overthrew his cousin Zahir Shah’s
monarchy in July 1937 in a nonviolent coup and therefore, the transition (1) to power was
peaceful (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 133). Daud, who had been masterminding the
coup for over a year along with support of the leftist groups, revolted when king Zahir
Shah was on vacation in Italy (p. 133). The coup was possible because Daud had the
support of many generals in the National Army, and it took only a few hundred troops to
take over key governmental buildings in the capital Kabul without firing a shot (p. 133).
Although Daud did not concern himself with other’s opinions, he had justified the coup
by pointing out the slow economic progress under Zahir Shah and promising to bring new
economic development (p. 134).
Moreover, no one could question his regime’s legitimacy (1) especially since he
had received a warm welcome by many Afghans (p. 134). Although Daud maintained a
tight control over the state, he faced periodic uprisings (0) and ‘resistance movements’ (p.
135). Moreover, Daud had intended to extend (0) his ‘one-man’ autocratic rule as long as
he could, but his regime would eventually collapse (0) in a violent coup five years late in
1978 (p. 138).
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Table 13: D. Khan Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
1
1
0
0
0

Total
1
1
0
0
0
2

Daud was the absolute head of the state (0) of a one-party autocratic rule despite claims
his regime was a ‘Democratic’ Republic (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 135). He
simultaneously held several key government positions (0) including the presidency,
serving as his own prime minister as well as holding the positions of interior and defense
ministries (0), the latter effectively giving him total control over the national army (p.
135). Although Daud convened a Loya Jirga in 1977 to adopt a new constitution, “it
provided for a one-party state with a strongman president and a mixed economy with
state ownership…” (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 135).
Table 14: D. Khan Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total

Scores
0
0
0
1
0

Total
0
0
0
1
0
1

Moreover, Daud maintained tight control over the rising political movements and
completely banned any political opposition (0) against the state (Wahab & Youngerman,
2010, p. 135). His regime not only regularly executed leaders of political movements, but
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also arrested hundreds others (p. 135). Political representation (1), however, grew rapidly
during Daud Khan’s regime as the rise of political parties had continued from Zahir
Shah’s liberal parliament movement (p. 136). The two prominent parties were the PDPA
and the Islamists, both of whom had been anti-Daud, the former eventually overthrewing
his regime in military coup (p. 138).
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Nur Muhammad Tarakai, 1978-1979
The communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) rose to power
rapidly. The regime seized power after overthrowing Daud Khan’s republic in April 1978
after the ‘Saur Revolution’ (named after the second month of the Persian calendar)
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 67). The ‘revolution,’ however, was a full military coup d’état in
disguise, planned and executed by the leftist PDPA leaders and carried out by rogue
officers in the national army (p. 67).
The coup was precipitated by the assassination of a prominent PDPA leader Mir
Akbar Khyber, which spread fears among the other PDPA leaders (Rasanayagam, 2003,
p. 67). Just two days before the coup began, Daud Khan had finally arrested and taken all
of the PDPA leaders to prison including Tarakai and Karmal on the eve of April 25 (p.
68). The third highest PDPA leader, Hafizullah Amin, was able to distribute the secret
documents with instructions on how to carry out the coup before he was arrested the next
day, on the 26th of April (p. 68). These rash arrests soon spread panic throughout both the
Khalqi and Parchami camps of the PDPA amid rumors that Daud was planning to
eliminate them all (p. 68).
On the morning of April 27, Major Aslam Watanjar, a Khalqi officer of the
Fourth Corps was instructed to take over the Arg presidential palace. The plan was that an
air squadron would fly over the palace to signal the attack, and Abdul Qadir, a Parchami
leader of the rebel officers, would move in while other officers in position would take
over the Bagram Airforce simultaneously (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 69). Although the
coup was planned intricately, most of it occurred ‘fortuitously’ since not all went
according to plan. Regardless, officers charged the palace where Daud Khan was
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attending a meeting with his cabinet members and heavy shooting began (p. 69). The
bloodiest fighting took place between the rebel officers and a 2000-man presidential
guard protecting Daud and his family in the fortress-like palace. However, by the
morning of April 28, the royal guards had fought to the last man before rebel officers
broke in killing Daud and his family in his Arg home (p. 69). Because most fighting
occurred inside the Arg and Kabul, there was no military resistance in other parts of the
country (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 70).
A few days after the coup, the PDPA formed a 30-member Revolutionary Council
and shared the seats evenly among the Khalqi and Parchami members. In its first meeting
on May 1, the Council elected Tarakai as the prime minister, while Karmal, Amin and
Watanjar were all given deputy-prime minister positions (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 70).
Abdul Qadir and Mohammad Rafi, the other two Parchami leaders who had played a key
part in the coup, were rewarded with positions of Defense and Public Works ministries.
However, this “…power structure reflected in reality the outline of an incipient struggle
between Karmal and Amin, with the ineffectual and indecisive Tarakai in the background
as a figurehead” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 71). In other words, the PDPA had sat up not
one but three different governments for the sake of keeping a political balance. In fact,
“What appeared on the surface as an equitable political balance was in fact a fearful
symmetry, with the ‘tiger’ Amin, the actual architect of the revolution, waiting to pounce
when the opportunity arose” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 71).
However, a Soviet-style Politburo soon replaced the Revolutionary Council with
Tarakai making decisions at the top. In the May 24 meeting of the Buro, Amin
announced that ‘Khalq’ would be the victors of the revolution “without reference to the
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Parchami role...” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 71) The Buro also issued orders to print
pamphlets with new titles for Tarakai as the ‘Great Teacher’ and ‘Great Leader’ (p. 72).
These were attempts targeted to push away Karmal and his Parchami followers from
power. The main orchestrator of these maneuvers was Amin, who had been orchestrating
with Tarakai to sideline Parchamis from the government, and eventually in a real
Machiaviallian-style, take power for himself by taking down Tarakai (p. 72). Amin’s plan
to ‘outmaneuver’ the Parchamis continued and in the next meeting on June 27, the Buro
announced that “state policy would be decided exclusively by Khalq” while “Amin was
inducted to the Politburo and appointed to key post of general secretary” (Rasanayagam,
2003, p. 73). Amin’s last step in ousting the Parchamis was transferring them all abroad
as ambassadors (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 73).
However, a party veteran like Karmal could not be ousted from the government
easily. Before he moved to Prague to assume the ambassadorial role, he tried to plot a
coup against Amin and Tarakai to overthrow them. The coup was to be executed on the
national holiday of Eid, where most officers in the army would be on leave and hence
less resistance (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 73). Tarakai’s Defense Minister Qadir and the
Army Chief of Staff, General Shahpur Ahamdzai, both closeted Parchamis, would
organize and carry out the coup planned for September 4. But this plot failed when the
Afghan ambassador in Delhi ‘tipped off’ Tarakai. Qadir, Shahpur and others involved
were promptly arrested, tortured and jailed. The plot gave Amin another excuse to
eliminate the Parchamis and their sympathizers completely by killing and imprisoning
them (p. 73).
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After ousting their rival Parchamis from the government, Tarakai and Amin went
on an official visit to the Soviet Union in December 1978 to sign a Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation, which included a crucial clause requesting military assistance when
needed (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 79). The Soviet Union would later utilize this same treaty
as ‘legal ground’ for sending military troops to Afghanistan in February 1979 (p. 79).
While Tarakai and Amin were desperately asking for Soviet military help, the
Mujahideen and other guerrilla elements had intensified their attacks against the PDPA
around the country. Ismail Khan, a Mujahideen commander in Herat, led an attack on a
government regiment all the way to Kandahar but was crushed by paratroopers, which
took 25000 lives (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 80). Other major violent attacks broke out in
Jalalabad in April 1979 and Paktia provinces. In June, the regime faced large violent antigovernment demonstrations in the capital Kabul. Amid the growing violence and
instability around the country, Tarakai and Amin began blaming each other.
In the 28 July Politburo meeting, Amin openly held Tarakai responsible for
government’s failure due to his unilateral decision-making and suggested a ‘collective
leadership and collective decisions’. Key posts were redistributed and Tarakai was
reduced to a mere figurehead while Amin was able to take majority in the Politburo.
Although Tarakai was still the Defense Minister and Amin his deputy, the Foreign
Ministry and Interior ministries were both passed on to Amin’s loyalists. Moreover,
Amin gained control of the army as well as appointing one of his loyalists as the head of
the presidential guard (p. 80)
When Tarakai left for a summit in Havana on September 7, reports reached him
that Amin had begun conspiring to take over power and kill the ‘Great Leader’. Tarakai
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arranged for a secret meeting with the Soviet leader Brezhnev in Moscow on his way
back, where presumably Karmal was present too (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 81). It was
decided that Amin would be removed from the government and transferred as an
ambassador while a new government would be formed with Karmal as the prime
minister. But Amin, with his vast spy network, was a step ahead of Tarakai, and after his
return on September 15, he immediately put Tarakai under house arrest while notifying
the Central Committee that the ‘Great Leader’ had resigned (p. 81). A few weeks later,
Tarakai was presumed dead but both the exact date and cause are unknown and it is
therefore presumed that he died either on 8 or 9 of October 1979 by being suffocated by a
pillow in the Arg palace or being hanged in the prison (p. 81).
In mensurating Nur Muhammad Tarakai’s regime, both the PDPA and Tarakai’s
claims to legitimacy (0) were overshadowed by their violent takeover of power after
overthrowing Daud Khan’s regime. Most Afghans saw the coup as ‘orchestrated’ with
Soviet Union’s help (Maley, 2009, p. 23).
Table 15: N. M. Tarakai Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
0
0
0
0
0

Total
0
0
0
0
0
0

The transition (0) to power from Daud Khan to PDPA was one of the most violent
periods in Afghanistan’s history (p. 23). The Khalqi and Parchami officers who carried
out the coup killed and massacred hundreds including president Daud Khan and his
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family (p. 23). Internal disputes in the party over executive power had weakened the
PDPA from the beginning. Only a few months after the PDPA took power, several
uprisings (0) led by various Mujahideen leaders had broken out against the regime (p.
26).
The first mass uprising began in March 1979 in Herat, which was actually a “…
‘mutiny’ by the 17th Division of the Afghan Army… in response to the brutality of the
Khalq activists” (Maley, 2009, p. 26). The uprisings had served as warning to the PDPA
and their sponsor Soviet Union, which had cautioned, “under no circumstance may we
lose Afghanistan” (Maley, 2009, p. 27). Not only the Soviet Union, but the PDPA had
also made it clear that they were intending to stay in power (0) for the long run to
implement their ambitious socialist agenda (p. 25). By September 1979, Hafizullah Amin
had effectively ousted Tarakai from power and had taken over the prime minister position
in the Politburo (p. 27). Tarakai was eventually sidelined from power but his rule ended
(0) completely after he was ‘murdered’ mysteriously in his home (p. 28).
Table 16: N. M. Tarakai Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total

Scores
0
0
0
1
0

Total
0
0
0
1
0
1

For over a year, the PDPA Khalq and Parcham factions struggled over sharing political
positions in the government and military (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 154). After
the new regime was announced, Nur Muhammad Tarakai was appointed as the president
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and prime minister, therefore giving him supreme authority in the Politburo-style party
(Maley, 2009, p. 24). Other key government positions (0) were shared among the other
PDPA leaders who had helped organize and carry out the coup (p. 24). Hafizullah Amin
was appointed as the Foreign Minister, while Abdul Qadir took the position of Defense
Minister (0) and Babrak Karmal was made the deputy prime minister (Maley, 2009, p.
24).
Although the PDPA shared high government positions among themselves and
their friends, political representation (1) was surprisingly high. While Pashtuns still
dominated the government, the old Persian-speaking Muhammadzai elites were replaced
by the eastern tribal-background Ghilzai Pashtuns (Barfield, 2010, p. 226). Hence the
PDPA had ended the centuries old monarchic rule by overthrowing the last royal Durrani
monarchs, opening way for various minority ethnic groups, in particular the Ghilzai, who
had been marginalized from politics for centuries (p. 226). However, the PDPA lacked
internal support from the majority of Afghans, and therefore used brutal tactics and the
military as a tool to crack down on any (0) opposition (p. 228). Such brutality was
evident in the elimination of Daud Khan and the subsequent murders of PDPA’s own
political leaders (p. 228).
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Hafizullah Amin, 1979
Amid the internal PDPA rivalries and struggles for power, Hafizullah Amin
eventually rose to power, replacing Tarakai as president of the party in April 1979
(Barfield, 2010, p. 228). However, the internal rivalries had become so destructive that of
half of the PDPA’s original eighteen thousand members, and the twenty eight thousand
who later joined the Party after the revolution, were either killed, ousted or left the Party
in a year (p. 228). A month later after assuming power, Amin had Tarakai assassinated
after discovering a Soviet-planned coup to overthrow him from power (p. 228). Amin
began his Khalqi rule by launching a series of new radical socialist reforms including
“land reform, equality for women, the abolition of marriage payments, and the
cancellation of many types of rural debts…” (Barfield, 2010, p. 229)
Although some of these reforms such as women’s rights and marriage dowry were
dated back to Amanullah Khan’s regime, the “land redistribution and rural debt were
new” (Barfield, 2010, p. 229). The Parchami camp and the Soviet Union advisors had
warned against sweeping reforms in a “country as socially conservative and economically
underdeveloped as Afghanistan” (Barfield, 2010, p. 229). However, Amin and his Khalqi
faction considered themselves ‘visionaries’ and called it a “revolutionary duty” to
transform Afghanistan into a communist state and crush anyone who opposed them (p.
229). The rationale was that the modern military was far stronger than any tribal militia
force and therefore, no one would be able to stop them. However, while previous regimes
such as the Muhasiban rulers were largely successful in employing military to stay in
power and keeping rebellions in check, the PDPA faced far more rebellions that were
almost always more violent (p. 229).
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The rebellions against Amin’s regime intensified due to the radical economic and
land redistribution policies based on socialist-Marxist principles of the Soviet Union (p.
230). The traditionally tribal Afghan society starkly opposed the implementation of such
polices and compared them to the Soviet Union collectivization scheme. But Amin
committed and pushed for the PDPA’s goals “…to break down the qawm-based political
structure by which rural communities had insulated themselves from the central
government and its officials for generations” (Barfield, 2010, p. 231). The rural people,
however, did not share the government’s vision and had traditionally favored the “live
and let live” principle when dealing with the central government. Moreover, the PDPA
was also “…not equipped to implement radical policies that struck at the core of the rural
economy and society” (Barfield, 2010, p. 231).
Facing insurmountable resistance from the villages, the Khalqis were forced to
abandon their ‘Cultural Revolution’ and shifted focus entirely to the urban areas such as
the capital Kabul, where the authority of the central government was strong. The
resistance, however, was gaining momentum and continued fighting the infidel regime.
Through kinship, ethnic ties and using common rhetoric, the tribal chiefs reached out to
their followers “…to defend their property, the faith of Islam, and the honor of their
families against outsiders” (Barfield, 2010, p. 232). The rural people “…objections to the
PDPA’s economic policies were combined with objections to its social policies,
especially those relating to marriage customs and women” (Barfield, 2010, p. 232).
Therefore, the opposition was almost paradoxical because it “...was pervasive but noncentralized… without having an easily identifiable enemy at the national or international
level” (Barfield, 2010, p. 232).
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In mensurating Hafizullah Amin’s regime, his transition (0) and his subsequent
first 100 days in power were unstable (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 81). Uprisings (0) against
his regime had intensified and virtually 75% of the country had rebelled against him (p.
81). The PDPA army had been reduced to less than a third due to constant desertions
from the 100,000 soldiers it maintained when it had come to power only a few months
earlier (p. 81). By autumn 1979, Amin had realized that his position was ‘vulnerable’ and
his relationship with the Soviet Union had progressively become worse, he began looking
for support elsewhere to prolong (0) his rule including reaching out to Pakistan and the
U.S. for support (p. 81). Amin even offered to recognize the Durand Line as the
international boundary between the two countries if Pakistani Prime Minister Zia Ulhaq
would stop supporting his enemies, the Peshawar based Islamic parties, but this never
materialized. Amin also desperately tried to repair relations with the U.S., which had cut
off aid programs after the death of its Ambassador Dubs in Kabul.
Table 17: H. Amin Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
0
0
0
0
0

Total
0
0
0
0
0
0

Despite these efforts, Amin’s downfall (0) was imminent as he was at odds with
the Soviet Union, the biggest supplier of aid and weapons to the PDPA (Rasanayagam,
2003, p. 82). In fact, in July 1979, the East German ambassador had told a U.S. charge’
d’affairs that Moscow considered Amin’s departure from the PDPA as the political
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solution to the problems of the regime (p. 82). By late 1979, Amin’s regime had become
weak, had lost legitimacy (0) and was near total collapse (Rasanayagam, 2003). In March
1979, Herat had fallen to the Mujahideen and Tarakai had summoned the chief Soviet
Military adviser General Gorelov and the charge d’affairs to ask for help (Rasanayagam,
2003, p. 84). The General had interpreted this meeting to mean that Afghanistan was
asking for military help. However, there were disagreements over deploying troops in the
Soviet Politburo, with some arguing that there was no legal justification under
international law to send troops (p. 85).
Brezhnev agreed with the Politburo decision to not send troops but did allow
delivering six MI-24s between June-Jul 1979. In the May 24 meeting, the Politburo again
approved military equipment but denied Tarakai’s request for helicopters and tanks. In
fact, “Contrary to what was bruited about in the international media at the time, and later
in the extensive literature… the Soviet leadership was not at all eager to send their armed
forces into Afghanistan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 87). Tarakai and Amin, however,
persistently asked for an active Soviet military role including creating a legal scenario at
the request of Afghanistan, but the Soviet denied the request.
Table 18: H. Amin Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total
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Scores
0
0
0
0
0

Total
0
0
0
0
0
0

However, it wasn’t until June 18 when Soviet Union appointed four-member
Commission on Afghanistan published an official report that led the Soviet leadership to
consider removing Amin from power. The report presented to the Soviet Union’s Central
Committee had concluded that the army (0) was the PDPA’s main weakness
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 88). Moreover, the transcript had cited reasons that Amin had
become a ‘dictator’, had been running ‘smear’ campaigns against the Soviet Union and
had been ‘mending’ relations with the U.S. as the ground for launching a Soviet Union
military intervention (p. 90). Hence, by November 1979, the Soviet leadership had come
to consensus that change in PDPA party leadership (0) was needed, and Amin was too
dangerous to be left in power (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 90).
Although other options such as poisoning Amin’s food through his Russian cooks
were considered, but these plans went ‘awry’ and in the end, on December 31, 1979,
Russian KGB commandos launched a surprise attack on Amin’s residence by infiltrating
his presidential home in Arg, killing the guards, and assassinating him in the operation
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 91). In the end, Hafizullah Amin had ruled for less than five
months after his rise to power by ousting his opposition (0) Khalq, and his regime was
known to be one of the ‘worst in Afghanistan’s modern history” (Maley, 2009, p. 28).
Political representation (0) was nonexistent, as Amin had filled top government positions
(0) with his Parchami ‘loyalists, family and friends’ (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p.
154).
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Babrak Karmal, 1979-1986
After Hafizullah Amin’s assassination, Babrak Karmal was appointed as the head of the
PDPA on December 28, 1979. He paid lip service to Nur Muhammad Tarakai and
blamed ‘the rogue’ Amin for his death (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 94). Karmal soon
embarked on his mission to set up a ‘national democratic government’ “…that would
mobilize all sectors of society before a socialist transformation could be affected”
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 94). The new PDPA had also opened the party to outsiders by
appointing 78 new non-party members out of the total 191 by May 1980 (Rasanayagam,
2003, p. 94). Karmal’s approach was to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people
through rolling back controversial reforms, releasing prisoners and allowing exiles to
return through amnesty (p. 94).
Karmal also reached out to the Islamic elements by establishing a Ministry of
Islamic Affairs, although this was merely a political move to keep the clergy in check by
making them government employees. Moreover, Karmal ordered building new mosques,
34 new ones in Kabul alone, while renovating the ones that had been damaged in the war
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 94). However, all of these strategies fell short of rallying the
Afghan population to his side. The cry for a jihad, a holy war for the liberation of
Afghanistan from the infidels, was echoed all over the country. Karmal was accused of
inviting the infidel Red Army, and protests against his regime multiplied (p. 95). By
summer 1981, Karmal’s regime had grown so desperate that he rolled back PDPA’s core
land reforms and eased national military service. Although these changes were
appreciated in the urban areas, they did not have an effect on the rural population.
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Furthermore, the Karmal regime was weakened by internal disagreements in the
PDPA ranks. Some nationalist Khalqis had accused him of ousting Amin and bringing
the occupying Red Army to the country (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 95). In one instance,
Karmal was left red faced when he had ordered a new flag to be marched in a military
parade only to find out that the Khalqis still carried their traditional red banner (p. 96).
Karmal was powerless to take action against the Khalqis fearing they would revolt. These
pro-Khalqi elements, which were also loyal to Tarakai’s memory, began rallying around
the nationalist Sarwari, who had sought the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. Karmal,
however, soon sent Sarwari away by appointing him as the ambassador to Mangolia.
Next, he began filling the Puli-i-Charkhi prison with disobeying Khalqis officers,
cadres and three ministers (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 96). Around 600 officers were
imprisoned on conspiracy charges in January 1980 alone, although some managed to flee
and joined the resistance. Essentially, Karmal’s regime was effectively divided within.
Karmal, a Parchami leader, for example could not remove the Khalqi Interior Minister
Syed Gulabzoi and instead set up a separate Intelligence Department independent from
the ministry’s jurisdiction (p. 96). This new department called by its Persian acronym
KHAD was led by Karmal loyalist Dr. Mohammad Najibullah, who was a brigadier by
rank (p. 97). KHAD was soon given a complete military division with helicopters, tanks
and armored vehicles, and was taken under the KGB wing. The department besides its
main task of gathering intelligence had other responsibilities such as making arrests,
suppressing border tribes, carrying out assassinations, and covert operations (p. 97).
The PDPA army, however, was becoming weaker and dwindling in size through
defections and desertions of officers. A year after the Soviet invasion, the army had been
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reduced to 30,000 men, only a third of the original size (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 99). The
membership in the PDPA was similarly decreasing and by 1982, despite Karmal’s
exaggerated claims that the PDPA had 70,000 members, the true membership was closer
to 20,000 (p. 98). Seeing that Karmal’s regime was unstable, the Soviet Union began a
long-term strategy of indoctrination in order to continue pursuing Soviet national
interests. A new nationwide program called Young Pioneers recruited some 40,000
school children some as young as ten, both through volunteering and coercion, to be
admitted to the Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan, a shadow organization
run by KHAD to spread communist propaganda (p. 98). The Russian language had
become compulsory in schools, and students in Kabul University were required to take
political courses in Marxist-Leninist theories. Moreover, thousands of Afghan students
were sent to the Soviet Union for “advanced political indoctrination” (Rasanayagam,
2003, p. 99).
In effect, the Soviet Union had begun implementing a full ‘Sovietization’ and the
‘divide and rule’ policies in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union began utilizing its old
strategy of “Nationalities Policy” in Afghanistan, which aimed at giving ‘autonomy’ to
Soviet republics based on ethnic and linguistic lines. The PDPA raised some regional
minority languages such as Uzbek, Turcoman, Baluchi and Nuristani to national status.
Moreover, the PDPA began promoting the cultures of different ethnic minority groups
through media and began educating children in their mother tongues (Rasanayagam,
2003, p. 99). Nationalist Afghans saw these policies as “an attempt to isolate ethnic
groups from each other and from the wider Muslim world, as the Soviets had done in
Central Asia, and to drive a wedge between these groups and Pashtuns who had
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traditionally dominated Afghan politics” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 99). In the southern and
eastern Pashtun regions, the divide and rule policy would pit tribal maliks against one
another, and whoever would support the communist regime, would be rewarded with
weapons and cash (p. 100).
Despite the active exploitation of the ethnic groups, Karmal was cautious with the
Pashtun tribes and exercised “a flexible and conciliatory policy… in effort to choke off
the Mujahideen supply lines from Pakistan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 100). For instance,
the eastern Pashtun Mohmand tribe was “won over by offers of food, fuel, weapons and
cash subsidies” (p. 100). Karmal’s attempts to lure other tribes to his side had reached its
peak when in September 1985, 4,000 members from various tribes gathered to make the
regime more ‘palatable’ to the eastern Pashtun tribes. In order to make his government
appear credible, Karmal himself had to attend to fend off claims that he had been brought
to power by Soviet tanks. However, new rumors about his mistress and his ‘drunken
bouts had further crippled Karmal’s reputation and had reduced him to a Soviet puppet.
Moreover, by mid-1985, there had also been an important shift in power when Mikhail
Gorbachev came to power as the new general secretary of the CPSU. From early on,
Gorbachev had intentions of withdrawing the Red Army and indicated that a regime
under Karmal was not plausible (p. 101).
The Afghan Mujahideen resistance against the PDPA meanwhile continued in full
force. Hundreds of thousands Afghan refugees had been displaced by the civil war and
settled in the neighboring Pakistan. The United States and Saudi Arabia channeled aid,
weapons and money, while Pakistan’s ISI had created sanctuaries, recruited fighters and
ran training camps for the resistance (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 103). The number of
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Afghan refugees who settled on the other side of the border in Pakistan grew rapidly from
80,000 in 1978 to 400,000 by 1980 (p. 103). Pakistan had the monopoly on the
distribution of aid and required that the refugees had to join one of the seven Islamic
Peshawar-based parties in order to be eligible to receive aid, food rations as well as
weapons and money for the Mujahideen (p. 103). These parties, which were operating in
Afghanistan as early as 1980 against the PDPA, included Jamiat-i-Islami led by the Tajik
Burhanuddin Rabbani; Hizbi-i-Islami led by the Ghilzai Pashtun Gulbuddin Hektmatyar;
a small faction led by Pashtun Mullah Omar who would later become the leader of the
Taliban; Ittehad-i-Islami led by the Pashtun Wahabi Abdul Rasul Sayyaf; and two
additional parties that were recognized by the Pakistani government were headed by the
Pashtun Sufi leaders Sibghatullah Mujadaddi and Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gailaini (p. 104).
By 1986, it had become clear that forces were against Karmal. The opinion in
Moscow was that his government was not popular with the Afghans anymore and that a
change was necessary. An article in the Pravda had specifically singled out Karmal’s
regime for losing popularity (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 119). Even though Karmal had
called nation-wide elections to a long-awaited Jirga, his regime had lost credibility and he
had to go. Eventually, on the eve of the anniversary of the Saur Revolution in April 1986,
Karmal was called up to Moscow, and was promptly replaced by Dr. Najibullah to take
“the salute at the celebratory military parade” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 119). After a
month, the PDPA ‘unanimously’ elected Najibullah as the new general secretary of the
Committee Central (p. 119).
In mensurating Babrak Karmal’s regime, his transition (0) to power came at the
expense of Hafizullah Amin’s life, who was assassinated in a KGB operation by the
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Soviet Union (Maley, 2009, p. 71). After Karmal was appointed as the new head of the
PDPA, Afghanistan had descended into a civil war and resistance movements (0) had
been fighting the regime on all fronts (p. 72). In August 1982, Karmal’s government
suffered a ‘setback’ when the rebels attacked Bagram Airbase destroying dozens of
aircraft (p. 72). However, the regime’s fighting against the Mujahideen went on until late
1986 (p. 73). Karmal also struggled to gain legitimacy (0) for his regime because its
survival relied on foreign military protection (p. 77). Karmal had intended to stay (0) in
power for as long as possible but his regime eventually lost support within the party and
the Soviet Union (p. 78). Although his regime did not collapse (1) because of the Soviet
Union military assistance, its influence and control was limited to the urban cities under
its control (p. 79).
Table 19: B. Karmal Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
0
0
0
0
1

Total
0
0
0
0
1
1

The Soviet Union installed Karmal as the new supreme head of the PDPA (0)
after removing Hafizullah Amin era from power (Barfield, 2010, p. 237). In 1980,
political representation (1) briefly surged after Karmal released political prisoners,
“rescinded the signature Khalqi decrees on land reform, rural debt, and women’s rights,
and abandoned the revolutionary red flag for a version of Afghanistan’s old tricolor one”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 237). Moreover, having Moscow’s support Karmal had intended to

115

keep the PDPA’s monopoly (0) on power in Kabul and would not let the socialist
revolution falter (p. 237). In fact, Karmal was so close to the Soviet Union initially that
he had become another symbolic leader similar to the British’s ally Shah Shuja (p. 237).
Table 20: B. Karmal Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representations
Political Opposition
Grand Total

Scores
0
0
0
1
0

Total
0
0
0
1
0
1

Furthermore, during Karmal’s regime, the Soviet Union deployed overwhelming
force to fight the political opposition (0) hoping that the resistance would eventually tire
out from fighting (Barfield, 2010, p. 238). This strategy included heavy bombardment,
planting widespread landmines, depopulation of villages as well as controlling the urban
centers and cutting supply chains to resistance controlled areas (p. 238). However, none
of these tactics were successful in ending the resistance and the rebels were not willing to
make peace as long as there was Soviet military presence in the country (p. 238).
The Soviet Union also invested to build up the PDPA army (0) to 90,000 hoping
that they would do much of the fighting; however the commanders refused to go on
missions and had secret truce zones with the Mujahideen (Barfield, 2010, p. 238). The
Mujahedeen’s momentum grew stronger as they acquired more experience on the
battlefield and more sophisticated weapons such as the American supplied anti-aircraft
Stinger missiles in 1986, which “thereby greatly reducing Soviet air superiority on the
battlefield” (Barfield, 2010, p. 238). Eventually, the PDPA and the 11,000 Soviet soldiers
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were not able to “pacify” the country and were in a stalemate against the Mujahideen
except from holding them off to overthrow the PDPA regime in Kabul (p. 238).
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M. Najibullah Ahmadzai, 1986-1992
Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai, also known as Najib or Dr. Najib, succeeded
as the new head of the PDPA party in 1986 (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 199). Belonging to
the Ghilzai Pashtun tribe, Najib had been active in Afghan politics since he was a high
school student, organizing and participating in protests. Moreover, he was loyal to
Moscow and was considered as “Gorbachev’s chosen instrument to carry out his game
plan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 199). A few months after taking power, Najib announced a
national reconciliation program to the Mujahideen making three promises: declaring ‘a
six-month unilateral cease-fire, offering to form a coalition government of ‘national
unity’ with the Mujahideen and accommodating the return of over 5 million refugees
from Pakistan and Iran (p. 199).
However, both the Mujahideen leaders in Pakistan as well as the radical Khalqis
were equally opposed to these offers, as the former sought to topple Najib’s regime and
latter felt betrayed by him for abandoning the socialist revolution (Barfield, 2010, p.
239). Regardless, Najib established the ‘Extraordinary Supreme Commission for National
Reconciliation’ with branches all around the country, urging relatives and friends of those
fighting in the resistance to accept peace in return for tax concessions and confiscated
property as well as ‘deferment of military service’ (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 119).
There was broad support and excitement among the Afghan refugee camps that
had shown eagerness to return home, but the seven-party Peshawar alliance had rejected
Najib’s program. The parties had their own agendas for ruling Afghanistan and rejected
sharing power. However, a survey conducted among the Afghan refugees had shown that
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less than one percent of refugees “would choose one of the seven Peshawar leader to rule
a free Afghanistan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 120).
Najib continued with the reconciliation program by extending the ceasefire for
another six months in June 1987. In July of the same year, he ordered a new constitution
to be drafted and again invited the Peshawar based oppositions to build a coalition
government and end their resistance (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 121). A Loya Jirga
officially adopted the new constitution in November 1987 establishing Islam as the state
religion and in theory, making Afghanistan a ‘multi-party parliamentary democracy’ (p.
121). In April 1988, new elections were held under the new constitution and a quarter of
the seats in the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) were left vacant for the opposition. Although
the PDPA allocated seats in the parliament to non-PDPA, most of the non-PDPA
members came from the National Fatherland Front, a sub-faction of the PDPA
communist party (p. 121).
Meanwhile, the efforts to withdraw Soviet troops finally paid off when all parties
reached an agreement in the Geneva Accords. With Deigo Cordovez as the mediator,
“The agreement [which] concluded on 14 April 1988 by the foreign ministers of
Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States…called for the withdrawal
of all Soviet troops within nine months, non-interference in each other’s affairs by
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the voluntary repatriation of the Afghan refugees”
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 121). Although these accords received universal acclaim for
ending the war, they are in fact seen as a factor for continuation. Some observers noticed
that Cordovez had viewed the conflict in terms of a Cold War proxy between the
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superpowers Moscow and Washington, rather than focusing on its political and social
origins in Afghanistan.
Moreover, Cordovez included as few parties to the negotiation as possible and
had left out the leaders of the Mujahideen resistance in the negotiations as well as other
regional players such as Iran (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 121). Although later Cordovez did
try to start a negotiation process between PDPA and the Seven-Party Alliance in
Peshawar by sending out a memorandum to the U.S., Soviet Union, Pakistan and
Afghanistan, his proposal was not adopted officially. The failure was due to two factors,
internal disagreements between the Seven-Parties and Zia Ulhaq’s agenda, which was to
“establish in Kabul a government amenable to Pakistani interests and dominated by his
fundamentalist Pashtun clients in Peshawar” (p. 122).
Gorbachev officially announced that Soviet troops would begin their withdrawal
on February 8, 1988 and complete it within the next ten months. The Geneva Accords
were officially signed on April 14 1988 in the UN branch at Geneva, Switzerland.
However, the U.S. had informed the UN secretary-general that the U.S. reserved the right
to supply aid to Mujahideen, as did the Soviet Union. In essence, the war went on as both
side continued to send weapons covertly meeting ‘restraint with restraint’ (Rasanayagam,
2003, p. 124). On February 15, 1989 the Soviet Union completed their withdrawal when
its last convoy left Afghanistan, leaving Najib’s government in charge. It was expected
that Mujahideen would swarm Kabul and Najib’s regime would fall within weeks after
Soviet troops left but because they were unorganized, ill-equipped and lacked a concrete
strategy, but Najib was able to hold on to power.
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However, the Mujahideen continued their attacks on Najib’s government while
receiving support from the Pakistani Secret Service ISI, which mobilized fighters on the
Peshawar side to capture the eastern Jalalabad city (Barfield, 2010, p. 241). ISI’s plan
initially was to take Jalalabad and move in on the capital Kabul but Najib’s army was
able to hold off the attack and prevent the fall of the capital in March 1989 (p. 241). ISI’s
failed attempt to bring down the regime gave Najib a much-needed dose of confidence.
Moreover, the rebels had proved to be incapable of maintaining momentum and lacked a
common command structure (p. 241). The internal disorganization and rivalries among
the Mujahideen seemed to affect their goal of reaching political leadership.
In a country where winners and losers are determined by whoever “turns a
perception into reality,” Najib seemed like a winner who could stand on his own in the
absence of Soviet Union (Barfield, 2010, p. 241). Moreover, the perception that
Mujahideen would easily take Kabul after the Soviet withdrawal was now waning.
Although the Mujahideen dismantled many PDPA outposts elsewhere in the country
especially in eastern Khost province, the number of Mujahideen commanders “willing to
cut deals” with Najib increased after the failed Jalalabad offensive. Najib’s regime now
appeared to “have more life left in it” but the important question remained whether with
Russians out if Najib could “frame the ongoing conflict as an internal Afghan affair, a
dispute among fellow Muslims that could not be justified as a jihad” (Barfield, 2010, p.
241).
Meanwhile the PDPA continued to receive money and arms from the Soviet
Union while the Mujahideen were funded and received weapons largely from the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia. Defections and switching sides for personal gain and better pay rather
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than ideology were common. Similarly “At the national level, the philosophical
differences between the resistance and the Kabul regime, which seemed so sharp when
the war began, blurred with time” (Barfield, 2010, p. 244). Najib capitalized on the
Soviet withdrawal portraying himself as a nationalist and a Muslim who “could protect
Afghanistan’s interests better than the Peshawar-based party leaders” (Barfield, 2010, p.
244).
Najib offered the Mujahideen cease-fires and autonomy to run their own militias,
which attracted about 20 percent of the Mujahideen fighters into joining his government.
Of the estimated 85,000-man army between 1988–89, the number of Mujahideen had
been decreased to 55,000 by 1990 (Barfield, 2010, p. 244). Najib’s strategy was to use
the Soviet Union financial support to offer resistance money and weapons while
simultaneously consolidate power “through networks of patronage and by maintaining a
powerful military” (Barfield, 2010, p. 244). In 1988, around seven hundred thousand
militias were on Najib’s payroll while the Soviet Union was willing to “provide [Najib]
with food, fuel, cash, and (covertly) weapons)” (Barfield, 2010, p. 244).
However, Najib’s government also faced “devolution of power” after the Soviet
withdrawal in 1989. This shift in the structure and dynamics of the contemporary Afghan
politics gave way for regional players to play a direct role in the country. For the first
time in the recent history, the central government in Kabul lacked the traditional
dominance it had exerted over the country for decades (Barfield, 2010, p. 246). The
Mujahideen aligned with regional players out of “necessity” as they depended on the
support of outside players and had to expand their power base beyond the local-level
commanders to fight the war (p. 246). Although the PDPA continued to implement a
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Kabul-central government to better control the territories, the country was eventually
divided into seven military zones with their own autonomy. As the resistance gained
momentum, Najib primarily focused on safe guarding the northern territory on the border
with the Soviet Union that allowed the essential aid and supply line for the government
(p. 246).
Najib’s regime came to the brink of collapse, however, when Soviet aid was
briefly cut during the failed coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 leaving Afghanistan
“without enough fuel and food for the winter” (Barfield, 2010, p. 248). However, things
became worse when all Russian support and aid suddenly stopped in December 1991
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving Najib’s regime in a critical condition (p.
248). The army had shrunk facing heavy desertions while corruption in the regime had
“absorbed 85 to 90 percent of the Soviet aid intended for the population as a whole”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 248). And because Najib’s regime survival entirely depended on
“distribution” of Soviet aid to the factions that made up his government’s backbone, “the
sudden end of such outside assistance was a fatal blow to his regime” (Barfield, 2010, p.
248). Eventually, in March 1992 Najib resigned and agreed to an UN-brokered
transitional agreement, which would create a new government.
The end of Najib’s regime alarmed all the parties as different factions began
attempts to dominate the new government. However, none were powerful or big enough
on their own to form a central government, which soon led to a process of political
compromises and alliances based on region and ethnicity (Barfield, 2010, p. 248). The
radical Khalqis that had opposed Najib joined Hekmatyar’s Pashtun based Islamist party.
The Uzbek Dostum joined with the influential northern Tajik Massud’s party in the north.
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This ensued a power struggle to take over the capital between Hekmatyar and Massud,
with the latter beating the former by arriving a day earlier to occupy Kabul in April 1992
(p. 248). Meanwhile, Najib sought political asylum at the United Nations headquarters in
Kabul and “disappeared from view” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249).
In mensurating M. Najibullah Ahmadzai’s regime, Mikhail Gorbachev had
replaced Karmal with Najib as the new General Secretary of the PDPA Central
Committee on May 4, 1986 (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 172). Although this
transition (1) of power within the PDPA was peaceful, the civil war continued to rage on
in virtually all parts of Afghanistan and hence, Najib struggled to legitimize (0) his
regime (Maley, 2009, p. 90). Resistance continued (0) as Najib’s regime faced attacks in
the northern Panjsheer Valley from Ahmad Shah Massud, in the central Hazarajat region
from Shura-i-Ettefaq and in the eastern and southeastern regions from various
Mujahideen commanders including Hekmatyar (p. 95). Regardless, Najib had continued
to consolidate his power (0) to maintain his grip on the regime (p. 97). However, after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992, Najib’s regime collapsed (0) in April 1992 (p.
140).
Table 21: M. N. Ahmadzai Regime
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total
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Scores
0
1
0
0
1

Total
0
1
0
0
1
2

When Najib became the supreme head (0) of the PDPA, he began a complete
purge of the party by routing out his political opposition (0) in order to take total control
of the party (Maley, 2009, p. 98). He took over the Chairman of the Revolutionary
Council in 1987 and ‘demoted’ many of Karmal’s supporters while “promoting persons
loyal to him” (Maley, 2009, p. 98). Moreover, he ‘systematically’ removed all prominent
influential elite within the PDPA who would stand in his way to gain complete authority
(p. 98).
Table 22: M. N. Ahmadzai Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total

Scores
0
1
0
1
0

Total
0
1
0
1
0
2

By 1986, Najib had replaced all key figures from top positions within the party including
the regional head of the party in Herat, the Secretary of the Revolutionary Council and
head of the secret police (Maley, 2009, p. 98). He did, however, appoint the Minister of
Defense (1) and allowed him to exercise full authority (p. 98).
Najib did make attempts to increase popular political representation (1) in his
regime (Maley, 2009). He began a ‘National Reconciliation’ program to invite the
Mujahideen to end the fight and join his government (Maley, 2009, p. 100). He also
assembled a Loya Jirga, which adopted the ‘Constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan’,
although the document did not limit Najib’s own power in any meaningful way (p. 101).
It was merely used to “create an image of a constitutionalist order” (Maley, 2009, p. 101).
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Najib also made efforts to appeal to the conservative mullahs through various
strategies such as putting many mullahs on the government’s pay roll and rebuilding
damaged mosques (Maley, 2009, p. 102). However, the ‘National Reconciliation’
program had failed to draw significant opposition since it could not be held in rebel
controlled areas (p. 103). The Mujahideen also rejected his offer of a Coalition
Government since the power-sharing arrangement offered by Najib would still keep him
in a “dominant position, with the Mujahideen offered only crumbs from the PDPA’s
dining table” (Maley, 2009, p. 103).
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The Mujahideen & Burhanuddin Rabbani, 1992-1996
The Mujahideen, who ran resistance movements against the PDPA and Soviet Union,
comprised of various ethnic factions within and outside Afghanistan, each based on the
region they represented in the country, as well as having a foreign sponsor
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 133). The Tajik Ismail Khan was operating in the western in
Herat province where he had various battalions under his command. The Tajik Ahmad
Shah Massud was operating from the northern Panjshir Valley, where by 1983 he had
thousands of fighters under his command (p. 133). Pashtun Gulbuddin Hektmatyar had
stationed just outside Kabul and had his base in the eastern part of the country.
Essentially, “Each functioned as a sponsor of fighting militias within the specific regions
or localities from which they drew their support, substantially on the basis of ethnolinguistic or tribal identification…” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 135)
After Najib’s fall, the Mujahideen leaders formed an interim coalition government
through the Peshawar Agreement brokered by the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
on April 24, 1992 (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 141). The agreement provided “the framework
for an interim government to be implemented in stages: the dispatch to Kabul of
Mujaddadi, the leader of a small Pashtun party, as a compromise choice to head a twomonth transitional government, to be followed by a four-month interim government
headed by Rabbani, the leader of the Jamiat, as a prelude to the formation of a council
that would act as an interim government for 18 months before the holding of a
nationwide elections” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 141). The agreement, however, soon
became dysfunctional because Hekmatyar refused to sign it as he was opposed to the
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position of the defense minister (which was held by Ahmad Shah Massud) and also
protested the inclusion of Uzbek General Dostum in the government (p. 142).
However, Hekmatyar’s real anger stemmed from the fact that he was not offered
the prime minister position in the coalition agreement. By August 1992, Hekmatyar had
begun attacking Rabbani’s government in Kabul by firing hundreds of rockets from the
outskirts of Kabul killing over a thousand civilians and forcing hundreds of others to
escape the capital (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 142). In March 1993, he was offered the
position of prime minister in another agreement in Islamabad, but Hektmatyar refused
again, choosing to remain in his posts and continued barraging Kabul with rockets. In
January 1994, Dostum, who had defected from the coalition government, and Mujadaddi,
who had failed to extend his two-month presidency, joined in an alliance with
Hekmatyar. Together, these three “unleashed the most ferocious artillery and rocket
attacks Kabul had ever experienced” destroying half the city and killing an estimated
25,000 civilians (p. 142).
Hektmayar’s objective was “to ensure that the Rabbani government did not
consolidate power by building a credible administration and expanding its territorial
control, and that it did not acquire the capacity, with lavish international support, for the
reconstruction of the country, and to dispense patronage, and thus attract loyalty of the
population” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 142). However, in this process, Hekmatyar had
caused more harm to himself, the Mujahideen and the Islamic parties. He had destroyed
most of the city but was still unable to take Kabul. Moreover, the chaos he had released
on the city ‘paved’ the way for other actors to make grounds including the Taliban.
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In the end, Hekmatyar had lost his own ‘credibility’ in the eyes of his prominent
supporter, Pakistan, which had hope to use him “as a vehicle for their regional ambitions
of achieving ‘strategic depth’ by installing an amenable client government in Kabul”
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 143). In fact, even the Mujahideen began despising Hekmatyar
and claimed that he had killed more Mujahideen than the communists in the jihad. In the
end, Hektmayar’s failed quest to take Kabul had left the country in chaos, which
presented opportunities for other actors to rise to power and fill in the void.
In order to compete with the Peshawar-based parties, Afghan leaders such as
Ahmad Shah Massud formed the National Commanders Shura (NCS) in October of 1990.
In the aftermath of Najib’s fall, Massud’s supporters also urged him to take charge of the
transitional government. Most of the NCS members were actual commanders who had
“fought against the Soviets” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249). Massud, who proved to be one of
the most successful military commanders during the Soviet occupation, did not prove to
be an expert politician. An ethnic Tajik, he feared “provoking ethnic conflict…[leaving]
the formation of the new government to the Peshawar leaders with the expectation that
they would do what was best for the country and arrange for future elections” (p. 249).
However, the Peshawar parties had “no intention of seeking a consensus or presenting
themselves for any electoral approval. This was their chance to seize power and they
snapped at the opportunity…” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249)
The Mujahideen had no shared goals after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union,
which had forced them into a “marriage of convenience”. Their “…unity was based on
resistance against the Soviet Union and its client Afghan government, not on any political
platform” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249). Hence, the new “Islamic State of Afghanistan” created
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by the Mujahideen after Najib’s regime was a “mere shell” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249). The
leaders of the Peshawar parties that formed the new government did not have a national
political base in Afghanistan and were opposed to any proposition that “might expose
their unpopularity or narrow base of support” (Barfield, 2010, p. 250). The parties
similarly did not want former king Zahir Shah to play any role in the new government
including a symbolic one because “Royal legitimacy through recognized tribal lineage
held enough sway to undermine the Pakistani Mujahideen parties” (Barfield, 2010, p.
250). Therefore, even the strongest factions under the leadership of Rabbani and
Hekmatyar, the two leaders of their respective Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami and Pashtun Hizb-iIslami parties, “lacked prestigious social origins or a strong tribal following of their
own…” (Barfield, 2010, p. 250)
The struggle for power among the Mujahideen was “inevitable” once the PDPA
collapsed. In other words, “It was not the result of some Afghan penchant for blood feud
of tribal rivalries (although these did play a part) but rather the predictable consequence
of having armed and funded political-military factions in Pakistan that had long waited
for such an opportunity to arise” (Barfield, 2010, p. 250). And because “…each faction
leader realized that if he did not obtain power now, he never would” (Barfield, 2010, p.
250). Compromise to make a coalition was also difficult because most of these parties
were formed based on personalities rather than ideologies. There were efforts by Saudi
Arabia to bring everyone to the table to form a government, however, these attempts
failed “immediately after the Peshawar parties arrived in Kabul” (Barfield, 2010, p. 250).
In the end, “All the sides committed atrocities, and what prestige the Mujahideen
had gained by expelling the Soviets was lost as they fought each other in the ruins of
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Kabul” (Barfield, 2010, p. 251). In the past political crises, Afghan leaders would rise to
the moment “…in order to establish political order in the country by combining some
recognized claim of political legitimacy with substantial aid from the outside
world…[But] both of these conditions were now lacking” (Barfield, 2010, p. 251).
Because the Soviet Union had brought to power Afghan leaders from the marginalized
ethnic groups, each had to “legitimize their right” to rule. However, none of the
Mujahideen leaders were able to “permanently” eliminate their rivals and become the
sole rulers (p. 251).
As Soviet Union had dissolved and the U.S. did not consider Afghanistan
strategically important anymore, foreign resources were becoming scarce. Even Saudi
Arabia was left in an awkward position of aiding one Sunni Muslim group to kill another.
While the UN sent emergency humanitarian aid, it was not successful in finding a
political solution for the crisis nor did it have the means to do so (Barfield, 2010, p. 251).
Pakistan’s ambition of installing a Pakistan friendly government in Kabul had also
faltered. The country was in a civil war fueled by political crisis because factions did not
have the ability to “…find any common agreement about what a future government
should look like, let alone who should run it... [making] it impossible to unify the country
politically” (Barfield, 2010, p. 251). A military unification was also not viable because
“…each faction was strong enough to defend its own home region but too weak to extend
its power beyond it” (Barfield, 2010, p. 252).
However, unlike Yugoslavia that was splitting into smaller states along ethnic
lines, “Kabul was never challenged by regional or ethnic separatist movements. No
Afghan leader saw the collapse of central power in Kabul as an opportunity to seek
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independence. Instead, the regions backed one of the two major contenders for national
power: Rabbani and Massud’s Shura Nazar (Supervisory Council), or Hekmatyar’s
Shura-i-Hamahangi (Coordination Council)” (Barfield, 2010, p. 252). Although this
division is often seen along regional and ethnic lines, it was not. For example, the
Pashtun camp led by Hektmatyar made alliances with the Uzbek Dostum and Hazara
Mazari to gain leverage against Massud and Rabbani (p. 252). Pakistan threw its support
behind Hekmatyar while Russia backed Rabbani and Massud (p. 253). However, Kabul
had effectively become a failed state “with its national institutions bankrupt and
powerless” (Barfield, 2010, p. 253).
The Mujahideen reign had descended the country into chaos, civil war and
political instability. The division in the country run on the local district and village level,
as commanders would set up posts and “abuse the local population, engaging in rape and
pillage without fear of punishment” (Barfield, 2010, p. 253). Although Rabbani was the
president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, “…his writ did not run beyond the palace”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 254). The country did not have a national army, as the fighters were
bands organized by each faction. The rival Hekmatyar had become obsessed with taking
over Kabul and seizing national government that he had never left the outskirts of Kabul
and continued shelling the city. Surprisingly both camps faced the same difference,
lacking a strong regional base in Afghanistan since both Rabbani and Hektmatyar were
“party political leaders who had sat out the war in Pakistan” (Barfield, 2010, p. 254).
In mensurating the Mujahideen & Burhanuddin Rabbani regimes, after the
collapse of the last communist PDPA regime in 1992, Afghanistan lacked viable political
institutions (Maley, 2009, p. 163). The Mujahideen leaders had succeeded in achieving
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their shared common goal of ousting the Soviet Union and bringing down their client
government (p. 163). However, because they no longer had a shared objective, the
Mujahideen leaders immediately split into different factions (p. 163). This division
among the elite led to the gradual fragmentation of the political system and internal
disagreements on who should lead the country (p. 164). Although after the collapse of the
PDPA, the transition (1) of power was brokered peacefully through the Peshawar
Agreement, civil war soon resumed amid disagreements over power sharing (p. 165).
The Peshawar Agreement distributed top government positions among the
prominent Mujahideen leaders. Hekmatyar was offered the position of Prime Minister,
Jamiat-i-Islami the Ministry of Defense and Gailani the Foreign Affairs Ministry (Maley,
2009, p. 165). Hekmatyar, who had hoped to be the president, rejected the prime minister
position as an unsatisfactory offer and began a rebellion (0) against Rabbani’s
government (p. 165).
Table 23: B. Rabbani Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
0
1
0
0
0

Total
0
1
0
0
0
1

In August 1992, he had abandoned any attempts to be a part of the new
government and began bombarding Kabul in protest killing over a 1,000 civilians (Maley,
2009, p. 165). Meanwhile the Council of Supreme Popular Settlement had met in
December 1993 to unilaterally extend (0) Rabbani’s term for another 18 months (Maley,
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2009, p. 166). Rabbani’s opposition, however, had ‘boycotted’ the Council’s meeting and
accused Rabbani of ‘manipulating’ it to ‘his advantage’ (p. 166). The Council, which was
an unelected body, further ruined Rabbani government’s (0) legitimacy (p. 166).
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia pressured Rabbani to find a solution to the Hekmatyar
situation and sign the new Islamabad Accords in March 1993, which would appoint
Hekmatyar as the prime minister and form a new Cabinet (Maley, 2009, p. 166).
However, the ‘distrust’ among the Mujahideen, especially between Hekmatyar and
Massud, had been a major factor in the failure of a joint Mujahideen government (p. 167).
Eventually Rabbani had effectively ousted Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami from the capital
and the government. But it was under Rabbani’s government that Afghanistan had
disintegrated into factionalism and descended into chaos. His Defense Minister Massud
could not protect the citizens in the capital Kabul (p. 168).
Table 24: B. Rabbani Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total

Scores
0
0
0
1
0

Total
0
0
0
1
0
1

By mid 1994, complete civil war had broken out between Rabbani-Massud and
Hekmatyar-Dostum-Hezbi-i-Wahdat parties (p. 169). However, the Rabbani
government’s total collapse (0) did not occur until September 1996 by a new emerging
force calling itself the Taliban (p. 177).
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The national army (0) under the Mujahideen had disintegrated completely and
country was under the control of armed militia force, each loyal to their Mujahideen
warlords (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 201). Each faction had thousands of armed
militia and controlled a portion of the country where they drew support. Political
representation (0), similarly, did not exist as the country was effectively ruled along
ethnic lines and strongmen exercised authority (p. 206).
Although Rabbani and Massud had set up a ‘national’ government (0), most top
government positions (0) were distributed among their own Jamiat Party, with Rabbani
appointed as the President and Massud as the Minister of Defense (Wahab &
Youngerman, 2010, p. 207). Moreover, the government’s authority extended only beyond
the capital Kabul to a few northern provinces under Massoud’s authority (p. 207).
Political opposition (0) was violent and bloody as all prominent Mujahideen leaders
continued to battle for the ultimate supremacy to extended their authority over the entire
country, but none succeeded, and the war for Kabul left hundreds of thousands dead and
forcing millions to leave the country (p. 208).
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The Taliban & Mullah M. Omar, 1996-2001
The Taliban rose to power as a military force during the Afghan civil war in the
1990s. The Taliban, the Arabic plural for Talib (“religious student”), was a Sharia
movement based on “purely religious inspiration that was able to transform itself into a
motivated and effective military force…” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 143) The Taliban
predominantly recruited members from the madrassas in rural Afghanistan and in
Pakistan. Most of the fighters that joined them were young Afghans born in refugeecamps and had never seen war before (p. 143). These new ‘children of jihad’ were
“therefore rootless and receptive to the ideological influences to which they were exposed
in the madrassas of Pakistan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 143). The Taliban rose to power at
a time when the inter-fighting among the Mujahideen parties had created total anarchy
and chaos throughout the country, which had effectively been divided into territories
controlled by different factions. Hence, the Taliban’s initial objectives were to put “an
end to the activities of petty ex-Mujahideen warlords who were preying on the local
population, and of establishing order and security by disarming their militia”
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 145).
The group secured their first major victory when a force of 200 Taliban fighters
seized a large weapons convoy from Hekmatyar in October 1994. Providing a safe
passage to a commercial 30-truck Pakistani convoy further strengthened their position
with their new master Pakistan (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 145). By November 1994, the
Taliban had grown into a well-organized 2,500 force and had captured their first major
city, Kandahar (p. 145). While Pakistan’s ISI was providing them with brand new
weapons, in Kandahar they had seized Mujahideen tanks, helicopters and planes (p. 145).
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Other nearby cities of Zabul and Uruzgan were taken without ‘a shot being fired’ while
Helmand fell to their control after some heavy fighting. By 1995, The Taliban had taken
western Herat and most southern Afghanistan. And by September 1996, the group had
completely defeated Hekmatyar’s forces in eastern Paktia, with Ahmad Shah Massud left
as their main rival (p. 151). Moreover, by September 26, the Taliban had reached and
captured Kabul, forcing Massud to complete retreat from the capital. With Kabul’s
capture, the Taliban had essentially captured over 70 percent of the country by mid-1996
(p. 152).
In May 1997, a force of 2,500 Taliban captured the northern city of Mazar-iSharif after heavy fighting. Taliban leaders were flown in by Pakistan to Mazar, where in
a press conference, Pakistan officially recognized them as the ‘government of
Afghanistan,’ convincing Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to ‘follow suit’
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 153). In Mazar, the Taliban faced strong resistance from the
Hazaras who had pushed back. When the Hazara forces took back Mazar in September
1997 forcing the Taliban to retreat to Kunduz, the latter cut off all roads leading to
Hazarajat from the south and north to force the Hazaras into surrender. By winter 1997,
300,000 Hazaras in Bamiyan, Wardak and Ghor provinces were starving (p. 155). The
Taliban were especially anti-Hazara, branding them munafiqun (‘hypocrites
masquerading as Muslims’). By September 1998, the Taliban had made a comeback and
defeated the Hazaras, taking back Mazar in fierce fighting (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 157).
Mullah Mohammad Omar, the leader of the Taliban had come from a poor
Ghilzai Pashtun family in southern Helmand province. He was a commander in the
Hizibi-i-Islami faction fighting against Najib’s regime from 1989 until 1992
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(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 191). The Taliban officially declared Omar as their leader in
March 1996 days before they sacked Kabul and toppled Rabbani’s government (p. 191).
A 1200 member shura (“Grand Assembly”) gathered in Kandahar and gave Omar the
title of Amir al-Muminin (“Commander of the Believers”) (p. 191). It is important to
notice that the shura that chose Omar, was unlike a traditional Afghan Loya Jirga, and
was based on the Islamic Arab shura practiced by the previous Islamic caliphs centuries
ago (p. 191). In other words, the political legitimacy of Omar’s appointment came only
from the ulema and religious scholars as opposed to other elements that usually played a
role in electing leaders such tribal chiefs, the elite, the educated middle class, royal
family, and so on.
After the Taliban ousted Rabbani’s government in September 1996, they installed
new power structures and eliminated the traditional bureaucracy in Kabul, which they
had considered corrupt. First, Omar set up a 10-member Supreme Shura in Kandahar that
oversaw all government decisions and reported directly to him. In Kabul, another lower
level 14-member ministerial shura was set up where the ‘ministers’ were held
accountable to the Kandahar shura and carried out nominal ‘ministerial’ functions
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 192). Omar often overruled the Kabul minister shura’s decisions
and “There was thus a confusing dichotomy of power that did not make life easy for
those who had to deal with them. The Taliban had unified but not monolithic power
structure” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 192).
Moreover, the Taliban had replaced all Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek bureaucrats in
Kabul with less experienced Pashtuns. Women were entirely ousted from government
positions as well as other civilian fields such as education (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 193).
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Omar’s friends and colleagues who primarily consisted of Kandahari Pashtuns had
dominated membership in the Kandahar Shura. Most important government decisions
were made in the Kandahar Shura, where provincial governors, military commanders and
tribal leaders were also invited, but the council in practice was a ‘loose and amorphous
body’ (p. 193).
Most higher-level government officials including mayors, governors, police chiefs
were appointed from the Kandahari Pashtuns, including in majority Persian speaking
cities such as Mazar, Herat and Kabul. The Kabul council of ministers did not include
Dari speaking Kabulis, the ‘lingua franca’, which made day-to-day government business
difficult. The few non-Kandaharis that existed in the provincial government positions
were often transferred around to prevent them from amassing political power. In short,
“… Political power was centralized at the level of the Kandaharis under Omar, to whom
all revenues were also remitted” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 193).
Mullah Omar was also the commander-in-chief of the military shura, which
included a chief general staff and ‘chief of staffs’ but there was no ‘discernable
hierarchical structure in the officers and commanders ranks. This was also true of the
entire regime since “The Taliban movement began and largely remained a military
organization…” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 193) The Taliban army numbered between
25,000 to 30,000 fighters throughout their rule while around 30% of their manpower
came from Pakistani madras (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 194). Effectively a military rule, the
Taliban had controlled over 90% of the country by late 1998 except in the north where
Massud’s Northern Alliance had held on (p. 197). They rejected any UN mediation for
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peace negotiation because their ultimate goal was to impose their will through a military
rule without sharing power.
However, the regime was incapable of providing even basic services to the people
and by 1990, over 70 international NGOs had been operating in Afghanistan, providing
aid and food to a poverty-stricken country (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 197). During the
1990s, millions of Afghans had left their homes and settled in as refugees in the
neighboring countries, with 3,722,000 in Pakistan and 2,940,000 in Iran (p. 197). Women
were confined to their homes and girls were banned from going to schools, which also
affected boys’ education since most teachers in general were women (198). The Taliban
had imposed bizarre interpretation of the sharia law that included mandatory rules such as
dictating how to dress in public, banning all music and traditional festivals like the
Nawroz (p. 198).
But even though the Taliban were not interested in government responsibilities,
they exercised an effective monopoly of using force until they had achieved their
objective. Because they were a military organization, and refused to share power, their
tactics mainly included ‘military option until last pockets of resistance’ (Rasanayagam,
2003, p. 203). In fact, Mullah Omar was not even a head of the state since he had
assumed the more religious title of ‘Commander of the Believers’ by symbolically
wrapping himself in the Cloak of the Prophet Muhammad in Kandahar (p. 203).
Therefore, he was the “amir of an Islamic emirate that was more religious than statist in
its connotations, and Kandahar, not Kabul, was the ‘capital’ of the Taliban Afghanistan”
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 204). In short, “Theirs was a ‘theocratic’ regime, legitimized by
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religious and not by a nationalist ideology nor by tribal genealogies, which had no
equivalent in the contemporary Muslim world” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 205).
The Taliban movement was historically different because it had exclusively relied
on a clergy leadership as well as recruiting primarily from the displaced Afghan refugees
in Pakistan. Refugee camps made an easy recruiting base because they tended to be
generally poor, with no opportunities for the youth and were usually manipulated by
political factions (Barfield, 2010, p. 256). In the case of Afghan refugees, much of the
propaganda revolved around regaining control of a ‘lost’ homeland. However, this ideal
recruiting rhetoric shifted when a new generation of Afghan refugees had been born, who
had never seen the country. In this sense, “The past is idealized because the present is so
miserable and the future so uncertain” (Barfield, 2010, p. 256). In other words, “Groups
with extreme messages, whether their ideologies are political, ethnic, or religious,
galvanize their followers not only with visions of reclaiming a lost homeland but also of
then transforming it” (Barfield, 2010, p. 256).
Afghan refugees, who had tasted victory by defeating the Soviet Union, were also
ready to return to their homeland. However, the Mujahideen, who descended the country
into chaos, disorder and instability, had slashed this hope for many refugees. Although
initially hailed as the liberators of the Soviet occupation, the Mujahideen had lost all
respect after their pity fights and a bloody civil war (Barfield, 2010, p. 257). Such a
discontent gave the Taliban an opportunity to capitalize in two ways: to recruit young
refugee boys and give them a new kind of jihad, one that would bring “a truer version” of
Afghanistan. Second, the Taliban drew on the discontent in areas where the population
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faced chaos and were ready to promise their allegiance to any group or ideology that
brought stability in their daily lives (p. 257)
Furthermore, the Taliban movement initially became extremely popular with the
people in the south because it promised “security of life and property to a region that
lacked both” (Barfield, 2010, p. 257). The Taliban’s style of “law and order” strategy
initially “overshadowed the movement’s radical Islamist ideology, which the Taliban did
not implement in full until they were better established” (Barfield, 2010, p. 257). Calling
themselves God’s servants, most of the Taliban’s leadership was low-level religious
clergy who relied on tribal military forces that were poorly organized. The Taliban’s
initial attacks were primarily on weapon depots to arm their foot soldiers as no central
government or army could challenge them.
The movement grew steadily replacing Mujahideen outposts while also recruiting
former Soviet trained fighters ex-Khalqis who now adhered to an entirely conflicting
ideology of Islam. Moreover, Pakistan directly supplied weapons and aid to the group,
without which, it would have not survived (Barfield, 2010, p. 258). The Taliban were
welcomed for bringing security and stability but their radical social and political policies
especially in the urban areas proved extremely controversial. It was a regime that
combined Salafi Islam with the Pashtun code of Honor, Pashtunwali. Moreover, “Their
religious interpretations were often idiosyncratic and tended to dress local custom in the
guise of religion” (Barfield, 2010, p. 261).
The movement largely faced two oppositions: on an intellectual level and an
ethnocentric level. The former was voiced by Muslim clerics from the al Azhar in Egypt
who denounced the group for lack of knowledge of true Islami after meeting with the
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Taliban leadership. The second opposition came from ordinary Afghans who believed
that the Islam practiced in the country for centuries did not need any change because
“Afghans were victors of a successful jihad and inhabitants of the only country in the
region that had never come under colonial rule” (Barfield, 2010, p. 263). The Taliban
argued, however, that they were best fit to rule the country because they united Pashtun
ethnic groups and diminished their existing rivalries by “appealing to a broader
commonality that rose above ordinary tribal divisions” (Barfield, 2010, p. 263). In fact,
“…one of the reasons for their particular success among Pashtuns was their ability to
sidestep existing tribal leaders hamstrung by local rivalries” (p. 263). However, this
rhetoric failed to go beyond a Pashtun base and for non-Pashtun and minorities, the
Taliban were an evil force that was establishing a Pashtun political hegemony they had
overthrown during the Soviet invasion.
Moreover, the Taliban regime also struggled to win any significant international
recognition and support. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
recognized and established diplomatic ties with the regime (Barfield, 2010, p. 264). Little
international recognition was a blow for a regime that heavily dependent on foreign aid,
which had decreased significantly. Pakistan, a poor country itself, could not meet the
deficit so Taliban relied heavily on United Nations aid, especially food. Although the
regime had violated the UN principles in every way possible such as killing Najib in
UN’s Kabul compound, and losing its seat in the headquarters in New York, the United
Nations could not cut humanitarian aid to the completely isolated country. Tensions were
high between Taliban and the international community in early 1998 after Taliban had
allowed Osama Bin Laden to set up camp in Afghanistan.
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The U.S. had launched missiles on Afghanistan after the attacks by Bin Laden on
U.S. embassies in East Africa demanding that he be returned. Saudi Arabia withdrew
their diplomatic mission urging Mullah Omar to hand over bin Laden but Omar rejected
the request and abused Saudi for cutting ties (Barfield, 2010, p. 266). Both Saudi and the
U.S. wanted to try bin Laden for terrorist attacks but Omar was unwilling to expel bin
Laden citing the code of honor Pashtunwali, according to which, hospitality (melmastia)
requires to protect a guest with your life. However, because “by the same code a guest
must accept the authority of his host, Mullah Omar assured the world that he had
forbidden bin Laden from engaging in any improper activities on Afghan soil…”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 268)
After the September 11 attacks, however, the equation changed completely as
Afghanistan was now in the center of attention. The U.S. gave an ultimatum to the
Taliban to expel Bin Laden or face annihilation. Omar refused these calls including from
its patron Pakistan, which also eventually abandoned the regime and sided with the U.S.
(Barfield, 2010, p. 269). The Taliban, who had assassinated Massud two days prior to the
September 11 terrorist attacks, had miscalculated that perhaps this would “derail an
expected US counterattack” (Barfield, 2010, p. 269). After failing to meet the deadline,
by October 2001 the U.S. launched airstrikes against the Taliban while the Northern
Alliance began mobilizing forces on the ground. Mullah Omar had threatened that the
U.S. would fall like previous occupying empires such as the British and the Soviet Union
but his regime was overthrown in two weeks. Taliban abandoned the capital Kabul in
order to regroup in their stronghold Kandahar but tribal leaders saw the Taliban regime

144

was faltering and regained power. In the end, both Mullah Omar and Bin Laden had fled
the country and took shelter in Pakistan (p. 270).
In mensurating the Taliban and Mullah Omar regimes, they were a ‘militarized
force’ whose rise to power began as a movement called Da Afghanistan da Talibano
Islami Tahrik (“The Islamic Movement of Taliban”) in 1994 (Maley, 2009, p. 182).
Taliban drew their financial and military support from Pakistan, who had abandoned their
long-time client Hekmatyar in favor of the new sudden rise of the Taliban (p. 183).
Although majority of the Taliban were Afghans, Pakistan had directly trained around
80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis who fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan from 1994 to
1999 (p. 185). By 1996, Taliban had become a formidable force that drove out most of
the Mujahideen warlords and had captured the capital Kabul.
The Taliban’s transition (0) to power came at the expense of ousting the Rabbani
government and years of civil war (Maley, 2009, p. 180). From early 1994 until late
1996, uprisings continued (0) as the Taliban and the Mujahideen government fought
against each other to establish dominance over Afghanistan (p. 181). The Taliban, who
made sweeping military victories against the Mujahideen across Afghanistan, had grown
from a small force of a few hundred to thousands (p. 180). By September 1996, the
Taliban had captured Kabul after months of heavy fighting and forced out the Tajik
Rabbani-Massoud government to abandon the capital (p. 180).
The Taliban had appointed a Ghilzai Pashtun Mullah Mohammad Omar as their
leader (Maley, 2009, p. 186). Although the Taliban attempted to legitimize (0) their
government through several Islamic acts, they never received formal recognition either
internally or internationally with a few exceptions. Domestically, Mullah Omar took the
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religious title of Amir al-Momineen (“Commander of the Faithful”) bestowed on him by a
group of ulema (p. 186). Omar subsequently appeared in public to lift the Cloak of the
Prophet Muhammad (Khirqa-I mubarak), one of the most sacred symbols in Islam as a
sign to further increase his authority (p. 187).
Table 25: M. M. Omar Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
0
0
0
0
0

Total
0
0
0
0
0
0

Soon, the new regime renamed the government as “The Islamic Emirates of
Afghanistan”, a symbolically significant title that stamped their absolute authority and
ended any debate of sharing power (Maley, 2009, p. 187). The Taliban’s ambitions were
to stay in power (0) for the long run as they began imposing their rule and established
power bases in various parts of Afghanistan (p. 191). However, the regime’s inevitable
fall (0) would come after the September 11 attacks when the Taliban government was
brought down in a U.S. military invasion in December 2001 (p. 222). Although the
regime ran “through motions of ‘state-like activity’,” Mullah Omar maintained
‘superordinate authority’ (0) and was the supreme the head of the regime (Maley, 2009,
p. 196).
Mullah Omar was appointed by a shura of 1,200 ulemas and mullahs in Kandahar
but the Taliban, however, did not bother to convene a Loya Jirga from around the
country to appoint their leader (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 221). Omar had the
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authority over all legal and civil matters through his title and Sharia Law was the de facto
state religion (p. 222). Moreover, the Taliban established two shuras, a 10-member
Supreme Shura in Kandahar, and a 14-member Shura in Kabul, both of which were
dominated by Kandahari Pashtuns and the Kabul shura did not include any native Kabulis
(p. 222). Although the Kabul Shura did establish government ministerial positions (0) and
was responsible to run the administrative government duties, the ministers’ decisions
were often overruled by Mullah Omar’s Shura in Kandahar (p. 222).
Table 26: M. M. Omar Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total

Scores
0
0
0
0
0

Total
0
0
0
0
0
0

The Taliban’s army (0) did not have formal hierarchies but local commanders
were provided with lump of cash to equip and feed their fighters (Wahab & Youngerman,
2010, p. 222). Political representation (0) was also one-sided or overwhelmingly biased
in favor of Pashtuns as the Taliban replaced all Non-Pashtun bureaucrats in high
government positions with Kandaharis (p. 222). And lastly, the Taliban did not allow any
form of political opposition (0) and relied on strategies of suppression and brutal
practices (p. 224). They implemented a form of exclusive Sharia Law and had established
the ‘Department for the Propagation of Virtue and Suppression of Vice’, a body of
religious police who enforced religious codes corporal punishment (p. 225).
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Hamid Karzai, 2002-2009
Afghans, especially non-Pashtun groups, initially welcomed the U.S. invasion and
ousting of Taliban. Twenty years of civil war had destroyed much of the country’s
infrastructure and institutions so the U.S. had to create a new state to bring stability and
order (Barfield, 2010, p. 272). Millions of refugees returned enthusiastically from the
neighboring countries. Although Afghanistan was a failed state in 2001, it was a unified
nation. The lack of a central government was “counterbalanced by a strong sense of
national unity forged during the Soviet war as well as the refugee experiences in
neighboring Pakistan and Iran” (Barfield, 2010, p. 278). Moreover, “Toppling one
Afghan regime required replacing it with another” (Barfield, 2010, p. 283). However, the
U.S. did not have such candidate and gave the United Nations the task to choose the new
Afghan leader after Taliban’s fall.
In November 2001, The UN convened an international conference in Bonn,
Germany to create “a provisional government and apportion leadership roles…”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 283) The conference was attended by representatives from the
Northern Front that had helped overthrow the Taliban; former king Zahir Shah’s royal
family members; and the Mujahideen that were based off Peshawar in Pakistan (p. 283).
However, “The Taliban were excluded from the talks, and because of their previous ties
to the Taliban, the Pashtuns had poorer representation than they would have normally
expected” (Barfield, 2010, p. 283). However, “Despite this disadvantage, the conference
elected Hamid Karzai, an ethnically Pashtun from the Popalzai tribe in Qandahar, to head
the provisional administration, while the United Front took over most of the key
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ministries. The whole government was “…subject to a vote of approval by a national
Loya Jirga, to be held in Kabul within a year” (Barfield, 2010, p. 284).
The conference was seen as a remarkable success showing how quickly the
parties came together and put aside their past differences. The United Front, who had just
ousted a Pashtun-dominant Taliban regime, agreed to elect a Pashtun head of state.
Hamid Karzai’s appointment also marked the return of the Pashtun Durranis to power
since most recent leaders had come from their rival Pashtun ethnic group the Ghilzais
such as the PDPA leaders Amin, Tarakai, Najib as well as Jihadi factions such as
Hekmatyar, Khalis, Sayyaf and the Taliban leader Omar (Barfield, 2010, p. 284). The rise
of the Pashtun Durranis back in power and how they had outdone the Ghilzais could be
explained by the traditional template of power according to which “the Durranis held
substantial advantages over their Ghilzai rivals because they were more skilled in the arts
of peace than they were in that of war” (Barfield, 2010, p. 284).
Karzai, was not a well-known figure in Afghan politics. He had tried to organize
revolts against the Taliban after they had killed his father and quickly assumed leadership
of his Sadozai tribe of the Pashtun Durrani group according to custom. The Populazais
had also approached him to return to Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks to “lead them
against the Taliban” (Barfield, 2010, p. 289). The question that arose was why the nonPashtun tribes and the leaders of the United Front ceded powers to a Pashtun leader
instead of taking the leadership themselves. The answer lay in the notion that “…after a
quarter century of war in Afghanistan, no faction was keen to engage in more fighting if a
political compromise was possible. Nor did any faction wish to dismember the country–
another alternative” (Barfield, 2010, p. 291). Former king Zahir Shah’s return to power
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was also unlikely because he had been living in exile and was considered a weak leader
even though he still had a huge following base in Afghanistan. The U.S. had also strongly
opposed the return of the monarchy.
Hamid Karzai was ratified as the interim president in the 2002 Loya Jirga until a
new constitution could be drawn and new elections could be held. Held in the capital
Kabul, it was attended by one thousand elected representatives and five hundred
delegates picked by the organizers representing virtually all ethnic groups and regions as
well as including a high number of women members (Barfield, 2010, p. 296). The Jirga
succeeded in its goal of appointing an interim government headed by Hamid Karzai and
his cabinet but was subject to harsh verbal exchanges and walkouts over filling the
executive head of the state (p. 296). Zahir Shah’s supporters especially from Southern
Pashtun parts of the country staged a confrontation and demanded that the former king be
elected as the head of the state. This was resolved after the U.S. special envoy, Zalmay
Khalilzad convinced the king to withdraw in favor of Karzai thereby ending the stand off
(p. 297).
The next Jirga that followed was the 2003 constitutional Loya Jirga of five
hundred representatives from all ethnic groups and political parties except the Taliban.
The objective of the Jirga was to ratify a new constitution and answer the question
whether the new government should be a strong, centralized, presidential system or a
decentralized, parliamentarian, federal system with regional autonomy (Barfield, 2010, p.
298). The minority groups, who demanded a parliamentary system with the prime
minister post, argued for more regional autonomy from the capital while the supporters of
the centralized government countered that decentralization of power would strengthen
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local conservative elements (p. 298). Pashtuns favored a strong central government under
Karzai in hopes of restoring the Pashtun dominance again. The international community,
including the U.S. also favored a strong presidential system as a better way to deal with
Kabul.
The Jirga eventually ratified the constitution, which gave the parliament the
power to confirm cabinet members as well as hold them accountable. Minority languages
were given official status while the Shiites were allowed “legal parity” with the
predominantly Sunni country (Barfield, 2010, p. 299). The Mujahideen factions also won
their demands that all laws should be in compliance with Islamic principles. Additionally,
the constitution restored women’s rights, considered a controversial issue throughout the
history of the country.
After the new constitution was adopted, next followed the presidential elections of
2004 to pick a head of state in a full democratic electoral process. Eighteen presidential
nominees were on the ballot, four of which were considered serious contenders along
with the favorite Karzai (Barfield, 2010, p. 300). Others included Abdullah Abdullah, the
Tajik leader of the former Northern Front; Dostum, the Uzbek head of the Junbesh-i-Milli
Isamic party; and Mohaqiq, the Hazara leader of the Hizb-i-Wahdat party (p. 300).
Hamid Karzai emerged as the winner with 56 percent of the eight million votes cast. The
turn out had been very enthusiastic among Afghans who genuinely seemed to participate
despite violent efforts by the Taliban to interrupt the elections.
Karzai’s votes came primarily from the eastern and southern Pashtun areas but he
also surprisingly received high support from the Tajiks. The Hazara and Uzbek
candidates “were confined to their own ethnic groups or the regions they dominated”
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(Barfield, 2010, p. 300) Although the elections legitimized Hamid Karzai’s government
in the eyes of the international community, its impact on Afghans was less clear. In other
words, “The presidential elections were an innovation that while allowing the expression
of popular opinion, could not by itself create political legitimacy” (Barfield, 2010, p.
300). Karzai would be judged by how successful he would be in the future in bringing
security, economic improvement and a stable government and an “electoral victory would
mean nothing if he failed to do so” (Barfield, 2010, p. 301).
The parliamentary elections, initially scheduled to take place with the presidential
elections, were held one year later in 2005. However, the newly elected president Hamid
Karzai was “less enthusiastic about seeing a branch of government equally empowered”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 301). The president was against political parties in the parliament and
refused to recognize them legally. He argued that forming parties would bring back the
political instability of the PDPA and confuse voters. In an attempt to “Further weaken the
emergence of an organized opposition, candidates could not even identify themselves as
members of a political party on the ballot” (Barfield, 2010, p. 301). Such a tactic would
undermine a candidate’s ability to appeal to the voters through “name recognition,
ethnicity, region, and social standing” (Barfield, 2010, p. 301).
Because there were no run-off rounds in the “first past the post” voting system in
the parliamentary elections, most winning candidates only received less than 10 percent
of the votes because seats were contested by over a hundred nominees in some areas
(Barfield, 2010, p. 301). Hence, “the chances of winning a seat better resembled a lottery
than a political contest” (p. 301). Despite these initial blows to weaken the body as an
opposing political institution to his administration, Karzai was dealt several blows by the
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parliament, when in 2006, it rejected a proposed template for the parliament, as well as
disqualifying his less educated conservative nominee to the Supreme Court Chief
position.
Karzai’s government eventually failed to created an “institutionalized state
structure” (Barfield, 2010, p. 304). His “…model of government was patrimonial, in
which the government administration and its assets were an extension of the rule. In such
a system, personal relationships determined everything from who would amass personal
wealth to who would be thrown in jail” (Barfield, 2010, p. 304). For instance, Karzai
would often avoid confrontation with his enemies, replace and transfer incompetent and
corrupt governors from one province to another. Moreover, “Karzai did not use assets of
the state to centralize power so much as he used them to create a patronage network of
personal clients bound to him” (Barfield, 2010, p. 304). However, Karzai’s popularity
had started to decline after 2005 “…because of his inability to create an effective
administration, a deteriorating security situation, and a lack of economic progress”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 310).
On the other hand, “The Afghan government…was treated less as a partner than a
nuisance” by the U.S. (Barfield, 2010, p. 316). Karzai’s government was dependent on
foreign aid but “75 percent of aid funds were disbursed and delivered outside official
Afghan government channels” (Barfield, 2010, p. 316). Bush’s administration had
declared Afghanistan a “mission accomplished” thereby slashing aid by 38 percent from
$4.3 billion in 2005 to $3.1 billion in 2006 (p. 318). Internally, the situation became
increasingly unstable amidst insecurity, a corrupt government and abuse of power by the
Karzai administration. Afghans, who seemed highly enthusiastic about elections a year
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ago, were discontent with the new government. Moreover, a deadly insurgency was on
the rise as the number of suicide bombs increased by 400 percent between 2005 and 2006
from 27 to 139 (p. 319).
Political and economic conditions contrasted so starkly by region that Afghanistan
had virtually divided into two different countries: “the north, west, and center, which
were relatively stable; and the south and east, which were not. Since the south and east
were predominantly Pashtun, this division had an ethnic component as well” (Barfield,
2010, p. 322). Eastern and northern regions were stable and thriving in the absence of
violence and insurgent presence while the “south lacked security, had a stagnant or
declining standard of living, and had become dependent on opium as a cash crop”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 323). Eventually foreign aid was stalled and reconstruction projects
were often abandoned due to lack of security.
In mensurating the Hamid Karzai regime, Karzai’s attempts to build a strong base
in his southern regions through promises of money and appeals to “moderate Taliban”
were faltering (Barfield, 2010, p. 324). Although the U.S. had ousted the Taliban regime
with ease in 2001, “There was no military follow up designed to ensure that they could
not return to mobilize their followers, who had simply returned home after their defeat”
(Barfield, 2010, p. 325). The Pashtun dominated areas bordering Pakistan had become the
hotbed of the insurgency against the Afghan government, its ally the United States and
the International Coalition Forces. The leaders of the insurgency were the same people
fighting the Soviets, changed from angry young men to aging fighters who were now
joined by Al Qaeda (p. 325).
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The Taliban had made a comeback as the ‘Neo-Taliban,’ launching an insurgency
(0) against Karzai’s government (p. 246). Although they lacked an extensive support base
since most of Afghanistan was under the authority of the central government, the Taliban
were ‘quite adept’ in aligning themselves with dissatisfied elements by “exploiting local
grievances, particularly those of non-elite Ghilzai Pashtuns directed against Durranis…”
(Maley, 2009, p. 247) Moreover, both the Karzai government and the U.S. struggled to
end the insurgency as their joint ‘counter-insurgency’ campaign faced multiple
challenges such as ineffectiveness, misguided airstrikes, lack of on-the-ground
intelligence, and the failed attempts to minimize casualties (p. 251).
Table 27: H. Karzai Regime Scores
DV Stability Indicators
Regime Legitimacy
Regime Transition
Uprising Frequency
Power Consolidation
Regime Failure
Grand Total

Scores
1
1
0
1
1

Total
1
1
0
1
1
4

Despite the security challenges, Hamid Karzai’s government marked the first in
centuries where a regime had constitutional term limits (1) and was elected in free
national elections (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 250). Similarly, Karzai’s second term
as president also ensured that the government did not fall (1) amidst the power transition
(p. 252). Hamid Karzai was elected as the democratically elected head of the state (1) in
free national elections, even though there were claims of ‘fraud’ (Wahab & Youngerman,
2010, p. 252). The first national elections had a turnout of 75% around the country and
the other top three candidates included an Uzbek Abdul Rashid Dostum, a Shiite
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Muhammad Mohaqiq, a Tajik Younus Qanuni, the first woman candidate Massuda Jalal,
and the eventual winner Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun (p. 253).
Karzai’s cabinet was also ethnically balanced as he appointed (1) a former Ahmad
Shah Massoud successor, the Tajik Mohammad Fahim as the Defense Minister (p. 253).
Moreover, other top government positions (1) were also representative of virtually all
ethnic groups, even though the Tajiks had dominated most key ministries (p. 253). Karzai
appointed former Mujahideen warlord Ismail Khan as the minister of energy, Dostum to a
top army position, as well as having a Hazara vice-president on his ticket (p. 253).
Although there was a clear bias for appointing or rather awarding former warlords
national and local government positions, political representation (1) was an all time high
in decades (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 253).
Table 28: H. Karzai Regime Scores
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators
Regime Leader
Army Head
Government Positions
Political Representation
Political Opposition
Grand Total

Scores
1
1
1
1
1

Total
1
1
1
1
1
5

Furthermore, in 2005, according to the new constitution, parliamentary and
provincial council elections were held where more than 5,000 candidates ran for the 249
seats in the Wolesi Jirga (“Lower House”) (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 253).
Members to the 102-seat Mesharano Jirga (“Upper House”) were ‘filled’ partially
through votes and some by presidential appointment (p. 253). A large number of women
were elected for the first time to the Parliament and the Constitution guaranteed ‘equal’
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rights for women as well reserving 25 seats for women in the Parliament (p. 269). The
Constitution also guaranteed various political opposition (1) and fundamental rights such
as freedom of speech, freedom of press and while making Islam as the state religion, it
allowed people of other religions to practice their faith freely (Maley, 2009, p. 238).
With the end of Hamid Karzai regime’s analysis, this chapter ends the within case
analysis of each regime. Here, the results of all the total 15 cases were discussed
individually. The next chapter discusses the overall results of all the cases by highlighting
the hypotheses, scores, and general trends. The scores for all the cases are presented in a
table below.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to examine the relationship between regime stability
and ethnic inclusion. Fourteen cases, consisting of all the regimes in Afghanistan from
1880 until 2009, were taken under study. Each case was assigned two sets of indicators
based on the dependent variable regime stability and independent variable ethnic
inclusion. If the indicator met the criteria, it received a score of 1, for a total of 5 possible
scores for each variable. However, if the indicators did not meet the criteria, they
received a score of 0.
The scores were then used to test the hypothesis, which assumes that the more
ethnically inclusive a regime is, the more likely it is to be stable. For instance, when a
case scored low on one variable, it would similarly score low on the other, and viceversa. In other words, a hypothesis would be robust in cases with the lowest difference
for their combined scores, while it would be weak in cases with the highest differences in
scores.
The overall results for the hypothesis are divided into three categories: cases with
perfect scores (i.e. a difference of 0); cases with the second lowest score (i.e. difference
of 1); and cases with highest scores (i.e. difference of plus 1). As illustrated in the Table
1.2 below, most cases fall into the first category including the regimes of Habibullah
Kalakani, M. Nadir Khan, M. Zahir Shah, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal, M.
Najibullah, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Mullah M. Omar. In other words, all of these
regimes had a difference of 0, which supports the hypothesis that if a regime was
ethnically inclusive it was also stable; and vice-versa, that is, a regime that was not
ethnically inclusive, was unstable.
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Table 1. 2: Overall Case Scoring Results
No.

Case

Stability Scores

Difference

Abdur Rahman Khan

Ethnic Inclusion
Scores
2

1

1

1

2

Habibullah Khan

4

3

1

3

Amanullah Khan

4

1

3

4

Habibullah Kalakani

0

0

0

5

M. Nadir Khan

2

2

0

6

M. Zahir Shah

3

3

0

7

M. Daud Khan

1

2

1

8

Nur M. Tarakai

1

0

1

9

Hafizullah Amin

0

0

0

10

Babrak Karmal

1

1

0

11

M. Najibullah Ahmadzai

2

2

0

12

Burhanuddin Rabbani

1

1

0

13

Mullah M. Omar

0

0

0

14

Hamid Karzai

5

4

1

Analyzing this first category of regimes individually, Habibullah Kalakani’s
regime had a total score of 0 for ethnic inclusion, and therefore, it also scored 0 on
stability. This result is consistent with the case analysis since Kalakani’s regime, as stated
earlier, was highly exclusive and highly unstable, as it fought a violent civil war through
its entire 9-month in power (Fletcher, 2003). Nadir Khan’s regime, however, scored 2 on
ethnic inclusion and 2 on stability, which reflects his attempts to assemble a Loya Jirga
that appointed him as king, and a relatively stable rule, with only low resistance
(Fletcher, 2003). M. Zahir Shah’s regime, which scored 3 on ethnic inclusion and 3 on
stability, is often considered as the ‘golden years of stability’ in modern Afghanistan, and
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hence, the scores reflect his efforts of opening up the system, allowing a liberal
parliament and acknowledging various political parties (Barfield, 2010).
Hafizullah Amin’s regime, which scores 0 on both ethnic inclusion and stability,
highlights his regime’s exclusivity and instability. He and his Parchami faction had taken
over power by killing Tarakai, sidelining the Khalqi faction and fighting a violent civil
war in over 70% percent of the country (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). Babrak Karmal
regime’s respective score of 1 on each variable are based on his attempts to assemble a
Loya Jirga, form a ‘national’ democratic government and increase political representation
(Fletcher, 2003). However, his regime was weak as civil war continued and he was only
able to stay in power through Soviet Union military support and aid.
M. Najibullah Ahmadzai’s regime scores 2’s on each variable. The scores reflect
his attempts of seeking a truce, forming a national reconciliation process, adopting a
constitution and ensuring a stable internal transition of power within the PDPA (Fletcher,
2003). The Mujahideens’ Burhanuddin Rabbani’s regime scores 1’s on each variable for
a peaceful transition and political representation because after the PDPA was defeated,
the civil war had been over although the peace last only for a brief period (Fletcher,
2003). And finally, the Taliban’s Mullah Omar regime scored 0 on each variable. The
Taliban were an exclusively Pashtun-dominated regime that was headed by a supreme
council under Omar’s authority (Barfield, 2010).
The second category include cases with a difference of 1 such as Abdur Rahman
Khan, Habibullah Khan, M. Daud Khan, N. Muhammad Tarakai, and Hamid Karzai’s
respective regimes. Abdur Rahman Khan’s regime scores 2 on ethnic inclusion for his
policies to openly appoint various ethnic groups to government positions (Kakar, 1979).
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His regime scores 1 on stability because it did not collapse, which reflects his highly
centralized, dictatorial rule, where he aggressively pacified the entire country and
eliminated any uprising against him (Kakar, 1979). Habibullah Khan’s regime scores 4
on ethnic inclusion for his policy of allowing many political exiles to return, his inclusion
of various ethnic groups in the government and giving power to the religious clergy
(Dupree, 1973). The regime similarly scored high, 3, on stability for avoiding all attempts
to go to war with the British Empire, continuing the national policy of neutrality and
maintaining a nearly 20 year peaceful rule (Dupree, 1973).
Daud Khan’s regime is the only deviant case in this study where the regime
scored lower, 1, on ethnic inclusion than it did on stability, contrary to the assumptions
this study was based on. Daud regime’s ethnic inclusion scores are for his initial attempts
to allow rise of political parties, appointing some PDPA leaders to government positions
and for changing the state into a presidential republic (Fletcher, 2003). Otherwise, his
rule was a dictatorial, single-party regime where political leaders and opposition were
regularly eliminated (Fletcher, 2003). The reason the regime scores higher, 2, on stability
is because Daud Khan had total control of the state by using the military as his tool to
maintain the status quo, threaten and kill anyone who challenged his authority (Fletcher,
2003). Nur M. Tarakai’s regime scores 1 only on ethnic inclusion, which reflects his
willingness to share executive power with various ethnic groups (Wahab & Youngerman,
2010). However, because he only ruled for a year, was out maneuvered politically by
Amin while a bloody civil war continued throughout the country, the regime scores 0 on
stability (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010).
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Hamid Karzai’s government is the highest scoring case in this second category
and in the study overall. The Karzai government scores positively on all indicators of
ethnic inclusion and stability, with the exception of uprisings. After the defeat of the
Taliban regime, transition (1) was peaceful as all parties came together to form a new,
interim democratic government in an international UN-mandated conference in Bonn,
Germany (Fletcher, 2003). The subsequent Loya Jirga, a new constitution, and national
free elections gave the government legitimacy (1) and established clear authority through
regular term limits for regime (Fletcher, 2003). As democratically elected president with
constitutional term limits, the regime did not seek power consolidation (1) through means
of authoritarianism. Although Karzai’s government did not collapse, the regime came
close to failure (1) due to continuing rise of the Taliban insurgency. Hence, the regime
doesn’t get a score only on one indicator, uprisings (0). Otherwise, the position of head of
state (1) was democratically elected, other top government positions (1) such as the head
of the army (1) were clearly established (Fletcher, 2010). Political representation (1)
drastically increased as virtually all ethnic groups were represented in the political
process while political opposition (1) was freely exercised (Fletcher, 2010).
The only case that falls into the third category—cases with a weaker correlation
or difference of higher than 1— includes Amanullah Khan’s regime. The regime scores 4
on ethnic inclusion and 1 on stability, with a total difference of 3. Amanullah Khan was a
radical reformist king, who won the country’s independence, and initiated social
modernization programs (Barfield, 2010). He established the country’s first Constitution,
establishing state institutions as well as holding Loya Jirgas (Barfield, 2010). His regime
was ethnically inclusive, with various ethnic groups appointed to the cabinet, council of
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ministers and the bureaucracy at large (Fletcher, 2003). However, despite his twenty-year
rule, his regime was highly unstable. The reforms soon backfired and gave rise to
uprisings and rebellions nationwide. Eventually, his regime collapsed during the civil war
of 1920s (Dupree, 1973).
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS, STUDY LIMITS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH
The existing literature argues ethnic societies are often vulnerable to ethnic
conflict and violence (Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Rustow, 1970; Lipset,
1959; Diamond & Linz, 1989; Skocpool & Goodwin, 1994). Ethnically diverse societies
usually tend to be set along deep ethnic cleavages rooted in historical divisions and
differences (Reilly, 2001). Hence, the lack of a system that fairly accommodates all
groups in diverse societies often leads to disagreements between groups (Reilly, 2001).
And because undemocratic options to reduce ethnic conflicts such as forcefully
suppressing ethnic groups or entirely eliminating them are ‘almost always worst’, any
arrangement to accommodate ethnic groups must come from a democratic framework
(Anderson, 2013).
However, there is little consensus on how to design a system that accommodates
ethnic societies. The consociational arrangement developed by Lijphart is one of the two
competing arrangements against the centripetalist approach developed by Horowitz.
Lijphart argues for power-sharing mechanism in ethnic societies among the elites based
on political compromise such as coalition building (1969). Horowitz on the other hand
argues for an incentive-based electoral system, which is predicated on rewarding different
ethnic groups to work together (2002). While both of these approaches have their pros
and cons, and regardless of which system works best, scholars agree that representing and
including all ethnic groups fairly contributes to the overall stability in ethnically diverse
societies (Lijphart, 1969, 1991; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Roeder & Rothchild, 2005; Sen
1999; Rustow, 1970; Dahl, Shapiro, & Cheibub, 2003).

164

The question this study attempted to answer was how ethnic inclusion impacts
regime stability in Afghanistan. The hypothesis was that ethnically inclusive regimes are
more likely to be stable. Scores were assigned on the dependent and independent
variables to illustrate the hypothesis. The first category of cases that scored the highest,
4’s and 3’s, on ethnic inclusion includes Habibullah Khan, Amanullah Khan, Zahir Shah
and Hamid Karzai’s respective regimes. These results are consistent with the literature as
all of those regimes are known to be ethnically inclusive of various ethnic groups to a
larger degree in government and political process.
Habibullah Khan inherited the throne and transitioned to power peacefully in
1901 after his father died (Barfield, 2010). He allowed political exiles to return, opened
up the system to all ethnic groups, and steered Afghanistan peacefully for nearly twenty
years until his assassination in 1919 (Barfield, 2010). Amanullah Khan’s rule was
similarly an open system where all ethnic groups were actively participated in the
government and bureaucracy. The amir ruled for nearly ten years despite facing multiple
rebellions but his regime was eventually brought down in civil war (Fletcher, 1965). And
lastly, Zahir Shah’s regime was also highly inclusive as he established a liberal
parliament, opened up the system to more political parties, and kept the internal stability
of the country for nearly forty years during his rule (Dupree, 1973).
The cases with the second highest scores, 2’s, on ethnic inclusion include Abdur
Rahman Khan, Nadir Khan and Najibullah Ahmadzai’s regimes. These regimes scored
relatively high on ethnic inclusion and stability because, as noted in the literature, they
similarly had a relatively mixed record on ethnic inclusion and stability. For instance,
although Abdur Rahman Khan recruited, hired and promoted personnel in his
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bureaucracy from minority ethnic groups such as the urbanized Tajiks, Uzbeks and
Hazaras, Sikh and Hindu generals in his army, his track record on ethnic inclusion was
primarily driven by self-interest and political gains (Fletcher, 1965). He only included
those groups in the government that had promised not to rebel against him and most often
oppressed, marginalized and intentionally left out different groups that he perceived as
threats to his rule (Mishali-Ram, 2008).
Nadir Khan also attempted to legitimize his rule by allowing a Loya Jirga
consisting of various ethnic groups to appoint the amir after he had ousted the Tajik
Kalakani from power (Fletcher, 1965). Nadir also established a constitution, which
allowed for a representative government to a greater degree. However, his persistence to
maintain the status quo was marred by resentment among the population that eventually
led to his assassination (Fletcher, 1965). Najibullah Ahmadzai was promoted to the head
of state internally without a fight, and he took some concrete steps in ensuring ethnic
representation and inclusion. He created the national reconciliation program by inviting
opposition to form a coalition government as well as opening up the PDPA to non-party
members, but all of these efforts eventually failed to materialize (Rasanayagam, 2003).
Najibullah held on to power for over five years but the civil war raged on and he was
eventually forced to resign (Rasanayagam, 2003).
The next category of cases that scored the second lowest, 1’s, on ethnic inclusion
include Daud Khan, Nur M. Tarakai, Babrak Karmal, and Burhanuddin Rabbani’s
respective regimes. Daud Khan’s regime is the only deviant case because it scored higher
on stability and lower on ethnic inclusion. This nuance is noted in the literature and can
be explained by the fact that Daud’s regime was more stable than it was inclusive. It was
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a single-party, exclusive government that heavily relied on the military to eliminate any
rivals and oppositions that threatened the status quo (Rasanyagam, 2003). He was able to
maintain tight control over the state by simultaneously holding various high positions
including the presidency, ministers of defense and interiors, and the commander in chief
of the army (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010).
Babrak Karmal similarly made attempts at reconciliation, calling for a national
Loya Jirga, and allowing more non-party representatives in the PDPA (Rasanayagam,
2003). However, all of these attempts failed to win him the broader support of the
Afghans and he was eventually removed from power by the Soviet Union as instability
continued during the civil war (Maley, 2009). Burhanuddin Rabbani and his Mujahideen
supporters also initially gave people hope of stability, peace and inclusion when they
formed a grand coalition government consisting of representatives from all major ethnic
groups. However, internal power struggles soon led to a civil war among the Mujahideen,
and any praise they had won for ousting the Soviet Union, quickly waned among the
population (Barfield, 2010).
The last category of cases include those which scored the lowest, 0’s, on ethnic
inclusion and were subsequently identified as the least ethnically inclusive and the most
unstable regimes. These regimes, which were highly exclusively, closely authoritarian
and made no attempt of ethnic inclusion, include Habibullah Kalakani, Hafizullah Amin
and Mullah Omar’s respective regimes. Kalakani, a bandit who ascended to the throne in
Kabul by overthrowing Amanullah Khan’s regime, established an exclusively small
bureaucracy run almost entirely by his friends, relatives and sympathizers (Fletcher,
1965). The first Tajik ruler to take over the central government in Kabul, Kalakani sent
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shock through the Pashtun hegemony that had been in power for centuries. However, his
time on the throne was continuously marred by a civil war, and less than a year in power,
he was captured and publicly executed (Barfield, 2010).
Hafizullah Amin outmaneuvered and assassinated his political rival Nur
Muhammad Tarakai and took control of the PDPA (Barfield, 2010). He ousted most of
his rivals from the government positions and filled the government with his Khalqi
loyalists (Barfield, 2010). However, he was able to rule for only a hundred days before
Soviet commandos assassinated him in his presidential palace (Rasanayagam, 2003). And
lastly, the Taliban’s Mullah Omar regime was also a highly exclusive regime, primarily
run and dominated by Kandahari Pashtuns. The Taliban regime grew from a small
military movement that eventually exercised complete control over the state
(Rasanayagam, 2003). The regime openly marginalized, oppressed and eliminated groups
for religious or political reasons. Mullah Omar was the supreme head of the theocratic
regime and spent his rule fighting a civil war in most of the country (Maley, 2009).
In conclusion, various trends appear from the analysis of the cases above. The
findings overall are consistent with the assumption that when a regime scored higher on
ethnic inclusion, it was more stable. As scores on ethnic inclusion decreased, regimes
tended to be less stable. Moreover, regimes that scored zeros on ethnic inclusion were
also the least stable. In general, in all the cases over the past hundred years, ethnicity had
an impact on the stability. This is consistent with the existing literature which stresses
that ethnicity has been a major force in all aspects driving religious, ideological,
geographic and linguistic differences in Afghan society (Mazhar et al., 2012; Sahar,
2014; Rubin, 1995; Adeney, 2008).
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Lastly, it is also necessary to revisit the strengths and limitations of case studies in
general and in the context of the present study. Case study methods are strong because
they achieve high conceptual validity by measuring concepts that are difficult to measure
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19). Moreover, case studies have the advantage of
identifying new hypotheses and explaining deviant or outlier cases (p. 20). Furthermore,
these methods allow a researcher to explore in-depth within-case analysis by the utilizing
multiple variables (p. 21). And finally, case studies have the advantage of explaining
complex causal relations (p. 22). The current study explored an in-depth historical period
analysis of ethnic inclusion and regime stability in Afghanistan and thus a comparative
case study design was selected as the appropriate method of research.
The trade-offs, limitations and pitfalls of case studies include case selection bias,
lack of a strong cause-and-effect relationship, lack of representativeness and
generalizability of results to a larger population (p. George & Bennett, 2005, p. 29). The
present study controls for selection bias because it includes all cases within the period
under study. Moreover, the present study applies process-tracing method to establish an
association between variables upon in-depth analysis, trends and patterns discovered in
the cases. For future research, a quantitative study with an extensive sample and more
variables would be useful to explore a causal relationship between ethnic inclusion and
regime stability over an extended period of history in Afghanistan.
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